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A b s t r a c t
Practice leads to performance gains in speed and accuracy. Investigations have 
indicated these may occur due to use of cognitive strategies. One such strategy, 
previously investigated with an Alphabet Verification task, is called Information 
Reduction (Haider and Frensch, 1996). It involves attending to and processing only 
information relevant to the task in hand. Information Reduction has been proposed 
to be consciously and abruptly adopted and applied consistently. However, it has 
been observed that not everyone makes use o f this strategy. This could be due to 
the nature o f the task, the conditions under which learning takes place or 
characteristics o f the participants.
Using new tasks developed for this study, plus post-testing questionnaires, 
further investigations were carried out. These confirmed Information Reduction is 
not a task-specific phenomenon, but demonstrated that the instructions and 
feedback given have considerable effects on whether irrelevant information in the 
stimuli is ignored. When instructed that a shortcut could improve performance, only 
one-third o f participants could verbalise Information Reduction use, although 
another third adopted it, apparently without awareness. Using Information 
Reduction without awareness is at odds with Haider and Frensch’s hypothesis about 
the mechanism. However, experiments testing transfer to other stimuli where the 
same regularity occurs or with similar stimuli obeying a slightly different rule 
suggested that conscious knowledge may be required for transfer to be successful.
One notable result from all experiments is that Information Reduction is 
often not used consistently. Whilst this may seem to be in line with the idea that it is 
consciously applied, it is not with other aspects of the proposed mechanism. Overall
it does seem to be less robust than has been suggested and there seems to be some 
way to go before an adequate theory to explain Information Reduction can be 
developed.
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C h ap ter  1 INTRODUCTION
There is an old adage which says that ‘practice makes perfect’ and our everyday 
experience is that tasks do become more easily, accurately and quickly performed 
after repeated practice. This performance improvement has been o f interest to 
psychologists for decades, from Bryan and Harter’s (1899) investigation o f rate of 
learning in telegraphy through to the present day. Psychologists are interested in 
elucidating the knowledge, processes and strategies which facilitate the 
improvements seen, and ultimately in devising ways in which learning might be 
optimised.
In learning, knowledge is acquired which leads to changes in behaviour and 
this can develop into a skill, that is, an accomplished, complex and organised pattern 
o f behaviour. Learning is something which usually takes time, although the amount 
o f time needed can vary enormously from one task to another. This can depend on 
factors such as the complexity o f the task, as well as processing differences between 
learners. On the whole learning occurs explicitly, particularly where a skill is 
concerned, although alongside the known learning there can be incidental or 
unintended learning. Some learning may occur implicitly, that is, it is considered to 
occur without conscious effort or possibly even awareness of what has been learned. 
One example o f implicit learning would be learning to speak grammatical sentences 
alongside learning to speak words.
Learning o f skills takes both time and repeated practice. All individuals 
develop, and become competent in, a variety o f skills throughout their lifetime, 
including ‘everyday’ cognitive skills such as the ability to use language, and motor 
skills, such as walking. In today’s societies most learn to read, write and perhaps 
drive a vehicle, and become reasonably proficient in these. A few may be considered
expert, that is, consistently, reproducibly and reliably superior performers, for 
example professional writers and motor racing drivers. Skill is needed in many 
occupations. Historically this was in trades such as carpentry or masonry, with 
apprentices learning ‘on-the-job’ from those who were already skilled. In the last 
century skills such as typing were taught initially in classrooms before the workplace 
was entered. Increasingly, skilled work involves monitoring and acting upon complex 
computer displays, for example in air-traffic control or electricity-generating stations. 
A common element to all these is the fact that the skill cannot develop from 
watching others, or from being given instructions, but requires the learner to actually 
perform the task regularly over a period o f time, in order to become faster and less 
error-prone.
The development of skill leads to changes in perception, cognition and motor 
responses (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). The time taken to improve 
speed and accuracy in any specific task varies between individuals and not everyone 
achieves the highest levels o f skill. It has become clear that general innate mental 
abilities such as IQ  or memory do not generally determine the level o f skill attained 
(see Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996, for a review), although these abilities may be 
important during learning. Studies have repeatedly found that, regardless o f domain, 
skill acquisition follows a similar pathway (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), which 
indicates that similar cognitive processes are operating. Central to this are the 
development of automatic processes, moving from the effortful, slow, serial and 
intentional processing of controlled tasks to effordess, fast, parallel and unintentional 
processing (Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). Any particular skill may involve several automatic processes, which 
need to be co-ordinated (Strayer & Kramer, 1994).
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Automation of cognitive processes may occur as a result o f repeated incoming 
data or repetition of the processes involved (Anderson, 1987; Logan, 1988;
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) and occurs regardless o f the 
task or domain. Since this automaticity develops from the incoming stimuli, it can be 
described as ‘bottom-up’ or data-driven, and is considered to be an inevitable result 
o f practice. The two main theories for the development o f automaticity in practice 
learning are the Production rules/algorithm-strengthening theory o f Anderson 
(1987), which involves procedural memory, and the Instance theory o f Logan (1988), 
which involves episodic memory. These theories and others around automaticity will 
be considered in the literature review (chapter 2). Logan theorises that many 
automatic processes may make use of single-step direct retrieval of the relevant 
response (Logan & Klapp, 1991) and depend on having encountered that particular 
stimulus before. Anderson’s theory suggests that it is the processing a stimulus 
receives which is automatised, although he has suggested that both proceduralisation 
and instance recall operate to varying degrees depending on the type o f stimuli being 
encountered (Anderson, Fincham, & Douglass, 1997). Intuitively, the use o f one 
over the other in different conditions seems plausible — m otor skills such as riding a 
bike use procedural memory, whereas cognitive skills like reading use ‘instances’ in 
declarative. As will be seen, the theories proposed suggest that the same information 
is processed but in a more efficient way, thus leading to improvements in 
performance.
Additionally processing can be strategically affected, that is, driven by stored 
knowledge (known as ‘top-down’). Developing strategies, either implicitly or 
explicitly, can enhance skilled performance. The development o f automaticity may be 
influenced by the interaction of data-driven and strategic processes (Strayer & 
Kramer, 1994). A strategy could be defined as a set o f operations which allow a
problem to be solved or a goal achieved more quickly and accurately than can be 
achieved with automatic processing alone. Strategies can be general and transferable 
from one task to another if they have the same stimulus-response conditions, or they 
can be stimulus- or task-specific and not transferable (Strayer & Kramer, 1994). One 
such strategy would be to attend and process only information that is relevant to the 
task in hand. Such a strategy will make more efficient use of limited cognitive 
resources and so is particularly useful in situations where a great deal o f information 
is available simultaneously. This has been reported, both anecdotally and empirically, 
in a number of areas. Examples of experimental and applied areas include visual 
search (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), air traffic control (Lee & Anderson, 2001; 
Niessen, Eyferth, & Bierwagen, 1999) and radiology (Kundel, Nodine, Conant, & 
Weinstein, 2007). It may also be used in more ‘everyday’ situations such as 
processing of labels on food packaging (Gaschler, Mata, Stormer, Kuhnel, & Bilalic, 
2010) and shopping online (Gaschler, Marewski, & Frensch, 2015).
1.1 In f o r m a t io n  R e d u c t io n
This strategy of learning, over the course of practice, to ignore irrelevant or 
redundant information at a perceptual level has been termed Information Reduction. 
It has been investigated experimentally (Gaschler & Frensch, 2007; Gaschler & 
Frensch, 2009; Gaschler et al., 2015; Green & Wright, 2003; Haider & Frensch,
1996; Haider & Frensch, 1999a; Haider & Frensch, 1999b; Haider, Frensch, & 
Joram, 2005), mainly using a task where participants were required to check whether 
a sequence of letters was alphabetically correct or not. This is known as the Alphabet 
Verification task, and will be described in more detail in Chapter 3. Each stimulus 
consisted o f an ordered string of letters where either four or five letters after the 
initial letter were replaced by the bracketed digit (4):
4
D [4] I 4 letters replaced = correct string, ‘triplet’ only
H [4] N  O P Q 5 letters replaced = incorrect string
The task was a two-alternative forced choice response determining whether it was 
four letters which had been omitted, giving a ‘correct’ response, or five letters, giving 
an ‘incorrect’ response. Participants were instructed that errors could occur anywhere 
in the entire string, so initially verification times varied systematically with the 
number o f letters in the string. However, if participants learned over the course of 
practice that they needed to check only the initial letter-digit-letter triplet and could 
ignore any trailing letters, the verification time for longer strings would decline to 
equivalence with the shorter strings — a reduction in the ‘string-length effect’. After 
training it was possible to examine if the trailing letters were being ignored by 
administering a test block where in some strings the triplet was correct but the 
trailing letters, previously irrelevant, started to contain alphabetic inaccuracies. Many 
participants responded that these ‘irregular’ strings were correct, indicating they were 
only processing the (correct) triplet and ignoring the (incorrect) trailing letters. 
Consequendy there was a high rate o f errors to these strings. Other participants 
noticed the change in position o f the errors and reverted to checking the whole 
string, causing a return o f the string-length effect.
Results from the various experiments have indicated that:
•  the strategy can be implicidy learned, it is not necessary to inform people o f 
the redundancy (Haider & Frensch, 1996)
•  once implemented the strategy is used for all stimuli of that type and that it 
can be transferred to structurally very similar stimuli, suggesting that it is not 
stimulus-specific (Haider & Frensch, 1996; Haider et al., 2005)
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• speed instructions may cause it to be adopted more quickly whereas accuracy 
instructions can slow rate of acquisition (Haider & Frensch, 1999b)
• stimuli need to consistently incorporate irrelevant information during 
training for Information Reduction to develop (Gaschler & Frensch, 2009; 
Haider et al., 2005), although the number of times each individual stimulus is 
encountered overall does not affect strategy adoption
• it is reportable (Haider & Frensch, 1999a; Haider et al., 2005)
•  it is not an artefact o f left-to-right reading (Green & Wright, 2003; Haider & 
Frensch, 1999a).
Although some of these results can be accounted for by Instance theory, the 
Production rules theory or a combination o f both, others rule out these theories of 
automaticity as a sole explanation o f the performance improvement seen. Instance 
theory cannot account for the item-generality found in Information Reduction 
(Doane, Sohn, & Schreiber, 1999; Gaschler & Frensch, 2007; Haider et al., 2005). 
Anderson’s theory is item-general and so can accommodate transfer to novel stimuli 
but cannot account for apparently conscious aspects o f the strategy, such as the 
effect o f changing the task instruction (Haider & Frensch, 1999b). A combination of 
the two might conceivably account for both item-generality and the effects o f change 
instructions, particularly when considering precisely what an instance may contain 
and whether the instances activated have to be identical to the stimulus, or just 
contain similarities. However, neither theory can account for changes at the 
perceptual level, which an eye-tracking experiment has demonstrated (Haider & 
Frensch, 1999a) and has also been inferred from other experimental results (e.g. 
Green & Wright, 2003).
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Consequently, Haider and Frensch (1999b) have proposed a two-stage 
Information Reduction hypothesis. The first stage o f Information Reduction 
(relevance detection) is considered to be implicit and data-driven, whereas the 
second (information selection) is strategically and consciously applied. Haider and 
Frensch have suggested that Information Reduction:
• is a general and non-domain-specific learning process that is not an 
inevitable consequence o f practice
•  may operate in addition to other learning mechanisms
• is used consistently on all stimuli o f the same type from the point of 
adoption onwards, even if the actual instance has not previously been 
encountered
•  is abruptly adopted, rather than gradually, although the switch occurs 
at different times for each individual, meaning that when the learning 
curves are aggregated, the normal power law curve is seen (Haider & 
Frensch, 2002).
The results from the various experiments, deductions from these and potential 
theories around how a person becomes aware o f the strategy will be considered in 
more detail in the literature review (chapter 2).
1.2 D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  r e s e a r c h  q u e s t io n s
Results from some experiments indicate that only around half o f participants 
adopt the Information Reduction strategy in the Alphabet Verification task (Haider 
& Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 2005). Those who adopt Information Reduction have 
been referred to as ‘reducers’, with those not using it called ‘non-reducers’. 
Additionally, results o f post-testing questions suggest that not all reducers are
7
consciously aware that parts of the stimulus are irrelevant to the task (Haider & 
Frensch, 2005). There are some hints in the literature of factors which could be 
involved in some being reducers and others non-reducers, including individual 
differences (Sohn, Doane, & Garrison, 2006); use o f other strategies (Doane et al., 
1999); and training conditions (Gaschler & Frensch, 2009; Haider & Frensch, 1999b; 
Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider & Frensch, 2005). If  Information Reduction is an 
abrupdy and consistendy adopted strategy, as has been suggested (Gaschler & 
Frensch, 2009; Haider & Frensch, 2002), then it should be possible to determine 
who is using it and who is not. At the start of the study for this thesis it was noted 
that the Information Reduction hypothesis had been derived from results using only 
the Alphabet Verification task. This could mean that the hypothesis was based on 
aspects of this task unique and artefactual to it and that in fact the proposed 
Information Reduction process is not a general learning process.
Having considered the published research, it seemed that further investigation 
o f Information Reduction would add to the body o f knowledge around this 
phenomenon. It would appear to be a useful and adaptive mechanism for focussing 
attention on relevant aspects o f the world, but potentially could also lead to 
problems if the irrelevant information becomes relevant at any point. Thus it might 
be ‘safer’ and more adaptive to be a non-reducer, at least in certain situations. A 
number o f areas for possible research were developed, which together could 
contribute to exploring what factors might be involved in determining whether or 
not individuals adopt the Information Reduction strategy, and the level o f conscious 
awareness of the strategy amongst reducers.
The research questions to be explored were:
•  is Information Reduction a mechanism o f human learning or merely an 
artefact o f the Alphabet Verification task?
•  is it possible to identify those using the Information Reduction strategy from 
the experimental data (error rates and response times) and from self-reports?
• do manipulations o f task and /or training conditions affect the number of 
people adopting an Information Reduction strategy?
• what, if anything, can be learned about the conscious nature o f the strategy 
from manipulations of training conditions and testing participants’ conscious 
knowledge post-testing?
• are there any processing or personality differences which point to whether 
someone will be a reducer or a non-reducer?
As well as potentially being able to inform occupational training, these 
questions have implications for the Information Reduction hypothesis. I f  it proves 
to be an artefact o f the Alphabet Verification task then alternative reasons for the 
apparent ignoring o f irrelevant parts o f stimuli in other fields would need to be 
sought. If  the adoption rates vary with different tasks or training conditions, then 
this could be evidence for Information Reduction being a conscious process, which 
can be used when the individual feels it gives an advantage — although the point at 
which this is true may differ between individuals. However, if manipulations o f task 
and training reveal that Information Reduction is only used by a sub-set o f people, 
then this would indicate that it is not a general learning process and exploration o f 
why not everyone appears to have this strategy at their disposal would be indicated.
1.3 St r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  t h e s is
The next chapter is a literature review, looking at some of the background to 
practice and implicit learning and the theoretical propositions derived from studies in 
it, before moving on to examine the evidence for strategy development in a variety 
of tasks. Experiments which have examined Information Reduction will be
considered in some depth and finally the issue o f processing and personality 
differences between groups of people will be explored.
In chapter 3 the methodology o f the experiments will be considered, before 
moving on to the various experiments performed themselves, in chapters 4-9. All 
experiments were followed up by a questionnaire designed to elicit whether 
participants were aware o f the regularity and if they made a conscious decision to use 
it or not. The first experiment tested three tasks which could potentially lead to 
Information Reduction: a multiple-triplet version o f the Alphabet Verification task, a 
shapes task and a target search task (the last originally developed by Edmunds,
2005). Having established that all these tasks could be used to investigate the 
strategy, the two unique to this study were carried forward. Experiment 1 then 
became a control for the other experiments to determine the effect o f the various 
manipulations. In Experiments 2 and 3 training conditions were varied by changing 
the feedback given and by emphasising speed over accuracy. Conscious awareness 
was further tested in Experiment 4 by informing participants that some people find a 
shortcut to enable faster responses and asking them to indicate if they had done so, 
at which point one further training block was given before the test block. 
Experiment 5 looked at the issue o f transfer from one set of stimuli to another, 
firstly a ‘near transfer’ situation where the rule for which information was relevant 
remained the same, although the stimuli altered, and secondly a ‘far transfer’ where 
the rule changed.
Chapter 8 explores some processing and personality differences, known as
individual differences, which were examined alongside Experiments 4 and 5. These
encompass personality factors such as the ‘Big 5’ o f agreeableness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience, as well as
related factors like impulsivity and distractibility. More cognitively related factors
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explored were trust in memory and a measure o f ‘cognitive miserliness’. Finally, 
chapter 10 will summarise the findings overall, discussing them in relation to theory 
and considering ways in which the research could be extended, as the results suggest 
that Information Reduction is less robust than had previously been noted. Neither 
the hypotheses proposed by Haider and Frensch about the mechanism of 
Information Reduction, nor the existing theories o f automaticity, are sufficient to 
explain the strategy, and a theory o f practice learning which incorporates both data- 
driven automaticity and top-down controlled processes may provide a better overall 
explanation.
1 1
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this review some o f the background to practice and implicit learning and the 
theoretical propositions derived from studies in it will be considered, before moving 
on to examine the evidence for strategy development in a variety o f tasks. This leads 
into outlining the experiments using the Alphabet Verification task. Finally, the issue 
o f processing and personality differences between groups o f people, known as 
individual differences, will be explored.
2.1 L e a r n in g  l e a d s  t o  skill  d e v e l o p m e n t
Both explicit and implicit learning have been implicated in skill acquisition. 
Explicit learning often takes place under the guidance o f a teacher, for example 
within a school or in an apprenticeship situation, and requires attention to all aspects 
o f the task as well as practice. Implicit learning by definition occurs without 
conscious awareness o f what is being learned, although some attention is paid to the 
stimulus. This section considers further the role o f practice in developing not just 
skill but also expertise, the way that measures o f improvement all point to common 
learning mechanisms and also some o f the evidence for implicit learning.
2.1.1 Investigating practice and expertise
It is generally accepted that to become skilled in some field one has to invest
both time and effort, and that the skill needs to be repeatedly and regularly practised
for both acquisition and maintenance. Psychologists have been investigating the
speed and accuracy changes in performance that develop from practice for well over
a century. Learning seems to progress through the same stages, whether the skill
being developed is perceptual-motor or ‘intellectual’ (Rosenbaum, Carlson, &
Gilmore, 2001). These stages are considered to be: declarative, when the basics of
the task are being learned; associative, when the procedures o f the task become more
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fluent; and finally autonomous, when the procedures become automatic and less 
susceptible to disruption from external events (Anderson, 1982). It has been found 
that regardless o f task the rate o f skill acquisition shows the same pattern. Section
2.1.2 looks more closely at this ‘power law’ as it has become known.
Some people can become highly skilled at a task and considered to be experts 
in that particular domain. It is often stated that expertise takes 10 years of methodical 
and sustained practice to develop (Simon & Chase, 1973) and this has been noted in 
many domains, such as medicine (Norman, Eva, Brooks, & Hamstra, 2006), 
mathematics (Butterworth, 2006), sports (Hodges, Starkes, & MacMahon, 2006), 
performing arts (Ericsson et al., 1993) and strategy games (Feltovich, Prietula and 
Ericsson, 2006), although this is not necessarily the case for all skills or all 
practitioners. Ericsson and colleagues have carried out a number of studies in the 
area of expertise. Their results, from testing expert and amateur pianists, indicate that 
superior performance is a result o f domain-specific mechanisms rather than general 
cognitive-motor abilities. They contend that variations seen in individuals’ 
performance levels in a wide range o f domains are directly related to the accumulated 
amount o f deliberate practice undertaken (Ericsson et al., 1993). Deliberate practice 
involves specifically aiming to improve, perhaps incorporating feedback from an 
instructor. Nonetheless, not all individuals achieve the highest levels o f performance. 
It may be that personality and other factors such as ‘talent’, ‘interest’ or ‘motivation’ 
act to predispose individuals to undertake and maintain deliberate practice and 
enable them to become highly skilled in their field.
Ericsson et al. consider that practice changes basic perceptual, cognitive and 
m otor abilities and that this is the main factor driving the development of expertise. 
Perceptual-motor changes have been detected in reading and also sight-reading in 
musicians (Lehmann and Gruber, 2006). A cognitive aspect of skill acquisition is the
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storing of domain-specific knowledge which enables experts “to encode meaningful 
relations between the elements of the stimuli” (Ericsson et al., 1993, p396). Studies have 
shown that skilled performers and experts are able to store and access relevant 
information in long-term memory more rapidly than those with less skill. This has 
led Ericsson to propose a theory o f long-term working memory. Some theories 
relating to cognitive changes will be considered in section 2.2 and long-term working 
memory will be elaborated in section 2.2.6. In m otor skills, future events are 
anticipated and planned for in advance — this can be seen in domains such as touch 
typing (Salthouse, 1986) and tennis (Farrow, Chivers, Hardingham and Sachse,
1998).
The cognitive, physiological and perceptual-motor adaptations that occur as a 
result o f practice may be specific to the particular skill or domain, meaning that skill 
in one domain will not transfer to another, even an apparently similar one. This has 
been noted within the domains of strategy games (Feltovich et al., 2006), surgery 
(Norman et al., 2006), sport (Hodges et al., 2006) and music (Lehmann and Gruber, 
2006). Early psychology experiments also suggested that transfer does not occur 
(Woodworth & Thorndike, 1901). However, many subsequent experiments have 
shown that positive transfer can occur, with the skill helping to maintain or improve 
performance in a second task (Chein & Morrison, 2010; Chen & Klahr, 1999; 
Karbach & Kray, 2009; McAllister, 1953; Schwager, Runger, Gaschler, & Frensch, 
2012; Singley & Anderson, 1985). The stimuli, the task, the responses and the 
generality o f any strategy employed, as well as the nature o f the practice involved and 
the shared nature o f the procedural memory productions required, determine 
whether, or how successfully, transfer occurs (Adams, 1987; Barnett & Ceci, 2002; 
Speelman & Kirsner, 1997; Strayer & Kramer, 1994; Taatgen, 2013).
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It is  c lear  th a t p r a c tic e  p la y s  a r o le  in  all ty p e s  o f  sk ill a c q u is it io n  an d  
p articu lar ly  in  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  e x p e r t ise . P r a c tic e  is  r eq u ired  to  crea te  th e  
k n o w le d g e  b a se  o n  w h ic h  sk ill r e s id e s , as w e ll  as to  d r iv e  p h y s io lo g ic a l an d  
p e r c e p tu a l-m o to r  c h a n g e s  th a t  e n a b le  b e tte r  p e r fo r m a n c e .
2.1.2 The Power Law
A s  n o te d  in  s e c t io n  2 .1 .1  th e  in c r e a se  in  s p e e d  a n d  a ccu ra cy  s e e n  as sk ill 
d e v e lo p s  o v e r  t im e  h a s  b e e n  n o te d  to  fo l lo w  a s im ilar  c u r v e  r eg a rd le ss  o f  th e  task . 
P h is  h a s b e e n  d e d u c e d  b v  s e t t in g  regu lar  t im e d  te s ts  as s o m e o n e  lea rn s  a sk ill e .g . 
B ryan  a n d  H a r ter ’s stu d y  o f  te le g r a p h y  (1 8 9 9 ) o r  C h a p m a n ’s s tu d y  o f  ty p e w r it in g  
(1 9 1 9 ) , o r  b y  c r e a tin g  a n o v e l  ta sk  w h ic h  is  p r a c tise d  rep e a te d ly  in  a re la t iv e ly  sh o r t  
s p a c e  o f  t im e , a g a in  w ith  regu lar  te s t in g  d u r in g  th e  a c q u is it io n  o f  th e  sk ill, e .g . 
S n o d d y ’s m irror d r a w in g  ta sk  (1 9 2 6 ) o r  K o le r ’s r e a d in g  o f  in v e r te d  te x t  (1 9 7 5 ).
In  s o m e  in s ta n c e s  an  in d iv id u a l’s c u r v e  m a y  s h o w  a p la tea u  a n d  a lth o u g h  s o m e  
h a v e  ca lled  in to  q u e s t io n  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th is  p la tea u  (K e ller , 1 9 5 8 ) , o th e r  th e o r is ts  
b e lie v e  th a t it in d ic a te s  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f ,  o r  a c h a n g e  in , a stra teg y , e n a b lin g  fa ster  
a n d  m o r e  a ccu ra te  p e r fo r m a n c e . T h e  p o in t  at w h ic h  su c h  d is c o n t in u it ie s  o c c u r  v a r ie s  
b e tw e e n  in d iv id u a ls  s o  th a t w h e n  a g g reg a ted  data  is p lo t te d  a s m o o t h  c u r v e  is 
o b ta in e d . A  lo g a r ith m ic  sc a le  p lo t  r e su lts  in  a stra ig h t lin e . F ig u res  2 .1 a n d  2 .2  
illu s tra te  a ty p ica l c u r v e  o f  h o w  a g g reg a ted  p e r fo r m a n c e  c h a n g e s  w ith  t im e  in  a 
p r a c tic e  le a r n in g  stu d y , a n d  h o w  lo g a r ith m ic  tr a n s fo r m a tio n  re su lts  in  a stra ig h t lin e .
Figure 2.1: Increase in num ber  
o f  w ords typed in 5 m inutes  
over hours o f  practice. T aken  
from  C hapm an (1919)
I
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Figure 2.2: C um ulative learning  
curves in lo g -lo g  co-ord inates  
from  various studies. R ep lotted  
by S teven s and Savin (1962)
1 to 100 tooo
AMOUNT OF PRACTICE (ARBITRARY UNITS)
T h is  w a s  fo rm a lly  n o te d  b y  N e w e l l  a n d  R o s e n b lo o m  (1 9 8 1 ) a n d  th e y  re fe r  to  it  
as th e  ‘p o w e r  la w  o f  p r a c t ic e ’. It is  n o w  a c c e p te d  th a t an y  th e o r y  w h ic h  p u r p o r ts  to  
e x p la in  p r a c tic e  le a r n in g  h a s to  b e  a b le  to  a c c o m m o d a te  th e  p o w e r  law . S o m e  
th e o r ie s  w h ic h  d o  th is  are o u t l in e d  in  s e c t io n  2 .2 . N e w e l l  an d  R o s e n b lo o m  
c o n c lu d e d  fr o m  e x a m in a t io n  o f  a n u m b e r  o f  s tu d ie s  p u b lis h e d  o v e r  th e  y ea rs  th a t  
th e  la w  h o ld s  fo r  all k in d s  o f  p ra c tice  learn in g : p e r c e p tu a l o n ly , m a in ly  m o to r ,  
p e r c e p tu a l-m o to r  a n d  ta sk s w h ic h  are m a in ly  c o g n it iv e , in v o lv in g  m e m o r y  o r  
p r o b le m  so lv in g . T h e y  a lso  say  th a t it  h o ld s  fo r  v a r io u s  fo r m s  o f  p e r fo r m a n c e  
criteria  — s p e e d  a n d  accu ra cy  b e in g  th e  c o m m o n e s t  m e a su r e s  - a n d  th a t it c a n  b e  
d e m o n s tr a te d  w ith  e ith e r  in d iv id u a l o r  g r o u p  data . T h is  all p o in t s  to w a r d s  th ere  
b e in g  c o m m o n  m e c h a n is m s  u n d e r ly in g  all p r a c tic e  lea r n in g , an d  th e o r ie s  a b o u t  th e s e  
p r o c e s s e s  are d e sc r ib e d  in  s e c t io n  2 .2 .
2.1.3 Implicit learning
It h a s  b e e n  su g g e s te d  th a t a lo n g s id e  th e  e x p lic it  lea rn in g  w h ic h  re su lts  fr o m  
a tte n t io n  b e in g  g iv e n  to  th e  v a r io u s  s t im u li a n d  r e s p o n s e s , im p lic it  le a r n in g  m a y  b e  
in v o lv e d  in  th e  a c q u is it io n  o f  sk ill. Im p lic it  le a r n in g  is le a r n in g  th a t o c c u r s  w it h o u t  
th e  e x p lic it  in t e n t io n  to  learn  a n d  o f t e n  w ith o u t  a w a r e n e ss  o f  w h a t  h a s b e e n  le a r n e d  
(F r e n sc h  &  H u n g er , 2 0 0 3 )  o r  th e  a b ility  to  e x p r e s s  th e  le a r n in g  (D ie n e s  &  B erry , 
1 9 9 7 ). Im p lic it  lea rn in g  w a s  first su g g e s te d  as a m e c h a n is m  fo r  im p r o v e m e n ts  in  an  
artific ia l g ra m m a r  task . T h is  u se d  a s tr in g  o f  le t te r s  w h ic h  fo l lo w  an  u n d e r ly in g  ‘r u le ’,
although the task was presented simply as a memory task (e.g. Reber, 1967). 
Subsequendy implicit learning has been implicated in other tasks such as serial 
reaction time (SRT) tasks where a longer-than-normal-digit-span repeating sequence 
is used, to which participants have to respond with key presses (e.g Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987). Less error-prone learning o f the ‘sentences’ than a control group, 
better-than-chance ability to distinguish grammatical strings from non-grammatical 
ones or slower response times (RT) when the sequence is disrupted are taken as 
indicators that implicit learning of the underlying structure has occurred. In grammar 
learning tasks some practice is involved but this may not be extensive with perhaps 
just 30 strings o f various lengths presented (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007) before 
moving on to the test phase. SRT tasks, on the other hand, may require several 
‘training’ blocks with a hundred or more trials in each. This suggests that implicit 
learning may have a role to play in practice learning.
Implicit learning is generally considered to be an elementary, obligatory and 
unintentional ability to extract structure from the environment as a result of 
processing events or stimuli within it (Jimenez, 2003), where either stimulus 
dimensions relevant to processing or responses or both are selectively attended. 
Implicit learning is thought to be both independent of, and dissociated from, 
awareness (Shanks, 2003), since it results in behaviour that is not consciously 
attributed to learning (Jimenez, 2003). Jimenez considers implicit learning to be 
something which can affect the whole of cognition, including our representations of 
the world, as well as behaviour and possibly consciousness, and may not be a 
separate system to explicit learning. Implicit learning has been suggested as a 
mechanism by which strategies may develop, where repeated patterns or 
relationships between the stimuli may lend themselves to more efficient processing 
(Haider & Frensch, 1996).
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However, implicit learning is hard to define and operationalise theoretically 
(Frensch & Riinger, 2003) and the evidence is equivocal as to whether it occurs 
independently o f attention or that any implicidy learned knowledge is not 
accompanied by some level o f awareness (Shanks, 2003). Questions have also been 
asked about what exactly is implicidy learned (Shanks, 2005). It may be that the 
participant has merely explicitly learned some pairs or triplets o f adjacent letters or 
parts o f the sequence and an explanation o f this nature could then be accommodated 
in, for example, Logan’s instance theory (see section 2.2.3), without the need to 
invoke different learning mechanisms. Memorising fragments could also account for 
why the participants do not seem to be aware o f the gross regularities but can only 
verbally report small patterns. N ot all presented sequences may be learned, or it may 
not be the regularities in the stimulus which are learned but the regularity in the 
responses (Riedel & Burton, 2006). Using spoken words which followed a regular 
recurring sequence on two dimensions (colour words and voice used, with different 
sequences for each), they established that only the sequence which had to be 
responded to was learned. Riedel and Burton suggest that this indicates that implicit 
learning is tied to peripheral processes, not central cognitive processes. Nonetheless 
an extensive literature exists which suggests that implicit learning occurs and 
attempts to determine the processes behind it.
Once implicit learning has occurred, then there may be some explicit 
awareness o f what has been learned. For example some participants may be able to 
report fragments o f the grammar, or parts o f the sequence (Curran & Keele, 1993; 
Lambert & Roser, 2001; Schwager et al., 2012; Zirngibl & Koch, 2002). The question 
then arises of how or when the implicit knowledge becomes available to conscious, 
declarative processes. A number of theoretical positions have been suggested for 
this, which will be considered next.
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2.1.3.1 E xplicit and im plicit learning system s are separate
and independent
This position suggests reportable knowledge exists because the explicit system, 
as well as the implicit, has been involved in the learning, although the learning occurs 
separately. Some theorists additionally separate attention from awareness and suggest 
there are three types o f sequence learning (Curran & Keele, 1993). These are: non- 
attentional, which operates by simple associations, attentional with awareness and 
attentional without awareness. The latter two have a mechanism for encoding the 
position of an event in a sequence. It is suggested that the attentional and 
nonattentional systems do not share information, although they may share common 
components at the implementational level.
Explicit and implicit learning may occur in parallel when there are physical 
responses given to stimuli (Curran & Keele, 1993; Willingham & Goedert- 
Eschmann, 1999). It is suggested that the explicit knowledge guides movement and 
that a conscious explicit process supports behaviour until the simultaneously learned 
implicit representation is sufficiently well developed, at which point the explicit 
process is no longer used (Willingham & Goedert-Eschmann, 1999). Cleeremans 
(1993) has suggested that explicit knowledge serves as input for the implicit learning 
mechanism. He concluded, from a comparison between groups given a hint or not 
to find a regularity, that reportable knowledge may be influenced by individual 
differences in attention allocation and short-term memory capacity, accounting for 
the fact that the amount of reportable knowledge varies between participants.
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2.1.3.2 Im plicit knowledge can be transformed into
reportable knowledge
This position derives from work with connectionist networks and suggests that 
it is the strength o f the representation which determines whether it is explicitly 
available or not (Cleeremans and Jimenez, 2002). Implicit and explicit knowledge lie 
on a continuum and are aspects o f a single set of underlying neural mechanisms. In 
order for knowledge to be available to conscious awareness and be reported verbally 
the representations need to be strong, stable and distinct (Frensch et al., 2003). As 
the cognitive system processes the stimuli over time, the weights between the units 
o f the network are continually adjusted and come to capture the correlational 
structure o f the task. As the task is practised, the representations become stronger 
and available to verbal report, although this may also need attention and other 
processes integrating the activity o f different brain regions. With more practice the 
representations become very strong and automatic, that is, it is difficult to alter their 
influence on processing, but there is metaknowledge o f their existence and effect 
(Cleeremans and Jimenez, 2002). Variability in reportable knowledge occurs because 
different people have different thresholds for when the representation is strong 
enough to be available to consciousness.
An alternative view which assumes implicit knowledge is the starting point is 
that reportable knowledge depends on which aspects o f knowledge (the 
propositional attitude) get represented (Dienes & Perner, 1999) — that is, whether 
there is awareness that knowledge is possessed or awareness o f what that knowledge 
is (Dienes & Berry, 1997).
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2.1.3.3 Verbal report derives from conscious examination
o f behaviour
This position, known as the Unexpected-Event hypothesis (Frensch et al., 
2003), builds on the fitst two theories in order to consider the mechanisms involved 
in the acquisition o f reportable knowledge and why some participants can report 
regularities and others cannot. It suggests that an unexpected event, such as a feeling 
of familiarity or a rapid m otor response prior to the processing o f a stimulus (or 
even the appearance of a stimulus in the SRT), triggers an intentional search for an 
explanation o f that event by an explicit reasoning system. In other words, explicit 
hypothesis testing drives attentional strategies to examine the structure of the task. 
Once a causal factor has been identified, such as the fact the stimuli are appearing in 
a regular sequence (SRT) or that the trailing letters are redundant to the task 
(Alphabet Verification task), then this phenomenonal awareness enables verbal 
report o f the regularity, as well as transforming the implicit knowledge into explicit.
If  a regularity is identified the participant is able to apply their knowledge in order to 
reduce RTs from then onwards. Their RT data will show a discontinuity at that point 
and will no longer fit a power function. Using data from six participants (Haider & 
Frensch, 2002) and also re-analysing earlier Alphabet Verification task data, as well as 
using the Number Reduction Task, Haider and Frensch were able to demonstrate 
that in general those who showed a discontinuity could report the regularity, whereas 
those who did not, could not. They strongly believe that it is knowledge o f the 
regularity which precedes the discontinuity and that this is shown by increased RT 
variances in the block preceding the discontinuity, as the hypothesis testing occurs. 
They presented empirical evidence to support this position. Any variable which 
affects the implicit learning system should also affect the verbal report (if it has not
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been learned, it cannot be reported), but variables affecting the reasoning system 
should not affect the implicit learning.
This section has outlined the central importance o f practice in the 
improvements noted in speed and accuracy and considered that some learning may 
be implicit. It has also been established that whilst common processes underlie 
practice learning, the rate o f learning, the application of strategies and the amount o f 
implicit knowledge which is also explicit may vary amongst individuals. The next 
section will consider some theoretical explanations for the cognitive changes which 
enable enhanced performance.
2.2 T h e o r e t ic a l  b a c k g r o u n d
Studies in practice learning point to there being underlying cognitive changes 
occurring as a task is practised. The changes occur after many encounters with the 
same stimuli or from using the same procedures repeatedly and result in faster and 
more accurate processing.
‘The process of skill acquisition involves some form of specialisation that creates
efficient knowledge specificfor a particular task ” (Taatgen, 2013, p440)
Many changes are data-driven and therefore £bottom-up’ and involuntary. A number 
o f theoretical models have been proposed to account for these performance 
changes. Firstly automatic processes will be considered, before moving on to two 
theories which have been proposed to explain how automaticity occurs, followed by 
some theories about how the stored information is organised.
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2.2.1 Automatic processes
When a task, such as reading or learning to drive, is first encountered it has to 
be tackled in a conscious and controlled way (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin 
and Schneider, 1977), with every element attended and subjected to cognitive 
processing. For instance, each letter has to be sounded out before being combined to 
make the word or sequences o f muscle movements have to be produced to change 
gear and so on. Controlled processing is considered to be effortful, slow, serial and 
intentional (Moors and De Houwer, 2006). As the task is practised, performance 
becomes faster and less error-prone and this has been explained by automation of 
cognitive processes. Automaticity has been invoked as an explanation for 
performance gains in practice learning from the earliest studies — Bryan and Harter 
note that “Only when all the necessary habits, high and low, have become automatic, does one rise 
into the freedom and speed of the expert. ” (1899, p357). Automaticity can be defined as 
involuntarily processing a stimulus or stimuli without conscious control. In 
psychological terms it is assumed to be a way to free up resources from a limited 
capacity system, allowing two or more tasks to be carried out simultaneously. 
Automaticity is considered to be unconscious, effortless, fast and obligatory (Moors 
and De Houwer, 2006). Automaticity generally develops through learning and 
practice and amongst other things is thought to give rise to such phenomena as the 
Stroop effect (MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; Stroop, 1935). Development of 
automaticity leads to changes in attention, awareness, control, speed and accuracy 
(Moors & De Houwer, 2006).
The seminal work of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) 
formalised the thinking on automatic processes, which they contrast with controlled 
processing. Following a series o f experiments with variants of the serial search 
paradigm, testing either accuracy or response times, they concluded that if the same
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stimuli, requiring a consistent response, are encountered regularly then automaticity 
develops. The stimuli are attended to and processed without conscious control, 
enabling faster and more accurate processing — in other words the development of 
skilled performance. Automatic processes are considered difficult to “suppress, modify 
or ignore” {Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, pl27). Concurrent inputs will not be attended 
to and in fact, effort is needed to switch attention to them if necessary. O n the other 
hand automatic selection means that the process is insensitive to distracters, however 
many there are o f them.
Two learning mechanisms which have been proposed to explain how 
automaticity develops are the Production rules/algorithm-strengthening view of 
Anderson and the single-step direct memory retrieval model of Logan, which will be 
described next.
2.2.2 Production rule architectures
Anderson (1987) proposed that practice results in knowledge being transferred 
from declarative to procedural memory and that continuing practice strengthens the 
trace to the stored procedure so its use becomes automatic. Anderson’s theory is 
process-based not item-based and the process or algorithm must be consistent for 
automaticity to develop. Anderson’s theory is based on a symbolic computer model 
(ACT*, later developed to ACT-R) and is a modular domain-general learning theory 
which suggests that practice results in elaborate cognitive skills becoming encoded in 
procedural memory as a set o f domain-specific “if . . .then” production rules. The 
productions specify under what circumstances a cognitive act is needed and what 
should occur (Anderson, 1982). A series of productions corresponds to the steps in a 
cognitive process for performing the task. The production rules are matched to the 
sensory data and content o f working memory in order to modify working memory or
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initiate motor output to enable performance in that situation (Muller, 1999; Taatgen, 
2013).
Further practice can result in productions relating to sub-goals becoming 
collapsed together (‘composed’) to create a new production, making the processing 
faster and reducing errors. This also frees up working memory, which no longer 
needs to hold the declarative knowledge whilst the problem is being worked on. 
Each time a production is successfully applied it acquires strength and the strength 
determines the speed with which it can be used. Anderson contends that this 
strengthening mechanism follows the power-function speedup in skill performance. 
The model proposes a variety of modules which Anderson has mapped onto 
particular cortical regions and has been used to predict activity during an equation 
solving task (Anderson, Fincham, Qin, & Stocco, 2008). This theory is based very 
much on the computer programming metaphor.
This model has been further developed into the Acttransfer model based on 
the primitive elements theory (Taatgen, 2013) in order to accommodate and account 
for results o f both near and far transfer experiments, in which the productions need 
to be applied to different stimuli from those on which they were formed. The 
primitive elements theory breaks down production rules into their smallest possible 
elements, which are mostly task-general rather than task-specific. There are a limited 
number o f these PRIMs, related to comparing or moving pieces of information 
within the global workspace, and they are combined to build production rules. Some 
production rules may be task-general, others may be task-specific. There are also 
intermediate partial rules, which are task-general. Each person will form their own 
sub-set o f task-general productions from all those available, which explains why 
individual performances can vary. The theory assumes that it is the development of
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skills and strategies which enables transfer between tasks; if none o f these overlap 
between tasks then transfer will not occur.
2.2.3 Instance Theory
Logan (1988) developed the instance theory of automaticity, which suggests 
that skill depends on automatic retrieval o f stored instances from a domain-specific 
knowledge base; an instance having been stored each time the task is practised. This 
theory is item-specific and relies on the stimuli being consistent. Logan proposes that 
automaticity involves a shift from algorithm based processing to one-step retrieval 
from memory. He believes that encoding and retrieval occur automatically and 
unavoidably if some level o f attention has been paid to the stimulus, although the 
amount of attention given will affect the precise details encoded. Thus all stored 
instances will not necessarily contain identical information, but the memory o f all 
instances is activated whenever the stimulus is encountered. With sufficient instances 
the memory retrieval is faster and more reliable than computing the algorithm. The 
number o f instances which is sufficient for the faster memory retrieval may vary 
depending on the task, and only a very few might be needed, particularly if  the 
stimulus is memorable. Instances have to be encoded in such a way as to be easily 
and quickly accessible. This theory successfully accounts for the ‘power law o f 
practice’ seen in practice learning studies. It does seem to require extensive numbers 
o f memory traces, given the number o f automatic processes and skills that are 
acquired during a lifetime.
Precisely what information is stored in an instance is unknown but Logan 
suggests that they comprise the goal to be attained, the stimulus, an interpretation o f 
how that stimulus relates to the goal and the response which co-occurred at a 
specific time (Logan & Etherton, 1994). However, the co-occurrences are not
represented equally within an instance (Logan, 1998). Instances must continue to be
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accumulated, even after the stage o f automaticity has been reached, and could 
therefore result in further improvements in speed or accuracy. Logan accommodates 
this by considering automaticity to be a continuum, in which properties appear at 
different rates, rather than an all-or-nothing process. Thus further speed 
improvements are possible, even after the switch to automatic processing has 
occurred, as shown in dual-task studies (Klapp, Boches, Trabert, & Logan, 1991). 
Other experiments have suggested that some attributes of a stimulus e.g. colour or 
location, may be encoded, but are not retrieved unless required, and that retrieval of 
attributes may take differing amounts o f time (Logan, Taylor, & Etherton, 1996; 
Logan, 1998). Logan acknowledges that the instance theory has no mechanism to 
resolve interference in the case where similar instances, but with changed attributes, 
which require different interpretations or responses are retrieved (Logan, 1998).
Logan has tested his theory using tasks which require algorithmic processing 
and practice (e.g. the Alphabet Arithmetic Task) and with category search tasks. 
However he theorises that the notion o f single-step direct retrieval from memory can 
explain a variety o f automatic processes noted in the literature such as ‘pop-out’ 
effects in visual search, priming effects in lexical decision tasks, Stroop effects, 
sequential effects in serial reaction time tasks, and perceptual m otor skills (Logan & 
Klapp, 1991). He suggests these processes can be explained by Instance theory if the 
difference between them lies in the memory system tapped.
2.2.4 Component Power Laws Theory
Rickard (1997) also developed a theory involving retrieval from memory, but
proposes one ‘prototype’ memory representation, with distinct problem and answer
nodes, rather than many separate instances and believes that only one retrieval can
occur at a time. This then precludes retrieval o f an instance and retrieval of any part
o f an algorithm occurring together, so that, unlike Instance theory, a strategy-choice
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mechanism determines whether one-step retrieval or execution o f the algorithm 
occurs. One consequence o f this is that the switch to direct memory retrieval may 
not occur abruptly, but instead there may be a transition period when either retrieval 
or the algorithmic processing occurs, before the representation becomes strong 
enough for one-step retrieval to be used exclusively. The model therefore predicts 
that the power law holds separately for each component (algorithmic processing or 
memory retrieval), but not for the overall data. It also allows for a conscious choice 
to use the algorithm, if retrieval has failed. In an experiment involving an arithmetic 
calculation, post-individual problem probes demonstrated that participants were able 
to verbalise whether they used an algorithmic or retrieval strategy and that they 
moved from using one to the other during the practice. For some problems this was 
an abrupt change and for some it was more gradual, within the same person, i.e. 
memory retrieval was not implemented for all problems at the same time.
2.2.5 Reconciliation o f procedural and retrieval m odels
Automaticity arises from practice learning, that is, repeated encounters with
either the same stimuli which require the same response or a related set o f stimuli
which all require the same processing algorithm. The Production Rules theory and
Instance theory do not have to be mutually exclusive — performance enhancements
can arise from both declarative and procedural memory. In fact, Anderson et al.
showed this occurs (1997) and that training circumstances affect which is the
dominant process. Repetition of identical stimuli favours instance retrieval, which is
considered to be faster than procedural retrieval, whereas stimuli which are similar
but not identical favour the formation o f production rules. Anderson et al. consider
that performance in a skilled task reflects a complex mixture o f processes, not just
production rules and instance retrieval. Before these automatic processes develop the
cognitive shortcuts used may involve creation o f analogies and development o f
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abstracted declarative rules, although these are not definitive stages which are passed 
through (Anderson et al., 1997). Rather these are overlapping and intertwined, with 
non-automatic processes returned to if the task requirements change.
The above theories are data-driven, bottom-up processes. The theories which 
follow all involve some top-down processing, with strategies determining how the 
learned information is organised and retrieved. The long-term working memory 
theory considers how information in memory may be structured, whereas chunking 
is more concerned with the contents of long-term memory. Template theory brings 
together both o f these ideas.
2.2.6 Long-term working memory
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) proposed that individuals skilled in a domain 
overcome the limitations of short-term working memory for information by utilising 
long-term memory as a working memory. Items are stored in long-term working 
memory via a retrieval structure which enables ready access by relevant cues held in 
short-term working memory. This efficiently combines both short-term and long­
term memory resources. They use this idea to explain both skills held by many 
people, such as reading, and skills that are possessed by just a few, such as trained 
exceptional memory for digit strings or medical expertise. The retrieval structure is 
rapidly modifiable if necessary, as shown by those who can recall very long and 
unique sequences of digits, and this indicates strategic and possibly conscious 
creation. As evidence for their theory, Ericsson and Kintsch summarise experimental 
results that concurrent memory tasks do not disrupt experts’ working-memory and 
indicating that experts have complex structures in long-term memory. Long-term 
working memory is considered to be something which is domain-specific and which
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develops over time as the skill is acquired through practice, although it does provide 
a means by which variable information from the domain can be stored.
2.2.7 Chunking
Chunking theory has developed from studies carried out in chess (Chase & 
Simon, 1973). Experiments with chess players o f varying ability showed that 
perceptual processes and matching to acquired patterns held in long-term memory 
are the most important factors in distinguishing skill levels and this seems to be true 
in other domains as well. For instance, perceptual chunking can be seen in reading, 
where letters may be grouped into words or sentences. The chunking theory suggests 
that information about individual parts o f a stimulus and their spatial relation to one 
another becomes aggregated, or ‘chunked’, resulting in the storage o f patterns 
commonly encountered. Learning consists of the creation o f these chunks, which in 
the case o f chess can be from actual games played or those read about. The more 
expert players have a greater number of, and larger, chunks. Relevant chunks can be 
accessed and moved into working memory relatively quickly and either contain, or 
have links to, information about the best next move. One o f the drawbacks with this 
theory is the capacity o f working memory limiting the total amount of information 
that can be actively held at one time. Another problem with it is the large number of 
chunks which are postulated for the very best players — figures of 50,000 are 
estimated, although up to 100,000 has been speculated — and the theory does not 
specify how these might be organised for easy access, nor how such a database might 
be quickly searched to match with the current game being played. There is other 
evidence (Gobet & Simon, 1996a) that the figure of 50,000 is not excessive.
Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) suggest that chunks can themselves become
chunked. Smaller sized chunks are used often, whereas larger ones are used more
rarely and thus take longer to acquire, and they use this suggestion to explain the
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power law. It is suggested that perceptual chunking is automatic (Gobet et al., 2001). 
Perceptual chunking does not seem to have been related to instance theory, although 
it is possible to speculate that a perceptual chunk is an instance, since chunks are co­
occurences of stimuli.
2.2.8 Tem plate theory
Chunking theory has been combined with the long-term working memory idea 
to create template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996b). This aims to explain some 
empirical results that highlighted shortcomings in chunking theory, for instance, 
findings that skilled players appear to hold more chunks than can be accounted for 
by models o f working memory. In template theory, long-term memory stores a 
variety o f information in several ways: firstly there are chunks containing around five 
pieces o f perceptual information relevant to the domain (in chess this is the playing 
pieces); secondly there are templates, which are high-level schematic structures (in 
chess, a generalisation of one game board at a particular point in play) and finally 
there is a retrieval structure or structures which point to a sequence of templates.
The templates are more elaborate than chunks and can contain semantic information 
as well as perceptual items. They are created automatically when learning 
mechanisms pick up frequently recurring patterns (Gobet et al., 2001), but can also 
generate links to form novel situations, such as new utterances from language 
knowledge. In chess templates might be familiar openings or lines o f play, with 
certain pieces fixed, as they always occur in those positions, but with ‘slots’ where 
other variable information, for example from the current game, can be rapidly 
placed. Individual pieces or chunks can occupy a slot. Templates are implicitly 
acquired throughout the learning period and allow a player to choose their next 
move. Searching the networked templates is an efficient way to achieve this, by 
narrowing the choice of possible moves. Retrieval structures are deliberately and
consciously constructed to enable access to a number o f templates and more than 
one can be held in short-term memory at a time. This theory has been specified 
enough to be implemented in a computer program, CHREST, which can simulate 
expert behaviour in chess, the learning o f electric circuits in physics and syntactic 
categories in language as well as vocabulary acquisition (Gobet et al., 2001).
2.2.9 Summary
The various theories presented here have tended to come from different areas 
o f practice learning. Theories o f automaticity consider that the whole stimulus 
continues to be processed, but that either the ‘answer’ — for instance the word being 
read — is directly retrieved or the trace to the procedural knowledge is strengthened. 
Instance theory is based very much on experimental studies where the task is novel 
and a level o f ‘skill’ can be obtained in a relatively short space o f time, whereas 
chunking and template theory have been developed from studies o f experts and 
intermediate players in chess, and long-term working memory was proposed from 
studies o f exceptional memory feats. The Production rules theory considers 
processes not items and has developed from computer modelling studies. The 
theories do not need to be mutually incompatible — it is possible to conceive of 
different learning mechanisms for different types o f tasks, which feed into different 
memory stores, and o f further processes occurring, such as creation of templates, as 
skill develops into expertise.
2.3 D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s t r a t e g ie s
Theories such as Instance theory and the Production rules theory, advanced to 
account for how skill acquisition via practice leads to improved performance in 
speed and accuracy for both cognitive and motor tasks, are based on processing 
changes, increased efficiency in carrying out the steps o f a task and increased
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efficiency in performing sequences of components (Haider & Frensch, 1996). These 
changes have been referred to as qualitative (Haider & Frensch, 1996), reflecting the 
fact that the same stimulus attributes are processed but in a more efficient way. In 
addition, there is evidence that in some circumstances skill may be acquired or 
enhanced by application of strategies, which are non-obligatory, modifiable, top- 
down cognitive processes driven by existing knowledge and directed at achieving a 
goal. The retrieval structures posited for long-term working memory and template 
theory are considered to be strategically based, in that already stored knowledge 
about the domain is used in their creation, and they are also dynamically modifiable 
to accommodate current information.
Other performance-enhancing strategies reported as linked to practice learning 
could be broadly described as alterations to the task representation. The kinds of 
strategy noted in the literature include setting o f response criteria and 
perceptual/attentional changes which enable salient information to be located 
quickly or less information to be processed. Altering the task representation may 
occur explicitly, for example from instructions given (Dreisbach & Haider, 2009), or 
may be implicitly learned from regularities in the task (Haider & Frensch, 1996). 
More detail about these strategies is given in sections 2.3.1 and 2.4. Explicitly or 
implicitly learned strategies acquired during practice may result in discontinuities in 
an individuars learning curve, as mentioned in section 2.1.2, and represent the point 
at which the strategy begins to be applied.
After outlining some of the reported strategies, the evidence around a strategy 
o f reducing the amount o f perceptual information, which is of particular interest to 
this research, will be examined in more detail.
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2.3.1 Experim ental evidence for the adoption o f strategies
2.3.1.1 Altering the task representation b y  instruction 
manipulation
Some studies have deliberately set out to alter the task representation by 
changing the instructions given. Dreisbach and Haider (2009) found evidence that 
manipulating task representation in this way could result in the ignoring o f irrelevant 
information. They used a Stroop-like task with words superimposed on semantically 
related or unrelated line drawings, with the added complexity that the drawing could 
provide an additional clue as to the response key required. Some participants were 
provided with a rule which simplified the learning o f the relevant response key, in 
other words an easier task representation, and these performed faster when there 
was a semantically unrelated distracter. The same effect was seen when participants 
in the harder task representation group were first given practice without the 
distracters, in order to learn the stimulus response mapping. Dreisbach and Haider 
took this to indicate that a strategy of ignoring irrelevant information was formed by 
those with the easier task representation or those who had learned the key-mapping 
first, directing attention to selectively focus on the word.
2.3.1.2 Setting response criteria
In many practice learning studies participants are instructed to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible as development o f skill is determined by 
improvements in speed and accuracy. However, the conditions o f the task may 
encourage either speed or accuracy to dominate the responses, in other words the 
task representation develops so there is a speed-accuracy trade-off. Strayer and 
Kramer (1994a) used a memory search task where participants were trained with 
either blocks o f consistently mapped or variably mapped stimuli or with blocks o f
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mixed stimuli. They found that if the mapping was always the same separate 
strategies arose — consistently mapped stimuli were responded to more quickly but 
less accurately whereas variably mapped stimuli were responded to more accurately 
and more slowly. In the mixed blocks no strategy arose and this gave intermediate 
speed and accuracy. These strategies of changing the response criteria would appear 
to have developed implicidy. In test blocks the developed strategies were 
appropriately deployed depending on the stimulus type.
Strayer and Kramer concluded from their series of experiments that data- 
driven learning is stimulus specific, automatic and continuous whereas strategic 
learning can be transferred to a new set o f stimuli, provided they are encountered 
under the same stimulus-response conditions. They suggest that adoption of a 
performance-optimising strategy occurs early in training and that it is hard to adjust 
this strategy or find a new one at a later time. Even giving a cue prior to stimulus 
presentation was not enough to enable strategy adjustment, trading speed for 
accuracy, once training had taken place, although Strayer and Kramer feel that other 
strategies may be dynamically modifiable (Strayer & Kramer, 1994b).
In other studies the effect o f altering the instructions to emphasise either 
speed or accuracy has been shown to alter the adoption of the Information 
Reduction strategy, in which irrelevant information is ignored (Haider & Frensch, 
1999b). Haider and Frensch found that more Information Reduction was seen with 
instructions to optimise speed, and with reductions in time available to respond, and 
less Information Reduction was evident with instructions to be as accurate as 
possible.
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2.3.1.3 Perceptual changes
Practice can alter the task representation o f how to perceive the stimuli — 
either to move away from attending to all individual features to holistic processing, 
or to move away from processing all individual features to only some o f them. The 
latter has been referred to as a quantitative change (Haider & Frensch, 1996). It has 
been noted in the expert-novice literature that experts attend to visual information in 
a different way to novices e.g. experienced players o f the video game Space Fortress 
(Mane & Donchin, 1989) eliminate repetitive saccades to previously processed or 
irrelevant stimuli and use peripheral vision for some object analysis (Shapiro & 
Raymond, 1989). Shapiro and Raymond also demonstrated that it was possible to 
train novices to make use of these eye-movement strategies and thereby improve 
their performance.
2.3.1.3.1 Holistic processing
Expertise can result in a shift from a featural search to holistic processing. 
Kundel et al. (2007) carried out an eye-tracking study with expert and less well- 
practised mammographers, finding that the experts were faster and more accurate at 
locating suspected lesions. They concluded that this was due to a rapid holistic 
processing enabling identification of areas needing closer examination combined 
with an extensive knowledge of the characteristic features o f normal and abnormal x- 
rays. This strategy appears to be both implicitly learned and implicitly applied.
Holistic processing has also been invoked as an explanation in some cognitive 
experiments involving stimuli novel to all participants, rather than expert-novice 
studies. Bethel-Fox and Shepard (1988) tested participants on mental rotation o f 3x3 
matrices with some filled-in squares. They found that stimulus complexity effects, 
whereby processing of matrices with more squares to encode took longer than those
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with fewer, were eliminated after practice. They attributed this to formation of 
internal representations of the practised stimuli which could be rotated holistically.
Pellegrino, Doane, Fischer and Alderton (1991) also attribute the increased 
speeding found for more complex stimuli, in a same-different judgement task 
involving irregularly-shaped polygons with the number of vertices varying from 6 to 
24, to the development of holistic stimulus representations as practice proceeded. 
These representations could then be rapidly compared with other stimuli.
2.3.1.3.2 Processing less information
An early example of a strategy o f ignoring irrelevant information occurs in the 
second part of the paper by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977), which investigated 
controlled and automatic processes. In experiments 4a-4d, participants were told to 
attend only to certain locations and to respond to certain stimuli. They practised this 
for a number of trials and were able to obey the instruction to attend selectively to 
part o f the overall stimulus. O n later trials some o f the stimuli appeared elsewhere, 
although the participants were still supposed to be attending to the specified area. It 
was found that if the trained stimuli were placed in an alternative location the 
participants automatically responded to them, thereby showing distraction. Although 
this was not a skill-acquisition task, it nonetheless demonstrated that perceptual 
adjustment is possible. The strategy was learned under explicit instruction and 
consciously applied.
Haider and Frensch (1996) claim to be the first to apply the idea that a strategy 
o f ignoring irrelevant information could be found in the field of skill acquisition. To 
investigate this, they developed the Alphabet Verification task, a cognitive task with 
stimuli which are novel to the participant at the start o f training. The Alphabet 
Verification task will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3 and the various experiments
which have been performed are outlined in section 2.4. Information Reduction
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seems to be a strategy which is learned implicidy, although it may become available 
to conscious awareness.
Other experimental evidence for a strategy o f only processing some parts o f a 
stimulus exists. Doane, Sohn & Schreiber (1999) built on some earlier work they had 
carried out using the same task and stimuli as Pellegrino et al. (1991). It had 
previously been concluded that different strategies were adopted depending on the 
difficulty o f the training set and that although a developed strategy was stimulus- 
driven it was not stimulus-specific (Doane, Alderton, Sohn, & Pellegrino, 1996). In 
the 1999 study, participants were also given a recognition test for individual 
encountered polygons following training. The idea behind this was that if 
participants had conducted an exhaustive search when making their comparisons 
then the polygons would be more familiar than if the same/different judgement had 
been made on a small number o f features. Doane et al. concluded from their results 
that participants trained with polygons that were hard to discriminate started with an 
exhaustive search which developed into a strategy o f limiting their search to features 
they had learned were relevant to the task, whereas participants trained with easily 
discriminable stimuli did not change their initial strategy o f an early terminating and 
unconstrained feature search. In other words the strategy which produces the most 
accurate results more quickly becomes adopted. It was necessary for participants to 
learn, for each o f the presented polygons, which o f the features were the relevant 
ones, in order for this Information Reduction-like strategy to be used, and this 
information would be stored as part o f the instance. Doane et al. do not report 
asking participants how they had gone about the task, to see if the strategies are 
verbalisable and thus available to conscious awareness. Also it is not clear if they 
consider the inferred Information Reduction-like strategy to be conscious or
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unconscious. N or is it possible to deduce, from the reported aggregated results, 
whether all participants in either condition used the attributed strategy.
Using eye-tracking in the Kanfer-Ackerman Air Traffic Controller Task, Lee 
and Anderson (2001) demonstrated that learning to ignore irrelevant information 
accounted for 85% of the speed-up observed over training, and that the separate 
unit-task improvements fitted a power-law function. The Air-Traffic Controller Task 
is a simulation in which participants are required to land planes taking into account 
various factors. These include wind speed and direction, length and condition (wet 
or dry) o f runway, how recently another plane has landed on that runway, type of 
plane and remaining fuel load. It is a complex task with a great deal o f information 
on the screen, so only fixating on relevant information would seem to be a useful 
strategy. Lee and Anderson note that participants did not mention in post-task 
questioning that they fixated less on irrelevant portions o f the screen and speculate 
that this was due to a lack o f awareness of so doing. However, this could be due to 
the nature of the question, which appears to have been very general. They also 
discuss the possibility that improvements in different parts o f the task are due to 
different mechanisms, suggesting that selecting a procedure (as with Instance theory 
(Logan, 1988)) strengthening a procedure (as with Anderson’s (1987) Production 
rules theory) and transforming a procedure (as in Newell and Rosenbloom’s (1981) 
chunking theory) may all be occurring.
2.3.1.4 Summary
As can be seen a number of different strategies have been reported in the skill
acquisition literature, many of which depend on the precise representation which
forms before or during the skill acquisition phase. Task instructions can not only
direcdy affect the representation but also can interact with a developing strategy. It
seems that both stimulus-specific knowledge and development of strategies are
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important, at least in some domains, in practice learning. N ot only this, but evidence 
that strategies are transferable and not item-specific, indicates that use o f a strategy 
can enhance performance when new, but related, stimuli are encountered within a 
domain. However, other evidence, which will be presented in section 2.6.1, suggests 
that not everyone may develop or apply a strategy. Factors which affect whether one 
particular strategy or another, or no strategy at all, is developed or used need to be 
explored. One such factor is individual differences (Schunn & Reder, 2001), 
processing differences between groups of people which arise either direcdy or 
indirecdy, for example from differences in working memory capacity or personality 
factors. The effect these may have on whether a strategy is learned, applied or 
possibly modified is examined in section 2.6.
Before the effects o f individual differences are discussed, the various 
experiments used in examining Information Reduction will be detailed, followed by 
the hypothesis about the mechanism derived from these experiments.
2.4  T h e  A l p h a b e t  V e r if ic a t io n  ta sk
The Alphabet Verification task involves verifying an alphabetical string where 
a number indicates letters to be skipped in the sequence and is explained in more 
detail in Chapter 3. In training the letter immediately following the triplet is either 
correct or is replaced by the next following one in the alphabet, making it incorrect. 
After a number of training blocks with the error always in the same place, a test 
block is administered in which the location o f errors is occasionally in the trailing 
letters, an ‘irregular’ string. If  participants are ignoring all but the triplet then they will 
incorrectly verify these strings, i.e. they will display negative transfer where the 
characteristic of the task is slightly altered.
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Examples o f strings are:
correct string D[4]I J K  L there are 4 letters missing
incorrect regular string D[4]J K  there are 5 letters missing
irregular string D[4]I K  L the ‘triplet’ is correct but J is
missing from the trailing letter string
The various experiments which have been carried out to investigate Information 
Reduction with the Alphabet Verification task will now be outlined.
2.4.1 Findings from the initial experiments and later 
confirmations o f item-generality
Initially Haider and Frensch (1996) conducted three experiments using the 
Alphabet Verification task. The measures they used were the ‘string length effect’, 
where the RT varies with the length of the letter string, and the error rates when 
irregular strings were presented in the test block (see Chapter 3 for a fuller 
explanation of these). They found that:
•  Information Reduction occurs whether or not specific instruction about 
relevance is given. In other words the learning can be incidental.
•  more Information Reduction occurs with longer training
• Information Reduction transfers to a new set of related stimuli, indicating 
that it is an item-general strategy.
A later experiment by Haider, Frensch and Joram (2005) repeated this item-
generality finding, using a greater range o f triplets (8 starting letters in each set, as
opposed to 5 in the 1996 study). RTs increased with this new item set, and this does
tend to rule out Anderson’s Production rules theory as contributing significantly to
this task. Being item-general it could account for the transfer, but it would predict
42
that the improved algorithmic processing should transfer without significant loss of 
performance. The increase in RT suggests that participants had to revert to the 
counting-through-the-alphabet algorithm instead o f retrieving instances, exactly as 
Instance theory would predict. However, the string length effect did not return, 
indicating that the trailing letters were still ignored and this indicates either that 
instance learning is not the sole process operating or that it is not used.
Item-generality was also demonstrated in a later experiment (Gaschler & 
Frensch, 2007) which varied the frequency o f presentation o f the strings. It was 
found that Information Reduction developed at the same time for both the 
frequently presented and the infrequently presented strings. It is hard to reconcile 
these findings with Instance theory, which states that the more frequent the 
encounter the more instances become stored and the more likely it is that memory 
retrieval will be faster than computing the algorithm, and therefore would predict 
that the same number of encounters would be needed for each string for its 
processing to become automatic.
It is likely that memory for specific triplet instances does play a part in the 
Alphabet Verification task, since it is performed significantly more quickly and 
accurately even when just the triplet is presented and Information Reduction is not 
required (Experiment 1, Haider & Frensch, 1996). This then makes it probable that 
Information Reduction occurs in conjunction with Instance learning in the Alphabet 
Verification task, although this does not mean that the two have to co-occur in all 
tasks. Another possibility is that a combination o f Instance learning and composition 
of production rules could account for these results, and that it is not necessary to 
invoke a new mechanism. However section 2.4.2 outlines other results which cannot 
be explained by a combination of the two automatic learning processes.
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Haider and Frensch treat each of their 50 correct and 50 incorrect strings as 
unique instances, so that D[4]I, D[4]I J, D[4]I J K  are all different. However, it is not 
known if they are processed as unique instances. Participants may segment the 
strings into triplet part and trailing letters, in which case they only have 10 unique 
correct and 10 unique incorrect triplet instances, or even less in some experiments. 
Additionally, Logan himself is not clear what is in an instance and whether only 
identical instances are activated. So, for instance, the stimulus D[4]I J K  will activate 
itself, but does it also activate any other related form e.g. D[4]I, D[4]I J? There would 
have to be a degree o f parallel, not serial, processing o f the elements of the stimulus 
if intermediate ‘stages’ are not activated, which tends to suggest that the stimulus 
must be processed holistically so that length of string would not affect processing 
time after automatisation. Haider and Frensch do consider that similar instances 
might be activated, as it could explain the attenuation of the string length effect. The 
issue o f what constitutes an instance is still to be resolved, but even if Instance 
theory can explain the reduction in the string length effect, it cannot explain the lack 
o f string length effect on transfer to completely new instances.
One of the assumptions Haider and Frensch make is that all participants 
process each element o f the string in a linear left-right fashion, giving rise to the 
string length effect. However, this is not necessarily the case, as suggested above and 
as seen in Haider and Frensch’s 1999 data where they noted “unexpectedly fla t slopes” 
on the aggregated data in the first training block (Haider & Frensch, 1999a, p i 77). 
This could be connected to the trailing letters being processed as a ‘chunk’ by some 
or all participants, rather than separately. Whether or not this happens may depend 
on an individual’s internal representation of the alphabet. Whatever the reason, it 
seems sensible to develop other tasks that do not make use o f a well-learned and oft- 
used sequence. Another issue with the Alphabet Verification task is that it takes
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around 500 trials for Information Reduction to develop and this means the 
participants are required for an hour or more. If  possible, it would be useful to 
employ a task in which Information Reduction developed more quickly, although 
Doane et al. (1999) used 960 trials in their polygon discrimination task and this may 
mean that Information Reduction does not develop without a large number o f 
repeated exposures to the stimuli.
The initial set o f results showed that the string length effect attenuated over 
practice, that there were an increased number o f errors in the test block due to 
irregular strings being categorised as correct and that the process transferred to novel 
but related stimuli. It was deduced that there may be an Information Reduction 
strategy in use. The full set o f results cannot be explained by Instance Theory or 
Anderson’s Production rules theory acting alone, although conceivably a 
combination o f the two might account for the observed effects. It seems most 
probable that instance learning and Information Reduction are operating in 
combination in the Alphabet Verification task, but it is not clear if all participants are 
carrying out the task in the assumed way. Some could be using other strategies, for 
example making use o f already existing internal representations o f the alphabet, and 
this may be an unconscious strategy. Using other tasks may prevent this surmised 
alternative strategy, although it should be borne in mind that other strategies may 
replace it.
2.4.2 Later experiments
Haider, Frensch and colleagues have carried out a variety o f experiments in 
which they manipulate aspects of the Alphabet Verification task, in order to test if 
the Information Reduction they had deduced was due to the characteristics o f the 
task. They suggest that this is an alternative to devising new tasks, which they
consider would be subject to methodological difficulties in measuring Information
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Reduction directly (Haider & Frensch, 1999a). However Information Reduction is 
inferred from the attenuation of the string length effect and an increased number of 
errors in the test block in the Alphabet Verification task, so this argument seems 
somewhat spurious. Doane et al. (1999) also use the decline in regression slopes for 
stimulus complexity to measure their Information Reduction-like strategy, finding 
this was significant in their difficult-discrimination group, but not the easy 
discrimination group. This therefore does not rule out using other tasks in which 
Information Reduction is inferred in this way.
2.4.2.1 Stressing either speed  or accuracy
In a second set of experiments Haider and Frensch demonstrated that 
changing the instructions to stress either speed or accuracy affects the extent of 
Information Reduction occurring, with Information Reduction being adopted more 
quickly under speed stress (Haider & Frensch, 1999b). They conclude this shows 
that people can modify their behaviour to some extent. In other words, that ignoring 
redundant information is a strategy that is, at least partly, under voluntary control, 
with participants choosing to use the strategy under speed instructions but choosing 
not to use it under accuracy instructions, or at least making a conscious decision to 
check the whole string in the accuracy conditions, over-riding the reduction process. 
Other research (Hoyndorf & Haider, 2009) indicates that being given accuracy 
instructions can cause participants to inhibit fast responses which might occur as a 
result o f an implicitly learned process. This was termed ‘not letting go’, and ties in 
with what is seen in other fields, such as emotional psychopathology and addiction, 
where conscious over-riding o f automatic processes is needed to overcome 
attentional bias to salient stimuli (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).
It has been suggested that speed stress can increase the rate at which a task
becomes automatic (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974). If  this is the case most of the results
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reported by Haider and Frensch, where the responses become faster more rapidly 
under speed stress, do not rule out either Logan’s or Anderson’s theories of 
automaticity, although Haider and Frensch take them as indications that the 
Information Reduction strategy is under conscious control.
One thing that Haider and Frensch do suggest is that under speed stress the 
participants may not have been ‘reducing’ by processing only the triplet but may 
have been reducing by randomly sampling parts o f the string to determine their 
response, which would have decreased their accuracy. This remains something to be 
tested. Post-testing questions or protocol analysis might provide some insights into 
any conscious knowledge, but probably eye-tracking would be more effective to 
determine where participants are fixating and for how long. Verbalisation not only 
assumes that participants are conscious o f the processing carried out, but that they 
are able to articulate it and that they include all relevant detail. Eye-tracking is a direct 
measure o f behaviour, although it cannot be assumed that fixated items are 
necessarily fully processed or that non-fixated items are not processed (Shapiro & 
Raymond, 1989).
It is known that people can consciously alter their response criteria depending 
on the demands o f the task, being more liberal and checking less when the need is to 
be fast, at the expense o f accuracy. This would seem to be borne out by Haider and 
Frensch’s results for experiment 1, where a large number o f participants in the speed 
condition (15/41) were excluded from the analysis due to making more than 15% 
errors. A slightly smaller proportion was excluded from the speed-accuracy and 
accuracy-speed conditions (9/40 and 8/41 respectively) but no data was given as to 
whether the errors were spread through all blocks or occurred predominantly in the 
speed-stress ones. This is in comparison with 3/45 being excluded in the accuracy 
condition and also in comparison to using a ‘cut-off of 10% errors in other
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experiments. That is, more participants may have been excluded from the analysis 
with the stricter cut-off. On the whole the participants left in the analysis did not 
show a reliable speed-accuracy trade-off, although the correlation was significant 
during the speeded blocks in the speed-accuracy and accuracy-speed conditions.
In experiment 2, where the speed stress involved the strings being visible on 
screen for a reducing amount of time as well as instruction manipulation, 13/21 
participants were excluded in the speed condition for more than 15% errors, 8/21 
and 5/21 in the speed-accuracy and accuracy-speed conditions and just 1/20 in the 
accuracy condition, where the strings were on screen for 6 seconds throughout the 
experiment. The relatively high numbers of people making more errors when under 
speed stress does bring into question the types of strategy, if any, being employed 
and does strongly suggest that the excluded participants were showing a speed- 
accuracy trade-off, which is an another valid strategy.
It is not clear from Haider and Frensch’s results (1999b) whether more 
participants used the Information Reduction strategy when under speed stress, or if 
it were just that those who did adopted Information Reduction more quickly. There 
is a slight indication in the 2005 experiment (Haider et al., 2005) that more might use 
the strategy, as this used short speeded blocks between the main training blocks and 
reports 63% of participants in the Always-regular condition using Information 
Reduction, as judged by a drop in RT o f 1 second between blocks. This compares to 
40-50% reported users in other experiments, although in these Information 
Reduction was measured by the more standard methods of attenuation o f the string 
length effect and increased errors to irregular strings. A large change in RT is 
suggestive of a strategy being employed but does not indicate which strategy. 
Therefore further experiments are needed to try and distinguish what the participants 
are doing — do the same proportion use Information Reduction as in experiments
where both speed and accuracy are instructed, but perhaps in conjunction with a 
faster development of triplet memory; do some of those who have not become 
aware of the regularity use a speed-accuracy trade-off instead; or do more 
participants use Information Reduction? A first step towards distinguishing these 
possibilities would be to determine how many seem to be using Information 
Reduction under speed stress and to examine whether there is a speed-accuracy 
trade-off for participants who do not seem to be using Information Reduction.
In this experiment, in contrast to many others, no trial-by-trial feedback on 
errors was given and since there had been no published work investigating the effect 
o f this on the development o f Information Reduction, it is possible that the results 
are confounded by the change to this variable.
2.4.2.2 Triplet position  and duplicating information
Haider and Frensch have shown that Information Reduction occurs whether
the triplet is positioned at the beginning (relevant-first) or the end (relevant-last) o f
the string, or even if training contains both triplet positions presented randomly
(Haider & Frensch, 1999a). By the end o f the training the slopes had not declined as
far in the relevant-last or mixed conditions as in the relevant-first, but by the
measures used Information Reduction was still inferred to be occurring. This goes
some way to showing that Information Reduction in the Alphabet Verification task
is not an artefact o f the left to right reading seen with Latin alphabets and that the
relevant information does not have to be encountered first for Information
Reduction to occur. It also suggests that an early terminating feature search strategy
is not in use, as this would require the whole string to be processed in training in the
relevant-last condition, whether it was correct or incorrect. This experiment gives the
first indication in the literature that not all participants use the Information
Reduction strategy. For those who received no feedback in the test block a
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scatterplot of mean regression slope over the final two training blocks against error 
rate for irregular strings suggests that some completely reduce, some do not at all 
and some are perhaps variable in their usage. In the relevant-first condition 41% 
were classified as reducers, with 52% classified as reducers in the relevant-last 
condition. Haider and Frensch do not comment on possible reasons for this 
differential use of Information Reduction. Since they hypothesise Information 
Reduction to be a general learning process it must be assumed to be available to all 
and therefore the question arises o f why usage varies between, and possibly within, 
participants.
An alternative transfer experiment to those described in section 2.4.1 would be 
to train participants with the triplet in one position and then given the other 
positioning in the test block. This does not seem to have been carried out, neither do 
other transfer type experiments, such as changing the nature o f the stimuli or 
keeping structurally similar stimuli but changing the ‘rule’ about what is relevant. 
Transfer experiments such as these could yield valuable information about whether 
an Information Reduction strategy is in use and its conscious nature.
A similar set of experiments to the triplet position ones of Haider and Frensch 
were carried out by Green and Wright (2003) in which there were relevant-first 
strings with errors in both the triplet and the post-triplet letters, relevant-last strings 
with errors in both the preceding letters and the triplet or reversed relevant-first 
strings, again with errors in both parts o f the string, in training, but with errors 
occurring in only one place in the test block. In other words, there were two sources 
o f information as to whether the string was incorrect in training. Participants in the 
reversed string condition were instructed to read from right to left, although it is not 
known if they were able to consistently follow this instruction, which would have 
required conscious effort to overcome the automated left-right reading process.
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Results indicate that participants tended to reduce to one source or the other, in 
general choosing to use the one encountered first in the reading order. This is 
indicative o f Information Reduction occurring at the perceptual level and is evidence 
that there is more occurring than the automated whole stimulus processing o f Logan 
and Anderson. However, the decline in the string length effect and particularly the 
error rate results suggest that some participants chose the second source processed, 
or possibly alternated between which source they would use. This latter possibility is 
not considered in the paper, nor is it possible to deduce from the results given 
whether some participants did not reduce at all.
Aggregated data always conceal what is happening on an individual level and 
later experiments confirm what was found in the triplet position varying 
experiments, i.e. that not all participants discover or use the Information Reduction 
strategy (Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 2005). Thus it seems likely that this is 
a common feature of all reported Alphabet Verification task experiments. However, 
a small-scale experiment with six participants (Haider & Frensch, 2002) indicated 
that length o f training may be a factor in whether Information Reduction is 
discovered and used, with the usual 500 training trials being insufficient for some. 
Nonetheless it could be the case that some would never discover the strategy 
however much training they received.
2.4.2.3 E ye tracking
Haider and Frensch (1999a) used an eye-tracking experiment, with the 
standard Alphabet Verification task instructions, which indicated that participants 
were ignoring the redundant information at the perceptual level. Fixations were still 
made on the redundant portions of the string but there were fewer o f them. Also 
they were o f shorter duration than the fixations on the relevant portions o f the 
string. The fixation frequencies predicted the attenuation o f the string-length effect —
participants who fixated less on the irrelevant information showed the smallest 
string-length effect, thus suggesting that they were not perceiving or processing the 
redundant trailing letters. The experiment involved the strings being projected onto a 
large screen and it is hard to calculate from the information given precisely the 
difference between using a normal monitor and the screen. It appears that the visual 
angle required to perceive a whole 7 letter string would have been more than twice as 
much as with a computer monitor, which would have necessitated more eye- 
movement. Therefore the participants may have been more inclined to fixate only on 
the relevant portion, in order to minimise effort, and this means that it may not be 
completely valid to generalise to experiments conducted on a monitor.
Haider and Frensch do note that part of the strategy may be to minimise the 
time spent fixating on the redundant information if it is not possible to completely 
ignore it. Again this would need to be a conscious decision and better tracking o f eye 
movements may pick this up. The Information Reduction hypothesis (see section 
2.5) is based on perceptual changes, which neither Logan’s (1988) nor Anderson’s 
(1987) theories predict, and this part o f the hypothesis essentially rested on the 
results from this one experiment. Given the importance o f conscious perceptual 
changes to the Information Reduction hypothesis, replication of this eye-tracking 
experiment is required. However, it should be borne in mind that eye-tracking can 
only indicate what is being fixated and for how long and not what is processed, nor 
whether any conscious decisions as to what to fixate are being made.
This eye-tracking experiment was another in which no trial-by-trial feedback 
was given, without explanation as to why, and the effect this might have had is 
unknown. The effect of varying the type of feedback, or even giving none at all, is 
something which could be investigated. If reinforcement occurs after a trial in which
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irrelevant information was ignored, then this might encourage the further use of the 
strategy and would confirm its theorised conscious nature.
More recently another eye-tracking experiment has been carried out (Gaschler 
et al., 2015), using a computer monitor, although again the visual angle for the strings 
was wider than would normally be used, with the longest strings spanning the whole 
screen o f a 17” monitor. A variation on the ‘normal’ Alphabet Verification task was 
that brackets were not included in the string, so that the relevant portion may have 
been less obvious (see section 2.4.2.5 for the effect o f lack o f segmentation in a 
different task). This variation was not deliberately introduced by the authors 
(Gaschler, personal communication, 2016). Strings were either presented three times 
per block (frequently), once per block (infrequently) or just twice overall (singletons). 
In this experiment feedback was given on incorrect responses during the training 
blocks. Results showed that the average fixation time on the irrelevant portion o f the 
string decreased at the same rate and to the same extent regardless o f the frequency 
o f encounter, providing further evidence for the item-generality o f the strategy. 
Results also showed that some participants adopted the strategy abruptly, whereas 
this did not seem to be the case for others, and that whilst some participants were 
reducing from the first practice block, others needed over 400 trials. This points 
towards individual differences between participants.
2A.2.4 Inconsistent training
The final experiments to be discussed differed from all the preceding ones in
that a small proportion of irregular strings appeared in the training blocks. It was
argued that by showing if a degree of inconsistency prevents Information Reduction
from developing, evidence for its conscious nature is provided, i.e. that if the rule is
sometimes broken, then a decision is made not to rely on it. However, without
knowledge o f the mechanism by which relevant information is distinguished from
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irrelevant, it could be that even a small degree o f inconsistency prevents knowledge 
of any regularities developing. Haider, Frensch and Joram (2005) go some way to 
addressing this latter criticism by incorporating some speeded trials containing only 
regular strings between the training blocks, and these show that those in the 90% 
regular condition performed at the same level as those in the 100% regular 
condition. They took this to mean that the strategy was learned and could be applied 
when speed pressure dictated it was more efficient, but was not used when more 
time was available. However, they used a drop in RT of more than 1 second between 
training blocks as evidence that Information Reduction had been adopted, which 
only really indicated that some sort of strategy was in use, and do not relate this to 
individual performance in the main training or the speeded blocks. The high error 
rates seen in the test block could be due to a speed-accuracy trade-off strategy being 
applied. Perhaps a better indication o f a conscious decision not to rely on the 
regularity was demonstrated by Edmunds (2005), who used a similar experimental 
procedure, where post-testing questions revealed that the same number noticed the 
regularity in the 90% regular condition as the 100% regular condition, but the 
regression slopes did not change significantly over training for the former condition 
as they did for the latter, indicating that the potential for Information Reduction was 
known but it was not used.
Gaschler and Frensch (2009) varied the presentation frequency as well as 
having some irregular strings in training. When the irregular strings were in the less 
frequently presented set, Information Reduction continued to develop for both sets 
and when they were in the more frequently presented set, Information Reduction did 
not develop for either set. If Information Reduction was dependent on the number 
o f encounters with an individual stimulus, as Instance Theory would predict, then 
this cross-set transfer should not occur and so this is further evidence that a separate
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mechanism was in use. When the irregular strings were presented in the less 
frequently encountered set, this was at a rate of 8% of incorrect strings per block, 
which answers the criticism that any inconsistency will prevent Information 
Reduction from occurring. Therefore it seems that there is a threshold roughly 
between 8% and 10% irregularity, when a significant number o f people will cease to 
rely on knowledge o f the regularity and this perhaps needs to be explored in more 
detail and at an individual level, since it may be important to know for an individual 
the point at which they can be prevented from developing Information Reduction.
2A.2.5 Task variations
At the start of this study, the only alternative task used to investigate 
Information Reduction which I was aware o f was the target search task developed by 
Edmunds (2005). In this task, participants are required to indicate if one o f three 
letters in a memory set is present in a variable length string of randomly ordered 
letters. In training the target always appears in the same position in the string, when 
it is present. Edmunds carried out a number o f manipulations using this task. He 
demonstrated that Information Reduction occurred when all the strings were unique, 
thus ruling out instance learning as an explanation. He also showed that increasing 
perceptual load, by increasing the length o f the strings, caused more participants to 
be aware o f Information Reduction. Other manipulations were: using brackets to 
segment the string into relevant and irrelevant sections (as is seen in the Alphabet 
Verification task); increasing difficulty by requiring participants to indicate if the 
letters adjacent to the target came before or after it in the alphabet; and using a 
limited number of relevant section instances. These manipulations resulted in lower 
regression slopes at the end o f training than occurred with the basic task and all but 
the segmentation of the strings also caused an increase in errors to the irregular 
strings in the test block. In addition more participants expressed explicit knowledge
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of the regularity suggesting that Information Reduction was used by more 
participants when attention was directed to the part o f the string where the regularity 
occurred and when using the strategy released cognitive resources to deal with an 
additional demand. Edmunds does not differentiate between knowledge and use of 
the strategy. Having a limited number of instances in the bracketed section was the 
most effective and this strongly suggests that instance learning of the relevant part of 
the string was partially responsible for the results seen.
Recently another Information Reduction task has been introduced in the 
literature (Gaschler et al., 2015), which required participants to indicate whether 
there were an odd or even number of instances o f a letter randomly scattered over 
the screen. The rationale for this parity judgement task was to test whether it was the 
spatial positioning o f the triplet in the Alphabet Verification task which induced 
Information Reduction. The regularity for the new task was that whenever the 
number of instances of the letter was above four it was always either an odd number, 
for half the participants, or always an even number, for the other participants. In the 
test block the irregular trials had the number of instances above four as even for 
those with the ‘odd’ rule and odd for those with the ‘even’ rule. As with Gaschler’s 
other experiments, there were frequent, infrequent and singleton trials in each block. 
Results showed a gradual decrease in processing time with practice and that some 
participants had an abrupt change in performance for all stimuli regardless of the 
frequency of presentation, although 19% did not appear to discover the shortcut at 
all. Whilst Gaschler et al. used letters in this task, it could equally well be performed 
with shapes or other stimuli types.
2.4.2.6 Comparison o f  tasks used
Both the Alphabet Verification task and the polygon-matching task (see
section 2.3.1.3.2) have led to conclusions about a strategy involving processing of
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only part of the stimuli. However, there are some differences between them in 
features o f the tasks and the theoretical explanations invoked. In the polygon task 
the relevant features vary from polygon to polygon, so that it is necessary to learn 
which features to process for each item. Indeed, different individuals may choose 
different features. Doane et al. (1999) suggest that instance learning is important for 
this task as well as using an Information Reduction-like strategy but that on transfer 
participants revert from retrieving specific instances to use of more general strategic 
skills. Transfer to novel hard stimuli was positive where an Information Reduction­
like strategy had developed and negative where an early terminating feature search 
had developed. O n the other hand, the Alphabet Verification task always has the 
relevant information in the letter-digit-letter triplet in training and on transfer to 
novel stimuli, the target search task always has the target in the same position and the 
parity-judgement task always has the large sets as either odd or even. That is to say, 
there is always a consistent rule which indicates which information is irrelevant and 
can be ignored. Haider and Frensch believe that the item-general transfer seen with 
this task indicates a conscious decision to limit processing to the relevant elements of 
the stimulus and base their hypothesis o f Information Reduction on this.
All these different types o f tasks indicate that a strategy in which fewer 
elements o f a stimulus are processed occurs in some practice learning tasks, and this 
ties in with other empirical evidence that not everything in a visual scene is 
processed.
2.4.2.7 Post-testing questionnaires
In some Alphabet Verification experiments the participants have been asked 
post-testing about characteristics of the strings they have noticed and around half 
report that the error always occurs in the triplet (Haider et al., 2005), with the
majority o f these appearing to use the Information Reduction strategy (Haider &
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Frensch, 1999a). This tallies with the experimental data, and suggests that using post­
testing questionnaires may be a reliable method of distinguishing reducers from non­
reducers.
All apart from one participant in the parity judgement task (Gaschler et al., 
2015) were able to verbalise the regularity in the task, but there were some 
participants who did not appear to exploit it, and carried on counting the letters in 
the display. Interestingly, Edmunds (2005) also found that all apart from one 
participant were able to express the regularity in the target search task when longer 
strings were used, which suggests that when a variable and larger amount of 
processing is required then people will endeavour to find ways to reduce the burden. 
Edmunds also demonstrated that other manipulations increased the number of those 
aware of the regularity, although this was not to quite the same extent. However, it 
does seem that numbers using Information Reduction can be altered with changes to 
training conditions.
2.4.2.8 Summary o f  experimen ts
The experiments outlined here indicate that Information Reduction involves a
change at the perceptual level, which cannot be explained by either Logan’s (1988) or
Anderson’s (1987) theories of automatic processing, or even a combination o f both.
The strategy seems to be data-driven but can transfer to new instances of the stimuli.
Evidence also suggests that it is a consciously applied strategy. It would appear that
strategies may be important in skill acquisition, but the theorised processes behind
strategy development are still not well specified. In addition, it is noted that
variations in adoption of the strategy may occur. These could be due to other
strategies being used, individual differences in participants or differences in task or
training conditions. For instance, Information Reduction seems to be sensitive to the
level of consistency encountered during training. It may be supplanted by other
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strategies, such as a speed-accuracy trade-off, under some conditions. W hat is not 
clear is if all people are capable of discovering and using the Information Reduction 
strategy but, for as yet unknown reasons, choose not to use it, or whether it is not 
available to all. Indeed it is possible that some may be unable to verbally express 
knowledge o f a regularity, but that Information Reduction is still used. Manipulating 
both type o f task and the training conditions offer promise as a way to explore the 
numbers o f people using Information Reduction and perhaps determining whether 
people use it sometimes and not at other times.
2.5 T h e  I n f o r m a t i o n  R e d u c t i o n  h y p o t h e s i s
Experimental results from the Alphabet Verification task indicate that the 
Information Reduction strategy can be transferred to novel, or less frequently 
encountered, stimuli (Gaschler & Frensch, 2007; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009). This 
indicates that the strategy is item-general and does not depend on instances being 
retrieved from memory. The item-generality suggests that theories such as the 
Instance model o f Logan (1988) cannot fully explain the processes occurring. 
Anderson’s Production rules theory cannot account for the conscious aspects o f the 
process, and neither theory can account for the perceptual differences that have been 
noted. This led Haider and Frensch to propose the Information Reduction 
hypothesis, with two stages: a data-driven, implicit stage in which relevant and 
irrelevant information is distinguished; and a consciously applied stage in which only 
relevant information is perceived and processed.
Haider and Frensch believe that Information Reduction is a general and non-
domain-specific learning process which is strategically applied, rather than an
inevitable consequence of practice and that it may operate in addition to other
learning mechanisms such as Instance theory. Although the switch to using
Information Reduction is thought to occur abruptly, rather than gradually, the fact
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that it occurs at different times for each individual means that when the learning 
curves are aggregated, the normal power law is seen. The various results obtained 
since the Information Reduction hypothesis was proposed do fit with this model, 
however, the evidence suggesting that it is a consciously applied perceptual strategy 
is not strong and there are alternative explanations.
There are also questions about whether Information Reduction is a general 
learning process. It has only been noted in a small number o f tasks, and results from 
manipulations o f just one of these, the Alphabet Verification task, have been 
published. It is still possible that the results Haider and Frensch obtained are simply 
due to characteristics of the Alphabet Verification task itself. If this two-stage 
Information Reduction process does exist, then presumably the data-driven stage is 
common to all. A question then arises as to why only some people appear to become 
aware o f there being redundant information and are able, or choose, to implement 
the strategy. In order to investigate this further, the number of people using 
Information Reduction in both the Alphabet Verification task and other tasks should 
be determined, as well as those who choose not to use it. For some people it could 
be that some mechanism, unconscious or conscious, suggests that they can gain just 
as much improvement, or at least a ‘good enough’ improvement, by merely learning 
stimulus-response associations, as Instance theory would suggest happens inevitably, 
or by using another strategy. If the numbers using Information Reduction can be 
established then a variety of manipulations can be carried out to examine if the 
number o f users can be increased or decreased. In particular, if conditions under 
which all participants use Information Reduction can be found, then this will provide 
stronger evidence that it is a general learning mechanism.
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2.6 I n d iv id u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s
From the earliest experiments into practice learning it has been clear that not 
everyone achieves the same level of skill, even if the same amount o f practice has 
been undertaken. Bryan and Harter (1899), in their investigations o f telegraphic 
operators, note that operators take different amounts o f time to learn and achieve 
different levels of skill, with only a few becoming fully expert. Chapman (1919), in 
his studies o f typewriting notes that individual learning curves show some variation 
to the averaged curve, although they all conform to a similar pattern.
Differences between groups o f people, known as individual differences, have 
also been noted in implicit learning. Using a colour sequencing task constructed 
from an artificial grammar which was presented to participants as a memory task, 
Karpicke and Pisoni (2004), showed that there were significant individual differences 
in memory for novel sequences for the grammar on which training had taken place, 
correlated to the auditory digit span. Most, but not all o f the participants, showed 
some implicit learning o f the grammar. This indicates that implicit learning is not an 
inevitable consequence o f task presentation. Performance on the Iowa Gambling 
Task, which requires implicit learning o f the yields o f the card decks, has been shown 
to result in two broad groups amongst a non-clinical population — those who could 
learn and those who could not (Glicksohn, Naor-Ziv, & Leshem, 2007).
Individual differences may be apparent in the learning, application and 
modification of strategies (Sohn, Doane, & Garrison, 2006), as well as in strategy 
choice and adaptation to changing circumstances (Schunn & Reder, 2001). This 
research is particularly interested in individual differences in using strategies in 
practice learning and so experimental evidence indicating that there are such 
differences will be considered next.
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2.6.1 Individual differences in using strategies
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) consider individual differences between their 
four participants in the early experiments, but conclude that these relate to 
performance, not the strategy used. It seems dubious to draw generalisations about 
strategy from such a small number, as it could be that these people were by chance 
similar, perhaps because they all had similar educational experiences and training. 
They also touch on some performance differences in the categorical learning 
experiment (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), which they attribute to the participants 
either not noticing the possibility of categorising the stimuli or failing to categorise. 
They suggest that even if the category became encoded, the ‘node’ corresponding to 
this does not necessarily become part o f an automatic response and that categories 
‘facilitate, benefit and modify controlled search procedures” (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, 
pl45).
Haider and Frensch (2002) found that not all learners acquire the Information 
Reduction strategy, even after extensive practice, and that the acquisition occurred at 
different times during practice. This is also apparent in other reported results from 
the Information Reduction experiments e.g. Haider, Frensch, & Joram (2005). Taken 
over all the indications are that perhaps 32-48% of participants could be classified as 
reducers, with another 40% or so not discovering the strategy within the training 
period and the rest not being classifiable by the various criteria they use. This might 
mean that these latter participants use the strategy inconsistently or have an 
alternative strategy. In experiment lb  (Haider et al., 2005) the majority of those 
classified as reducers (11 out o f 14) were able to report verbally that they ignored the 
redundant letters as well as retrieving the answer from memory. Haider and Frensch 
take this conscious report as evidence that the strategy shift is at least partly an 
intentional decision, but their results also indicate that memory retrieval is known
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consciously and this could suggest that any strategy enters conscious awareness. 
Despite classifying participants as reducers or non-reducers, no examination of 
individual difference factors which might explain these variations in usage have been 
reported.
Sohn, Doane & Garrison (2006) tested cognitive abilities and on the basis of 
general reasoning, spatial visualisation, perceptual speed, spatial problem solving and 
verbal comprehension divided their participants into high, medium and low ability 
groups. They were then tested on the polygon shape discrimination task. Sohn et al. 
found that the high ability group were able to develop a precise strategy which 
transferred readily to novel stimuli, if trained on the difficult-first shapes, or if 
trained on the easy-first were able to shift strategies effectively on transfer. Low 
ability individuals were also little affected by transfer regardless o f initial training 
because they did not develop an accurate strategy in the first place. The medium 
ability group was differentially affected by transfer — those who had been trained on 
difficult stimuli had an effective strategy which transferred, those trained with the 
easy stimuli did not develop an effective strategy to deal with the difficult 
discrimination on transfer. In other words, cognitive ability7 affected both which 
strategy was used and ease o f transfer in the polygon discrimination task. This 
suggests that certain cognitive abilities need to be taken into account when training 
in situations that could lead to an Information Reduction strategy developing, 
although Sohn et al. did not separately analyse the correlation of the individual tests 
they utilised with the accuracy results before and after transfer.
White, Cerella and Hoyer (2007) suggest that even though memory-trace 
formation, as theorised by Logan, is an inevitable consequence o f repeated 
encounter with the stimulus, it may be that retrieval is a conscious strategy which can 
be controlled. This could be either by choosing to retrieve or choosing to use the
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retrieved solution. White et al. (2007) carried out an experiment where both younger 
(<26) and older (>60) adults were tested on two types of list, either distinctive or 
confusable, in an Alphabet Arithmetic task and found that the older adults were less 
likely to rely on their memories, particularly for the more confusable solutions. It is 
speculated that this may be due to a lack o f confidence in memory for the older 
participants. For both sets o f participants a switch (if it happened) to relying on 
retrieval occurred later during training for the more confusable items. It was also 
noted that some participants seemed to use a retrieval strategy consistently for some 
items but not others.
2.6.2 What psychological factors could be involved in the 
individual differences seen?
A variety o f factors are likely to be involved in the individual differences seen 
in strategy development. As noted in section 2.6.1 Sohn et al. (2006) found 
differences in visual discrimination when a number o f cognitive abilities were tested, 
although it is possible that only one or two o f the abilities they tested were actually 
implicated. The factors involved may depend on the precise task, as it is generally 
held that skill development per se is not differentiated by IQ or memory. Considering 
Information Reduction, and particularly the Alphabet Verification task, it might 
reasonably be supposed that differences in working memory and attention might 
account for some or all o f the individual differences in strategy development and use. 
Alternatively, some participants may be aware that they could learn which are the 
correct and incorrect triplets but do not trust their memory, as was suggested for the 
older participants in White et al.’s (2007) experiment. Choosing to continue with the 
counting algorithm may affect application of Information Reduction.
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Evidence has been presented that attention can play a part in near transfer of 
skills (Woltz, Gardner, & Gyll, 2000), which is not dissimilar to the transfer testing 
utilised in the Alphabet Verification task and other Information Reduction-type 
tasks. Measures o f selective attention such as the Stroop paradigm have been used to 
demonstrate its involvement (Woltz et al., 2000). It has been reported that there is 
no evidence for individual differences in the ability to focus or divide attention 
(Lansman, Poltrock, & Hunt, 1983). Inattentional blindness could be considered a 
corollary to Information Reduction, where there is a failure to perceive something 
unexpected (the gorilla) rather than a failure to perceive something expected (the 
letter string). In one experiment, 42% failed to see the gorilla (Seegmiller, Watson, & 
Strayer, 2011), which is not very different to the percentage of people reported to be 
reducers (Haider & Frensch, 1999a). Little work has been done so far in elucidating 
factors which could contribute to inattentional blindness, but variability in 
attentional control is suggested as a mechanism (Seegmiller et al., 2011) and this is 
linked to working memory.
It has been reported that working memory factors, such as its limited capacity, 
may play a role in improving latency early on in skill acquisition as it is the route by 
which information gets transferred to long-term memory (Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). It is likely that memory for the correct triplets plays a part in the Alphabet 
Verification task, as latency improves even when there are no additional letters 
beside the triplet (see, for example, the control condition in experiment 1 in Haider 
and Frensch, 1996), and participants have reported that memory was a strategy they 
used (Haider & Frensch, 2002). However, this will involve longer-term memory and 
working memory may not be critical for this. Working memory is implicated in 
attentional control though and so could play a part via this executive function (Kane 
& Engel, 2002). Kane and Engel report that working memory span, as measured by
65
span tasks embedded in other processing tasks, reliably measures its capacity, and 
that working memory span is also highly correlated to fluid intelligence.
Whilst overall IQ may not play a part, the elements making up ‘intelligence’, 
particularly fluid intelligence, may exert some influence over the learning of 
strategies, although the extent to which such factors have a role in implicit learning 
could be debatable. Fluid intelligence is considered to correspond to non-verbal 
reasoning and ability to solve novel problems, identifying underlying patterns and 
relationships. It is often measured using Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Individual 
differences in personality factors such as conscientiousness have been suggested as a 
predictor for inattentional blindness (Simons & Jensen, 2009) although this has not 
been shown to correlate with either fluid intelligence or executive functions 
(Unsworth et al., 2009). Unsworth et al. found that extraversion was negatively 
related to vigilance, which is the ability to sustain attention on a task. O ther executive 
functions they examined, such as fluency (the ability to generate unique examples 
from memory), seem unlikely to be very relevant to the Alphabet Verification task.
2.6.1 Summary
It is apparent that individual differences can affect strategy development in 
different ways — some may not develop a strategy at all, although conceivably if given 
explicit instruction would. O f those who develop a strategy, some may do so more 
quickly than others. There may also be differences in application of the strategy.
Overall, then, it would seem that fruitful avenues to explore in the 
investigation of individual differences in development and /or use of strategies would 
be attention either as a single construct or in combination with working memory and 
fluid intelligence as part o f executive function. Some personality factors such as
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conscientiousness and extraversion may play a role, and are something that could be 
investigated reasonably easily.
2.7 C o n c l u s i o n
This review has shown that practice is vital for acquisition and maintenance of 
skill with the pattern o f improvement in speed and accuracy during practice identical 
in many domains. This suggests that the same underlying processes are in operation 
despite the fact that the rate o f improvement may vary between individuals. Some 
people may develop additional strategies which improve their performance further. 
The main theories that endeavour to account for the basic processes occurring in 
skill acquisition have been outlined. It has been noted that some learning may occur 
implicitly, and that this may be particularly true for strategies. It is noted that a 
variety o f strategies may develop, depending on the task. However, the review 
concentrated on the evidence for one o f these strategies, known as Information 
Reduction. One aspect o f Information Reduction that has received little attention is 
that only around half the participants in the Alphabet Verification task seem to adopt 
it. It is not clear if the reasons for this are characteristics o f the task; characteristics of 
the training conditions, characteristics o f the participants or a combination o f all 
three.
The next chapter will describe the construction o f the Alphabet Verification 
task and the new tasks designed for this study, to explore these aspects, as well as 
considering the types o f analysis to be carried out.
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Chapter 3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Background
Over the years a variety o f qualitative and quantitative methods have been 
used to investigate the development o f skill in both cognitive domains and those 
where m otor skills are also required. These include observation, diary studies, 
interviews, verbal reports, simulations and computer modelling as well as 
experiments. For example, the early studies o f Bryan and Harter (1899) used regular 
testing o f trainee telegraphy operators combined with observation and introspection; 
Ericsson et al. (1993) used interviews and diary studies with violin players o f various 
levels to investigate the role of practice and Schneider and Shiffrin (1977; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977) used experimental techniques in their classic studies of 
automaticity.
In order to investigate the processes occurring in skill development, cognitive 
psychologists have developed tasks which can simulate the repeated practice 
required, but can be carried out in either one or a few sessions. Using laboratory- 
based tasks enables standardisation o f both task and instruction, and variables to be 
systematically manipulated, yielding data important for theory development. Despite 
the artificial nature o f many laboratory-based tasks, it is considered that they provide 
a way for a high level o f skill to be achieved in a relatively short interval o f time 
(Proctor & Vu, 2006), an important practical consideration. They are a useful model 
for practice learning and have yielded valuable insights, showing, for instance, that 
learning can often be incidental or implicit, and that becoming skilled involves 
developing higher-level strategies and goal structures as well as automatisation o f 
perceptual, cognitive and motor components o f a task.
Previous studies into Information Reduction have used the experimental 
method (Edmunds, 2005; Gaschler & Frensch, 2007; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009; 
Gaschler et al., 2015; Green & Wright, 2003; Haider & Frensch, 1996; Haider & 
Frensch, 1999a; Haider & Frensch, 1999b; Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 
2005), with participants responding to repeated presentation of stimuli in one 
session. Eye-tracking has also been employed to determine whether participants 
really do attend less to the irrelevant part o f the strings (Gaschler et al., 2015; Haider 
& Frensch, 1999a), as well as self-report to elucidate what participants have become 
aware o f during the task (Edmunds, 2005; Gaschler et al., 2015; Haider et al., 2005). 
There has also been some investigation o f individual differences — anxiety and IQ - 
using standardised psychometric instruments (Edmunds, 2005).
This chapter will detail the main task and measures employed in previous 
Information Reduction studies and then outline the three methods used in this study 
to address the research questions. These were experimental, self-report and 
individual difference questionnaires. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
the validity of the data collection procedure.
To start with, in section 3.2 the structure of the Alphabet Verification task that 
has been used by researchers in many studies (Gaschler & Frensch, 2007; Gaschler & 
Frensch, 2009; Green & Wright, 2003; Haider & Frensch, 1996; Haider & Frensch, 
1999a; Haider & Frensch, 1999b; Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 2005) is 
described. Section 3.2 also describes the analyses applied to the data arising from the 
Alphabet Verification task. As one o f the questions to be considered is whether 
Information Reduction can be detected in other analogous tasks, section 3.3 
describes the development o f the tasks to be used in Experiment 1. Other aspects of 
the research questions will be addressed by the use of post-testing questionnaires.
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3.2 T h e  A l p h a b e t  V e r if ic a t io n  ta sk
Having noted from the expert-novice literature that a strategy o f distinguishing 
between relevant and redundant information seems to occur, Haider and Frensch 
(1996) were interested in testing in a cognitive experimental setting whether this is 
part o f skill acquisition. Therefore they needed a task where part o f the stimuli was 
relevant to the response required and part o f it was redundant. Another 
consideration was to be able to track the development o f the strategy over the course 
of practice.
An existing task, the Alphabet Arithmetic Task (AAT) (Logan, 1988), could 
fulfil the second part o f this requirement. In the AAT participants are asked to verify 
strings o f the type
A + 2 = C 
B + 3 = F 
C + 4 = G 
D + 5 = J
The addend can vary from 2 to 5 and the answer can either be true or false. Initially
response times (RT) vary systematically with size o f addend but with practice the
RTs converge to be equivalent for all. However, this task consists o f strings where all
the information is relevant to verification and thus was unsuitable for testing Haider
and Frensch’s hypothesis. Therefore they adapted this task, by replacing the addend
with a bracketed digit between two letters (e.g. D(4)I or D(4)J, henceforth known as
the ‘triplet’) and including a variable number of additional letters after the triplet,
none o f which were relevant to verifying the letter string. However, the instructions
at the start o f the experiment were that errors could occur anywhere in the string,
thus participants were encouraged to check the whole string. It was expected that
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initially RTs would vary systematically with the number of additional letters. The task 
is known as the Alphabet Verification task and the variation in RTs seen with the 
increasing number of additional letters is the ‘string-length effect’.
The digit represented the number o f letters to be skipped: thus D(4)I is correct 
because the four letters E, F, G and H are skipped but D(4)J is incorrect since there 
are five letters between D and J. Haider and Frensch do not explain how the 
parameters of the task came to be chosen, for instance, why the digit 4. Also they did 
not use letters from the very start or end o f the alphabet, possibly to avoid the 
extremely over-learned sequences of ‘A, B, C’ and ‘X, Y, Z ’.
Strings started with different letters and between zero and four consecutive 
‘trailing’ letters were appended to the triplet, to give five correct examples for each 
starting letter. There would be another five incorrect examples for each starting 
letter, which always had five letters missing in the triplet, although the digit remained 
as 4. This gave strings of the type:
D (4) I J  correct string
D(4)J K L M  incorrect string
K(4)P Q R correct string
K(4)Q incorrect string
During the training blocks the trailing letters were always consecutive and correct, so 
that verification o f whether the string was correct or incorrect could be achieved by 
processing only the triplet portion of the string. However participants were not 
generally informed of this regularity. Typically an experiment involved 80-100 of 
these ‘regular’ strings per training block, with half being correct and half incorrect. 
Each training block would be repeated a number of times, so that over the course of 
training each individual string would be seen several times, thus additionally
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providing a test o f the Instance Theory (Logan, 1988, see also section 2.2.3 in 
Chapter 2). Haider and Frensch suggest that using 10 starting letters, with zero to 
four additional letters, results in 50 unique instances of correct strings and similarly 
50 unique instances o f incorrect strings. However, it could be argued that, if, for 
instance, the procedure for verifying the strings consisted o f two main components: 
“count through the letters where the digit is” and “check the other letters against the 
alphabet”, the triplet and the other letters might be processed as two separate sets o f 
instances, and this would mean that in fact there were only ten unique correct 
instances and ten unique incorrect instances o f the triplet. Given the limited number 
o f letters in the alphabet and the need to have a variable number o f additional letters 
this repetition is unavoidable, but it does have the potential to confound instance 
learning with Information Reduction. However, assuming that instance learning will 
apply equally to all stimuli, since they are all seen the same number o f times, means 
that examination o f the change in the ‘string-length effect’ over training gives an 
indirect measure o f Information Reduction.
To examine the string-length effect, a linear regression on the mean RTs for 
the various string lengths, by block and by participant, was carried out. The 
regression essentially plots a straight line through the data points for the RTs and 
calculates a coefficient for the slope. The regression slopes at the start o f the 
experiment suggested that the string-length effect was evident — that is the slopes 
were positive. An ANOVA on the regression slopes over the blocks demonstrated 
that the RTs to the longer strings decreased reliably more than those to just triplets 
over the course o f practice, indicating that the verification time for longer strings had 
reduced to near equivalence with the shorter strings. Figure 3.1 illustrates RTs for 
one participant throughout Experiment 1, reported in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
showing how the RTs decline and the slope changes. Haider and Frensch concluded
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fr o m  th e ir  r e su lts  th a t p a r tic ip a n ts  h a d  le a r n e d  th a t th e y  n e e d e d  to  c h e c k  o n ly  th e  
in itia l le t te r -d ig it - le t te r  tr ip le t an d  c o u ld  ig n o r e  an y  tra ilin g  le t te r s , s h o w in g  
I n fo r m a t io n  R e d u c t io n . T h e r e fo r e  th is  s e e m e d  a su ita b le  m e t h o d o lo g ic a l  t o o l  w ith  
w h ic h  to  in v e s t ig a te  th is  s tra tegy .
Figure 3.1: R Ts by string length  and b lock  for  o n e  participant in E xp erim en t 
1, reported  in C hapter 4  o f  this thesis, m ultip le-trip let task
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T h ere is a lso  an  a d d it io n a l w a y  o f  te s t in g  i f  th e  tra ilin g  le tter s  are rea lly  b e in g  
ig n o r e d , an d  th a t is  to  start h a v in g  a lp h a b e t ic  irreg u la r ities  in  th e  la tter  p art o f  th e  
s tr in g , w ith  a c o r r e c t  tr ip let. T h is  is k n o w n  as an  ‘irregu lar’ str in g . I f  p a r tic ip a n ts  h a v e  
le a r n e d  n o t  to  p r o c e s s  th e  tra ilin g  le tter s  th e n  th e y  w ill n o t  n o t ic e  errors o c c u r r in g  
th e r e . H a id e r  a n d  F r e n sc h  (fo r  e x a m p le , E x p e r im e n t  2 , 1 9 9 6 ; E x p e r im e n t  1, 1 9 99a )  
a d d e d  a te s t  b lo c k  w ith  a p r o p o r t io n  o f  irregu lar  str in g s . T h e s e  a lp h a b e t ic  
in a c c u r a c ie s  w e r e  a c h ie v e d  b y  o m it t in g  a le t te r  fr o m  th e  s e q u e n c e , fo r  e x a m p le :
D (4 ) I  J L  M
K (4 )P  R
M a n y  p a r tic ip a n ts  r e s p o n d e d  th a t th e s e  irregu lar  str in g s  w e r e  c o r r e c t , in d ic a tin g  th e y  
w e r e  o n ly  p r o c e s s in g  th e  (co rrec t)  tr ip le t a n d  ig n o r in g  th e  ( in co rrec t)  tra ilin g  le tters . 
C o n s e q u e n t ly  th e r e  w a s  a h ig h  rate o f  errors to  th e s e  str in g s , w ith  th e  n u m b e r  o f
erro rs in c r e a s in g  i f  m o r e  p r a c tic e  b lo c k s  h a d  b e e n  e x p e r ie n c e d . I n fo r m a tio n
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Reduction is deemed to have occurred where both a reduction in the string-length 
effect over practice is observed and responses in the test block show either a high 
rate o f errors to irregular strings, or a return o f the string-length effect.
In one study (Haider & Frensch, 1999a) the reduction in string length effect, as 
measured by the regression slopes, was correlated against the number o f non-triplet 
errors in the test block and this found a significant correlation, suggesting that they 
may both be measuring the same effect.
3.3 M e t h o d s  U s e d  i n  t h is  s t u d y
The main methodology adopted for this series o f studies was the experimental 
paradigm of Haider and Frensch, with post-testing questionnaires also being used. 
Presentation o f stimuli and recording of RT to each stimulus, along with incorrect 
responses, was achieved via a computer program. The post-testing questionnaires 
used consisted o f a short series o f questions related to the task carried out (Appendix 
1) and, for experiments 4 and 5 reported in chapters 7 and 9, some previously 
validated individual difference instruments which were freely available from 
published papers, internet sources or individual researchers (Appendices 2-6).
3.3.1 D esign  o f new tasks
One aim was to determine whether Information Reduction would be seen in 
tasks analogous to the Alphabet Verification task, or whether it is an artefact o f this 
task. In order to explore this it was necessary to develop some alternative tasks. To 
facilitate comparisons between these new tasks and published results on the 
Alphabet Verification task, the new tasks were designed to have the same 
parameters:
•  one element that was relevant to fulfilling the task and at least one other 
element that was irrelevant
• a variable number o f irrelevant elements so that the equivalent o f the string 
length effect could be detected
•  a method of introducing relevance into the formerly redundant element(s) to 
test for increased errors/ return of the ‘string length effect’
The Alphabet Verification task can be criticised for the fact that each stimulus 
breaks down into two perceptual units: the initial letter-digit-letter triplet and the 
trailing letters, which Haider and Frensch have observed to have different perceptual 
saliency and complexity. This may lead to differential processing, for instance, the 
trailing letters may be processed as a pre-existing instance, since they are well-learned 
sequences. Consequently some participants may not process each letter individually 
and thus not show a string-length effect. Therefore another consideration for the 
new tasks was to avoid continuous strings o f letters from the learned forward 
alphabet sequence, to encourage the participants to process element by element 
initially.
A marginal note in Haider and Frensch (1999a) referring to Lincourt, Rybash, 
& Hoyer (1998) suggests that Information Reduction had also been detected in a 
task where the whole stimulus consisted of letter-digit-letter triplets. A task requiring 
more calculation could lend itself to greater use o f a strategy like Information 
Reduction and with further triplets to compute the string-length effect should be 
apparent for all participants. It will be seen that in order to create different sets of 
stimuli the digit used did not remain as 4 in the various experiments. This task is 
henceforth known as the multiple-triplet task.
One completely novel picture-matching task was devised (see Chapter 4). 
Participants were required to make a same/different judgement between two 
adjacent boxes containing between 3 and 6 geometric shapes, with the differing
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shape always located in the same place in training. The locations o f the other shapes 
within the box varied from trial to trial, although the blocks were repetitions o f each 
other. In the test block the differing shape was randomly positioned elsewhere. It 
was anticipated that boxes with more shapes would take longer to process than those 
with fewer, mimicking the string-length effect. This task differs from the others in 
that there is no clear place to start checking, unlike the linear letter strings, and 
consequently a string length effect may be apparent for both matching and differing 
stimuli. This task will be referred to as the shapes task.
The target search task was developed by Edmunds (2005) and involves 
presenting a memory set o f three letters followed by blocks of random letter strings 
o f 3-7 items. In training the strings either contain one item from the memory set at 
position two, or do not contain a memory set item. For target-absent trials the whole 
stimulus should be processed element-by-element initially, creating a string-length 
effect. In the test block the position o f the memory set item is anywhere from item 
three onwards in the ‘irregular’ trials. The task also addresses one o f the criticisms of 
the Alphabet Verification task by avoiding pre-existing perceptual segmentation.
Examples of the stimuli can be seen in Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, and Tables 9.1 
and 9.4 in Chapter 9.
3.3.2 Experimental m ethod
The method employed was as close to the experiments of Haider and Frensch 
as possible, in order to be able to make comparisons between the tasks and 
conditions. The multiple-triplet task uses the alphabetic sequence and is subject to 
the same criticisms as the Alphabet Verification task, in terms o f repetition o f the 
stimuli; the other two tasks lent themselves to supplying a wide range o f unique
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instances, but these were restricted to similar repeating constraints as in the Alphabet 
Verification task so as to enable comparisons between the tasks.
Although Haider and Frensch give the approximate size o f the letters in their 
display, they do not specify which font was used, nor letter colour or background 
colour. In the papers by Gaschler and Frensch, the font is given as Courier New 
(which has each letter the same size and spaces them equally), black on a pale yellow 
background, although the RGB dimensions for the background are not given. For 
stimuli containing letters, in the experiments reported here, Courier New font was 
used, with the letters approximately the same dimensions on screen as Haider and 
Frensch report, in order to keep as closely as possible to their presentation.
However, pale yellow was not available as a background with the programs used so it 
was kept as white.
Participants were given instruction as to how the stimuli were constructed and 
which key to press for which response. They were told to attend to the whole 
stimulus and to work as quickly and accurately as possible, except where speed was 
being manipulated. There was a practice block o f 10 trials, with feedback. Incorrect 
responses to more than 3 trials resulted in the practice repeating, which should 
ensure that the requirements were understood. In all experiments, except the 
feedback manipulation experiment (Experiment 2, Chapter 5) trial-by-trial feedback 
was given throughout the training trials. Anyone who had over 10% errors during 
training was excluded from the analysis on the basis that they either did not really 
understand the task or did not carry it out correctly. The figure of 10% is in line with 
previous experiments (Haider & Frensch, 1996; Haider & Frensch, 1999a). Stimuli 
were randomly presented within each block.
As well as the training blocks there was a test block in which the location of 
errors was moved in 20% of the incorrect stimuli. Haider and Frensch (1996; 1999a)
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demonstrated that giving feedback during the test block meant that participants were 
more likely to become aware that errors were appearing in the previously irrelevant 
part of the stimulus. Therefore, although initially the error rate rises, it soon drops 
again but conversely the string length effect returns, as participants revert to 
checking the whole string. Piloting for Experiment 1, reported in Chapter 4 o f this 
thesis, suggested it was preferable not to give feedback as the change in relevance 
was spotted after just one or two incorrect responses. Without feedback those who 
have adopted the Information Reduction strategy (‘reducers’) should continue with 
their reduced processing, although they may still become aware o f the change. This 
could be because the lack o f feedback on that one block acted as an alert that 
conditions had changed. N ot giving feedback in the test block gives the opportunity 
to test the correlation between the reduction in string length effect against irregular 
errors, which has previously only been done in one experiment (Haider & Frensch, 
1999a). This also potentially provided a way to distinguish those who were ‘reducers’ 
from those who were ‘non-reducers’, which was another aim of the study.
3.3.3 Analyses
Analyses were identical to those generally employed. Firstly comparing error 
rates between the final training block and the test block, distinguishing between 
errors made to regular and irregular stimuli. Secondly, ANOVA of mean RTs per 
block. Thirdly, computing the regression slopes for each participant and each block, 
using stimulus length as the predictor and RT as the dependent variable and then 
carrying out an ANOVA to test for any change over the course o f the experiment. It 
was expected that error rates to ‘regular’ stimuli (the correct and incorrect stimuli 
seen in training) would be similar between the final training block and the test block, 
but that reducers would show a significantly larger error rate to the ‘irregular’ stimuli. 
Analysis o f the error rates and the change in regression slopes show if Information
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Reduction was being used at an aggregated level, and could also be used to examine 
what individuals were doing. In two experiments Haider and Frensch (2002, 2005) 
used a drop in RT of over a second between blocks as an indication of Information 
Reduction, but this could just indicate that any strategy has started to be used and 
therefore may not be a specific test for Information Reduction. Also this would not 
detect anyone who starts using Information Reduction in the first block.
One problem that is apparent is how to distinguish the effects o f using one 
strategy from another, since participants may employ more than one at a time. 
Analysis o f the ‘string length effect’ by computing regression slopes does remove the 
factor of speeding due to triplet memory, since it is essentially a way to subtract this 
portion of the RT. Edmunds (2005) pointed out that the difference between the 
slopes for correct and incorrect strings could indicate the extent of Information 
Reduction, if it is assumed that processing of incorrect strings terminates once the 
triplet error has been noted. If use o f the strategy is conscious knowledge then one 
possible way that the strategy used can be determined is by the use of post-testing 
questionnaires.
Edmunds (2005) examined whether it was better to consider standardised § 
coefficients rather than b in the regression and concluded that they give similar 
results and both are sensitive to a reduction in the string-length effect, confirming 
that it is not simply an artefact o f the analysis. He also considered whether the effect 
noted and labelled as Information Reduction could in fact be due to fatigue. He 
carried out a small experiment to test for this, in which every block contained a 
significant proportion o f irregular strings, forcing participants to continue checking 
the whole string throughout. Since no Information Reduction was seen under those 
conditions, the conclusion was that the results attributed to Information Reduction 
were unlikely to be explained by a fatigue effect.
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3.3.4 Post-testing questionnaires
Haider and Frensch have hypothesised that Information Reduction is 
consciously applied and therefore it is anticipated that there should be awareness of 
the relevance o f parts o f the stimulus and the redundancy o f other parts. Short 
questionnaires to determine what conscious knowledge o f the task participants had 
on completion have been used in a number o f studies (Edmunds 2005; Gaschler et 
al., 2015; Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 2005). The questions used here were 
adapted from those used by Edmunds. They were general to start with and then 
became more specific, to probe how much participants were able to verbalise about 
the task. An example list o f the questions is in Appendix 1. They were analysed by 
categorising the responses, for instance, whether information about only processing 
the relevant information was freely volunteered and whether the participant 
indicated that they had used the regularity when carrying out the task, and then 
counting the total numbers in each category. In addition the responses were related 
to the individual’s regression slopes and error rate as part of classifying whether they 
were ‘reducers’ or ‘non-reducers’.
There are limits to what can be deduced from such questionnaires, since 
wording o f any question is open to interpretation and may not be understood in the 
manner intended, thus some may not report their knowledge about the task. Also the 
point at which any strategy started to be used cannot be accurately determined, as it 
relies on a post-hoc estimation by the participant. The answers were only used to 
generate basic categorical data, as that was all that was required to map onto the RT 
and error data, and were not analysed in a qualitative way.
The following instruments were used as tests o f individual differences, in order
to establish whether reducers could be distinguished from non-reducers by one or
more o f these means: the functional/dysfunctional impulsivity scale (Dickman,
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1990); the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & 
Parkes, 1982), a measure o f distractibility (Forster & Lavie, 2007); the Squire 
Subjective Memory Questionnaire (Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979), a measure of 
trust in memory; the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005, and personal 
communication, 2014) and the personality factors of agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience. Questions 
to tap the latter were taken from the International Personality Item Pool 
(h ttp ://ip ip .ori.org/). These can be found in Appendices 2-6 and will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 8 on individual differences.
3.4 D a t a  c o l l e c t io n
The method of data collection mainly utilised in these experiments was to send 
a program file over the internet to the participant for them to carry out the 
experiment using their own computer and then return the datafile. Whilst still 
somewhat unusual for RT experiments such as those reported here, this approach to 
data collection is becoming more common (Keller, Gunasekharan, Mayo, & Corley, 
2009). Internet-based data collection started in 1994 and is now widely accepted 
(Reips, 2002). Nonetheless, concerns may be raised as to whether experiments 
carried out without the normal laboratory level of control are valid and reliable 
(Corley & Scheepers, 2002). Potential issues arise around whether the participant 
understands the instructions, remains on task, is interrupted and over the variety of 
hardware in use (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013), all of which could affect 
the data collected. However, advantages of web experiments include a reduction in 
experimenter and demand effects (Crump et al., 2013; Reips, 2002). Crump et al. also 
point out that there is more natural variation in participants’ RTs than in the timing 
differences between different computer systems.
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Studies have demonstrated that data collection carried out in the participants’ 
own enviroment and not under a researcher’s supervision is as valid and reliable as in 
the laboratory, despite the variety o f hardware in use. Corley and Scheepers (2002), 
using a timed linguistic priming experiment via a web-based package (WebExp), 
were able to show the same priming effects as had previously been obtained in a 
laboratory study. The WebExp package is implemented as a Java applet in the 
participant’s browser and interrogates the operating system in order to capture 
timing data (Keller et al., 2009). Keller et al., as well as demonstrating that WebExp 
was able to show the same effects and generate reading times matching those of a 
previously published study investigating reanalysis in sentence processing, also 
showed that it could measure the duration o f a known time interval reliably. Crump 
et al. (2013) replicated several ‘classic’ RT experiments (Stroop, task-switching, 
flanker, Simon, and Posner cuing), using an HTML webpage and running JavaScript 
locally in the browser, recruiting participants through Amazon.com Mechanical 
Turk. They found comparable results to those obtained in the laboratory and 
conclude that even small RT effects o f ~20ms can be reliably measured this way.
The results also suggest that participants completing the experiment and returning 
data do remain on task throughout. Keller et al. (2009) acknowledge that network 
latency could be a problem for web-based RT studies, but this would not be a 
problem for studies such as that reported here, which are carried out entirely on the 
participant’s computer, not through a browser, with the internet only used for file 
exchange.
Participants were recruited from an Open University Psychology module or 
from the Open University Virtual Participant Panel by email invitation (Reips, 2002; 
Reips, 2012), which ensured that no-one participated more than once. Participants 
received no form o f compensation for their time. Crump et al. (2013) found that
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incentive simply altered the rate of recruitment, not the quality o f the data. All 
participants were given 10 practice trials, which repeated if more than 3 incorrect 
responses were recorded. This helped to ensure that the participants understood the 
instructions. Crump et al. conclude that instructional checks are required in learning 
experiments. Additionally, those who had over 10% errors throughout the 
experiment, which indicates the task was not carried out correctly, perhaps due to 
misunderstanding the instructions, were not included in the analysis. Inspection of 
the data on receipt of the file suggested that in a very small number o f trials (0.04% 
across all participants, tasks and experiments) an individual RT was excessively long, 
possibly due to an interruption o f some sort, and these data points were removed. A 
statistical comparison of data collected for Experiment 1 under laboratory conditions 
with that collected from participants via the internet shows no significant differences 
between RTs and the regression coefficients for the slopes at the beginning or end of 
the training (Appendix 7).
After returning the datafile, participants were emailed either the post-testing 
questionnaire as a word-processed document to complete and return (Experiments 
1-3), or a link to a survey set up in Qualtrics containing both the questions about the 
task and some individual difference questionnaires (Experiments 4-5). Using a web- 
based survey gives an ability to maintain consistency of factors such as page layout 
and order of presentation of questions (Hewson, 2014), although it was not 
necessary to use some of the other features available in the package.
3.4.1 Reflection on data collection
Although I had access to a number of cohorts of Open University psychology
students and to the Virtual Participant Panel, actually collecting the data proved to be
a long drawn-out process. O f all those invited to participate, only a small fraction
(around 10-15%) volunteered and then there was further attrition between
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responding to the invitation and returning data. In many cases the reason for this 
was not communicated to me but some participants reported problems running the 
software and it is likely that some o f the other failures to return data had the same 
cause. Additionally, given the repetitive nature o f the task and the time requirement, 
other participants may simply have withdrawn part-way through, either through 
boredom or being interrupted or needing to attend to some other task. Whilst 
participants are always told o f their right to withdraw, it may be easier to do this if 
not ‘under the eye’ o f the researcher. By the very nature o f internet-based research, it 
is hard to find figures comparing the level o f withdrawal with that experienced in 
laboratory-based research. However, it is known that an absent experimenter will 
reduce the level o f obedience (Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986). Those who volunteered 
to participate were inevitably a self-selecting sample, although being Open University 
students were more diverse, certainly in terms of age, than is typically found in many 
other experiments.
Some issues were encountered with the emailed link to the Qualtrics survey, 
which in some cases appeared to be blocked by the participant’s email provider. This 
was discovered in some cases where a participant contacted me to say they had not 
received it. The difficulty was overcome if they had an alternate email address. In 
other cases it was not possible to know if the link had not been received or if the 
participant chose not to complete the questions. Overall 44 questionnaires were not 
returned, from 394 participants who contributed analysable data. This gave a 
response rate o f 89%, which is likely to be higher than that normally experienced for 
internet-based questionnaires, and probably reflects the fact that most o f the attrition 
had already occurred at the recruitment stage.
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Chapter 4 EXPERIMENT 1 
E x p e r im e n t  T e s t in g  N e w  T asks1
4.1 In t r o d u c t io n
Previous experiments in the literature manipulating the Alphabet Verification 
task have enabled a number of conclusions to be drawn about the process of 
Information Reduction, whereby there is an additional speeding over the course o f 
practice which cannot be explained by theories of automaticity, such as the Instance 
theory (Logan, 1988) or the Production rules theory (Anderson, 1987). It has been 
hypothesised that Information Reduction occurs in two stages, with implicit learning 
o f a regularity being bottom-up and data-driven and leading to a top-down strategic 
switch to ignore, at a perceptual level, irrelevant elements of a stimulus (Haider & 
Frensch, 1999b). Whilst it has been noted in other fields that just relevant 
information is used (e.g. Doane et al., 1999; Lee & Anderson, 2001), only Haider and 
Frensch have attributed this to a non-automatic mechanism. Therefore it would 
seem prudent to demonstrate Information Reduction in other tasks than just the 
Alphabet Verification task, to ensure that the results seen are not simply an artefact 
o f this task. For instance, it could be that the construction o f the stimuli themselves 
affords processing which appears to be Information Reduction. Stimuli in the 
Alphabet Verification task consist of two sections which differ in perceptual salience 
and in complexity, thus potentially preferentially attracting attention to one, which 
happens to be the relevant section, above the other. Additionally, the second section 
consists o f alphabetically ordered letters that participants will have encountered
1 The experiment reported in this chapter was included in the paper: Information
Reduction— More than meets the eye? (2015), Nancy E. Rowell, Alison J. K. Green, Helen Kaye &
Peter Naish, Journal o f  Cognitive Psycholog}7, 27:1, 89-113, D01:10.1080/20445911.2014.985300
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many times, thus possibly needing minimal processing or even already existing as 
instances which can be retrieved in one step, as theorised by Logan (1988).
There are aspects o f the results obtained by Haider and Frensch, such as the 
observation that some do not use the strategy, that do not appear to have been 
examined. In the triplet-position-varying experiment, Haider and Frensch (1999a) 
suggest that roughly 40-50% of participants can be classified as ‘reducers’. Later 
experiments (Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 2005) also give similar figures. 
W hat cannot be determined from these papers is whether non-reducers have noticed 
the regularity of errors in training but chosen to ignore this information or whether 
the regularity has not been detected and therefore cannot be used. If Information 
Reduction is a general learning mechanism, available to all, then further exploration 
o f the reducer/non-reducer divide is needed. Using the test block error rates and 
reductions in the string length effect it may be possible to identify reducers from 
non-reducers. If  rates of reduction remain the same with a variety of tasks and 
alterations to training conditions then it could be concluded that people are 
dependably one or other. Post-testing questionnaires may reveal the levels of 
awareness of the regularity amongst non-reducers. The results would provide 
evidence that could be used in theorising about the processes involved.
Haider and Frensch also believe that Information Reduction is a strategy that 
is consciously applied as a result of learning and each person uses it consistently on 
all stimuli o f the same type from the point of adoption onwards. However, it has 
been shown that a strategy change from algorithmic processing to memory retrieval 
can be gradual, rather than abrupt (Rickard, 1997). Experimental evidence is divided 
as to whether strategy shifts are conscious decisions or not: Doane et al. (1996, 1999) 
believe that the Information Reduction-like strategy seen in their polygon-matching 
task was subconscious. Touron and Hertzog (2004a, 2004b) probed participants
during the noun-pair look-up task to determine whether they were using a memory 
strategy or continuing to scan the table. Their results indicated that participants were 
aware and able to report which method they were using. Testing a form of 
Information Reduction aligned with implicit sequence learning (Haider, Eichler, & 
Lange, 2011), using both inclusion and exclusion tasks, suggested that knowledge of 
a regularity/strategy entered conscious awareness for only 34-41% of participants 
and that some participants used the strategy without conscious awareness o f it. Since 
conscious processes are generally controlled, they would also be effortful and slow 
(Moors & De Houwer, 2006), requiring attention and subject to the vagaries of this 
resource, which would preclude absolute consistency in usage. O n the other hand, 
Information Reduction appears to incorporate elements o f automatic processing, in 
that it is fast and could be considered effortless since usage makes processing more 
efficient and thus may not be as consciously applied as Haider and Frensch have 
suggested. Conscious knowledge can be assessed by questioning participants about 
their awareness (Haider et al., 2011). If  Information Reduction is a consciously 
available strategy then it should be reportable in some sense. Riinger and Frensch 
(2010) argue that verbal report is the most sensitive and valid measure o f conscious 
awareness o f an implicitly learned sequence.
The multiple-triplet task was developed from the Alphabet Verification task, 
but the entire string consists o f letter-digit-letter triplets, to address the criticism that 
in the Alphabet Verification task, the relevant part is more salient and complex than 
the irrelevant part. Due to the limited number o f letters in the alphabet, and the fact 
that computing two or three ‘gaps’ o f four letters would be time consuming for the 
participants, it was decided to keep the initial digit as 4 to match the complexity o f 
the Alphabet Verification task, with subsequent digits being 2. The regularity was 
that alphabetic violations always occurred in the initial triplet in training, but
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elsewhere in the string in the test block. Half the trials were correct and half 
incorrect. The second task used was the shapes task and required participants to 
make a same/different judgement between two adjacent boxes containing between 3 
and 6 geometric shapes. The regularity was an alteration to the orientation of the 
shape placed middle right, with irregular stimuli having an orientation change to a 
shape elsewhere in the box. Half the trials had matching boxes and half contained 
one differing shape. The third task employed in this experiment was the target search 
task (Edmunds, 2005). Participants were required to search a variable length letter 
string for a letter in the memory set of C, O and V. Half the trials were target 
present, and half were target absent. In target present trials in training the target was 
always located at position 2 in the string, reading from the left, and anywhere from 
item 3 onwards in irregular strings in the test block. The non-memory set letters in 
each string were randomly generated with no intentional alphabetic sequence or 
word included. Although it can be used with completely new instances on every trial, 
for the purposes o f this study training strings were restricted so that the initial three 
letters repeated within blocks with varying numbers of subsequent letters, and the 
same set o f stimuli were repeated in each training block. Examples o f the stimuli can 
be seen in Table 4.1.
This experiment served two purposes: first to test if Information Reduction is 
used in tasks analogous to the Alphabet Verification task, and second to indicate, if 
possible, the numbers using it in each task. The results of the experiment form a 
control for other experiments which use an identical procedure apart from one 
specific manipulation of training conditions or stimuli. Chapter 3 has outlined the 
three tasks used: the multiple-triplet task, the shapes task and the target search task. 
The hypothesis was that Information Reduction, as detected by a reduction in 
regression slopes over training and either a large number o f errors to "irregular"
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stimuli in the test block or a re-emergence o f the string-length effect, would be seen 
in the new tasks.
4.2 M e t h o d  
4.2.1 Participants
There was a total o f 71 participants, 45 students o f the Open University who 
had recently completed a psychology module and 26 members o f the Open 
University Virtual Participants Panel, who were mainly staff and psychology students 
o f the Open University. 15 were male and 56 were female. There were 25 (4 male) in 
the multiple-triplet task, 23 (4 male) in the target search task and 23 (7 male) in the 
shapes task. Their ages ranged from 24-612, mean age 39. All participants performed 
one task only.
4.2.2 Materials
To construct the multiple triplets 10 initial letters were used (B to K  
inclusively). Each initial letter was used once each with single, double and triple 
triplets, resulting in 30 correct strings. To construct the 30 regular incorrect strings 
the second letter, immediately following the digit 4, was substituted with the next 
one in the alphabet and this meant that any following letters were also shifted one, 
e.g. B(4)G(2)J became B(4)H(2)K. For the test block 12 irregular strings were 
constructed by keeping the initial triplet as the correct strings, but changing the third 
or fourth letter to the next in sequence e.g. B(4)G(2)K. For the practice trials, five 
correct, three incorrect and two irregular strings were selected.
For the shapes task, the following were selected from those available in Powerpoint: 
four-pointed star, isosceles triangle, right-angled triangle, diamond, hexagon, block
2N o age effects were detected — see Appendix 8 for an analysis
arrow, trapezium, block cross, arch, cube and rectangle. Each o f these served as the 
‘target’, with the rectangle being used as the target in the practice trials. A Python 
program was used to randomly generate sequences o f two, three, four and five 
shapes from this selection, with duplicates being allowed. There were 20 sequences 
at each length, giving 80 shape sequences overall. Within a larger rectangle (box) the 
target shape was positioned in the right middle and the other shapes were randomly 
placed around the rectangle. This was then duplicated so that the two boxes 
containing the shapes appeared side by side on the slide. For half of the 80 slides 
created in this way, the target shape was rotated in the right hand box, giving 40 
correct (matching) and 40 incorrect (differing). To create the ‘irregular’ trials in the 
test block, the position of the target shape was swapped with one of the other shapes 
for 16 o f the differing slides.
To construct the strings for the target search task a Python program was 
used to generate 20 random three-letter strings, from almost the entire alphabet, but 
excluding C ,0  and V, to serve as the within-block-repeating part o f the string. 
Duplicate letters were allowed. For 10 o f these the second letter was substituted with 
one of the target letters C, O or V, used in rotation, to create the target present 
strings. This gave 10 target present and 10 target absent strings. Each of these then 
had zero, one, two, three and four additional letters, also generated randomly from 
the Python program, added, so that each initial triplet was used five times, giving 50 
target present and 50 target absent strings. Again, duplicate letters (excluding C, O 
and V) across the whole string were allowed. For the test block, in 20 of the target 
present strings the target letter was swapped with the letter in one o f position three, 
four, five, six or seven to create the irregular strings. This was done with equal 
numbers o f each length. For the practice trials, 5 target present, 3 target absent and 2
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irregular strings were generated on the same principles, but with different 
initial triplets.
4.2.3 Procedure
Most participants were tested remotely by downloading the experiment file to 
their computers, although eight participants in the shapes task were tested under 
laboratory conditions, all on the same computer. Remotely tested participants were 
asked to carry out the task in a quiet room with no interruptions. The briefing and 
task were presented via the computer program — either using the experiment 
generator package E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) or the 
open source software Python. This ensured standardisation o f the procedure, which 
included reminding participants o f their right to withdraw, confidentiality and 
anonymity of data, as well as providing contact details of the researcher.
After briefing, the participants were presented with detailed instructions about 
the task, given examples o f all three types o f stimulus and the response required. 
Participants were instructed to be as fast and accurate as possible. The experiment 
started with a practice session with 10 trials, with immediate visual feedback on 
whether the response was correct or incorrect. If  more than three responses were 
incorrect then the practice repeated. Each trial consisted o f a fixation cross displayed 
in the centre of the monitor for one second, followed by the stimulus which stayed 
on screen until a response was made, and then the feedback of ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ 
was displayed for 500ms.
The training trials, which took place in blocks after the practice, were the same 
except that a blank screen was displayed for 500ms when the response was correct 
and visual feedback was only given if there had been an incorrect response. At the 
end o f each block the participants were encouraged to take a short break.
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The test block, containing the ‘irregular’ stimuli, followed the training blocks 
with no indication that it was in any way different. In this block no feedback was 
given at all, as piloting had suggested that participants became aware o f the change in 
stimuli very quickly if informed o f incorrect responses. Instead every trial was 
followed by a blank screen for 500ms.
At the end o f the experiment, participants were thanked for their participation 
and reminded to return the results file to the experimenter. On receipt o f a datafile, 
the participants were requested to complete a few questions about the task 
(Appendix 1), supplied in a W ord document, and once this had been returned were 
debriefed.
4.2.4 D esign
The within-participants independent variables were block, ‘string length’ and 
type of ‘string’: regular correct, regular incorrect or irregular, as indicated in Table 
4.1. For the multiple-triplet task the string length was one, two or three triplets, for 
the shapes task it was 3-6 shapes and for the target search task it was 3-7 letters.
There were 60 strings per block in the multiple-triplet task, with 8 training 
blocks, giving 480 trials during training. There were 80 shape stimuli per block in the 
shape matching task, with 6 training blocks, giving 480 training trials. There were 100 
strings per block in the target search task, with 5 training blocks, giving 500 training 
stimuli. In each task half the training strings in each block were correct and half were 
incorrect. Each task had one practice block o f 10 stimuli at the beginning and one 
test block after the training blocks. The test block had some regular incorrect stimuli 
replaced with irregular ones — 12 for the multiple-triplet task, 16 for the shapes task 
and 20 for the target search task.
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The dependent variables were response time (RT) to each stimulus and 
number o f stimuli incorrecdy responded to.
4.3 R e s u l t s
4.3.1 Accuracy
The analysis excluded participants with errors in training of 10% or greater for 
all trial blocks. In the multiple-triplet task three were excluded, leaving 22 
participants’ data, and in the shapes task one participant was excluded, leaving 22 
participants’ data. All 23 participants’ data from the target search task were analysed.
Table 4.2 shows that similar numbers o f errors were made to the ‘regular’ 
strings and shapes in the final training block and the test block but more errors were 
made to the irregular strings, inconsistently placed shapes or inconsistently placed 
targets. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (String Type: regular correct, regular 
incorrect and irregular) on error rates for the test block showed a significant 
difference among the trial types for each task. For the multiple-triplet task string 
types, F(2,42) = 76.64, MSE = 62817, p < 0.001, 0.785, with the difference
lying between the regular and irregular strings (pairwise comparison: regular correct 
vs regular incorrect p = 0.269, regular correct vs irregular p < 0.001, regular incorrect 
vs irregular p < 0.001). For the shapes task different shape types, F(2,42) = 19.18, 
MSE = 3047, p < 0.001, 0.477 with each significantly different from the others
(pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular incorrect p = 0.002, regular correct 
vs irregular p < 0.001, regular incorrect vs irregular p < 0.001). For the target search 
task string types, F(2,44) = 58.88, MSE = 2635, p < 0.001, >lp2— 0.728 with the 
difference lying between the regular and irregular strings (pairwise comparison: 
regular correct vs regular incorrect p = 0.06, regular correct vs irregular p < 0.001,
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regular incorrect vs irregular p < 0.001). The effect sizes are large3 for all tasks, 
suggesting that much o f the variance in the error rates is explained by the difference 
in the stimuli types and that the effect would generalise to the population.
Table 4.2: Overall error rates in final training block and test block by stimulus type
Task ‘String type’ Final training 
block
Test
block
Multiple-
triplet
Correct strings 5% 4%
Incorrect strings 4% 6%
Irregular strings - 72.7%
Shapes Matching shapes 1% 0.8%
Differing shapes, consistent position 2.8% 7%
Differing shapes, inconsistent position - 18.5%
Target search Target absent 0.1% 0.2%
Target present, consistent position 0.9% 1.6%
Target present, inconsistent position - 15%
In the multiple-triplet task 14 of the 22 participants (63.6%) incorrectly 
categorised all 12, or almost all (11), o f the irregular strings, and another two 
participants incorrectly categorised two-thirds. In the shapes and the target search 
tasks the highest proportion of irregular string incorrect categorisations was two- 
thirds and one-quarter respectively, with most participants incorrectly categorising 
less than this. However, in the shapes task 8 participants (36%) made at least twice as 
many errors to the inconsistently placed as to the consistently placed differing shapes 
whereas 15 participants (65%) made at least twice as many errors to the target 
present, inconsistent position strings as to the target present, consistent string types 
in the target search task.
3 Richardson (2011) suggests that Cohen’s benchmarks of effect sizes in partial eta-squared are: small - 
.0099, medium - .0588, large - .1379
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4.3.2 Response tim es
There was no significant correlation between overall mean RT and mean error 
rate in training in any task, (multiple-triplet task r(20) = -0.036, p = 0.875; shapes 
r(20) = -0.117, p = 0.605; target search task r(21) = -0.229, p = 0.292) suggesting no 
speed-accuracy trade-off occurred.
Figure 4.1 shows that response times decreased over the course o f practice, 
indicating that overall participants got faster. Responses to correct stimuli were 
slower than to incorrect stimuli, although the RTs for correct and incorrect stimuli 
converged in the multiple-triplet and target search tasks. This seems to reveal a 
greater speeding for the correct stimuli over and above the speeding due to practice.
Figure 4.1: change in response times over the course of each task. Error bars
represent the standard error of the means
Key: solid line — correct stimuli, broken line — incorrect stimuli
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Separate repeated measures ANOVA by Block for each task (Table 4.3) 
showed there was a significant decrease in overall RTs during training for all tasks, 
and that the effect was large for all tasks, indicating that participants got faster.
Table 4.3: ANOVA results for response times in each task, by Block
Multiple-triplet Over training 
(Blocks 1-8)
F(7,147) = 42.4, MSE = 45403977, p 
< 0.001, r]p2= 0.669
Final training Block 
— test Block
F(l,21) = 1.32, MSE = 255059, p = 
0.263, -np2 = 0.059
Shapes Over training 
(Blocks 1-6)
F(5,105) = 48.07, MSE = 2419007, p 
< 0.001, r)p2= 0.696
Final training Block 
— test Block
F(l,21) = 12.2, MSE = 233384, p = 
0.002, y]p2 = 0.367
Target search Over training 
(Blocks 1-5)
F(4,88) = 63.63, MSE = 1045185, p < 
0.001, rip2 = 0.743
Final training Block 
— test Block
F(l,22) = 25.8, MSE = 120403, p < 
0.001,7]p2 = 0.54
In the multiple-triplet task there was no significant increase in RT between the 
final training block and the test block, suggesting that participants did not alter their 
processing speed in the test block. There was a significant increase between the final 
training block and the test block in both the shapes task and the target search task. 
This slowing down suggests that participants reverted to fuller checking o f the
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stimuli. The RTs were slower for the multiple-triplet task, reflecting the counting- 
through-the-alphabet required for each triplet.
4.3.3 “String-length effect”
One of the indicators o f Information Reduction is an increased speeding in 
trials using longer strings or stimuli containing more shapes compared to the shorter 
ones over the course of the task. This can be ascertained by computing the 
regression slopes coefficient for ‘string length’ per participant and block and then 
subjecting these to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA by Block.
For correct strings in the multiple-triplet task there was a significant reduction 
in the slopes during training (Blocks 1-8), F(7,147) = 16.68, MSE = 1949802, p < 
0.001, y]p2 = 0.443. For incorrect strings there was also a significant reduction in 
slopes during training (Blocks 1-8), F(7,147) = 3.29, MSE = 128037, p = 0.017, rjp2 = 
0.135. One reason for this may be that participants were not initially terminating 
their evaluation when the error was encountered, but were checking more of the 
string, this being contrary to previous suggestions (Haider & Frensch, 1996). There 
was no significant increase in the slopes between the final training block and the test 
block for either correct or incorrect strings, F(l,21) = 1.28, MSE = 17468, p = 0.27, 
7]p2 = 0.058, and F < 1 respectively. This was consistent with the high number of 
irregular strings incorrectly categorised, indicating that Information Reduction had 
occurred and only the initial triplet was being checked.
For matching shapes a significant reduction in slopes was found during 
training (Blocks 1-6), F(5,105) = 9.37, MSE = 109312, p < 0.001, r\~= 0.309. For 
differing shapes there was also a significant reduction in slopes during training 
(Blocks 1-6), F(5,105) = 5.67, MSE = 46694, p = 0.001, rjp2 = 0.213, which was 
expected since the boxes cannot be processed in a linear fashion and so initially a
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varying number o f comparisons would be made before finding the ‘incorrect’ shape. 
For matching shapes there was not a significant increase in the slopes between the 
final training block and the test block, F < 1, but there was a significant increase in 
the slopes between the final training block and the test block for differing shapes, 
F(l,21) = 22.6, MSE = 147028, p < 0.001,r\p2 = 0.518. The lack o f a significant 
increase in slope for matching shapes was unexpected, given that many o f the 
irregular stimuli were spotted, since increased checking would have been anticipated 
as a differing shape was not found at the expected position.
In the target search task there was a significant decrease in the coefficient of 
the regression slopes for target absent strings during training (Blocks 1-5), F(4,88) = 
17.47, p < 0.001, MSE = 76173, r\p = 0.443. There was not a significant decrease in 
the coefficient o f the regression slopes for target present strings during training 
(Blocks 1-5), F(4,88) = 2.2, p = 0.123, MSE = 5066, ^p2= 0.091, as would be 
expected, since processing can cease as soon as the target is found. There was a 
significant increase in slopes between the final training block and the test block for 
both target absent and target present strings, F(l,22) = 14.52, p = 0.001, MSE = 
15749, ^p2= 0.398, and F(l,22) = 24.71, MSE = 10986, p < 0.001, r]p2= 0.529 
respectively. The increase in slopes in the test block for target absent strings would 
be expected if participants noticed that the target was occasionally located later in the 
string and therefore checked the whole string when a target was not found at 
position two, however, it would not be expected for target present strings.
The effect size for the change in regression slope over the course o f training 
for correct strings (multiple-triplet task), matching shapes (shapes task) and target 
absent strings (target search task) was large in all cases, suggesting that much o f the 
variance could be explained by an increased speeding for the ‘longer’ stimuli.
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Figure 4.2 shows that in all three tasks the mean o f the regression coefficient 
for each block was higher for the ‘correct’ stimuli than for the ‘incorrect’ and never 
reduced to the same level over the training blocks, suggesting that reduction was not 
complete, at an aggregate level. However, this may conceal what was occurring at an 
individual level. For instance, in the multiple-triplet task if analysis is restricted to the 
14 who, by their error rate, showed no indication of having noticed the irregular 
strings, then the slopes for incorrect and correct strings converge fully at block 7.
Figure 4.2: The change in coefficient of regression slopes plotted by block for 
the different stimuli types in all the tasks (error bars represent the standard 
error of the means)
Key: solid line - correct stimuli, broken line - incorrect stimuli
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It is also noticeable that the slopes for both matching and differing shapes 
were higher at the end of training than those in the other tasks, which may indicate 
that processing did not cease once the relevant location had been checked, even if it 
contained a differing shape.
One pattern that would be consistent with individuals using Information 
Reduction is if the mean coefficient o f the regression slopes for ‘correct’ stimuli over 
the final two training blocks correlates with the error rate for ‘irregular’ stimuli in the 
test block. Participants with the lower slopes at the end of training should have the 
greatest number of errors to ‘irregular’ stimuli, giving a negative correlation.
For the multiple-triplet task this correlation was significant, r(20) = -0.78, p < 
0.001, but for the shapes and the target search tasks it was not, (r(20) = -0.17, p = 
0.44 and r(21) = 0.22, p = 0.32 respectively). For these two tasks this probably 
reflects the fact that although a significantly larger number o f errors were made to 
the ‘irregular’ stimuli in the test block, all participants spotted most o f them. Figure 
4.3 shows scatterplots o f these two measures with levels of awareness, from the 
questionnaires, for the three tasks.
4.3.4 Post-task questionnaires
Based on the answers to all the questions the responses were coded into 
“explicitly aware/used Information Reduction strategy”, “explicitly aware, continued 
checking irrelevant elements”, and “did not verbally express regularity”, relating to 
awareness o f the regularity of positioning and use o f an Information Reduction 
strategy. An example of the first was: “Whether it was right or wrong could be 
decided by the second letter. I only looked at the first 2 letters regardless o f how 
long the string was” and an example o f the second was “I noticed that the error was 
always at the beginning but I thought that might be a way o f lulling us into a ‘false
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sense o f security’ so always checked anyway”. The coded responses are shown on the 
scatterplots in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Scatterplots showing the mean coefficient of regression slopes 
over the final two training blocks against the percentage of errors to the 
‘irregular’ stimuli, indicating categorisation from the questionnaire
Key ♦  - explicitly expressed regularity and indicated use of Information 
Reduction strategy
■ - aware of regularity, but continued checking irrelevant elements 
A — did not verbally express regularity 
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It can be seen that in the multiple-triplet task the verbal reports do mainly 
distinguish ‘reducers’ from ‘non-reducers’, where ‘reducers’ are those with low slopes 
and high errors. However, three people who appeared to be unaware of the 
regularity were acting as if reducers, which is inconsistent with the proposal that 
Information Reduction is a consciously adopted strategy. The picture is more mixed 
for the shapes task where the data show that no participant was fully reducing and 
half the participants showed no explicit awareness o f any regularity. It could be 
surmised that partial reducing occurred, with those who indicated use o f Information 
Reduction being amongst those with the higher number of errors and lowest slopes. 
The picture is also mixed for the target search task, where all participants had low 
slopes and the majority showed no explicit awareness o f the regularity, but again it 
would appear that some partial reduction was occurring. There are no published 
criteria for assessing whether partial reduction has occurred, or how this might 
manifest in the participants’ self-report. Some questionnaires stated that the 
regularity was checked first and then other checking occurred, some or all o f the 
time, and this may be evidence o f partial reduction.
4.4 D iscussion
From the significandy larger number o f errors made to ‘irregular’ stimuli and
the significant reduction in slopes for ‘regular correct’ stimuli it would appear that
Information Reduction occurred in all three tasks. This supports the hypothesis that
Information Reduction, as determined by these measures, would be seen in these
new, analogous, tasks. The results suggest that Information Reduction can be seen at
an aggregate level in a variety of cognitive laboratory tasks, providing evidence to
support Haider and Frensch’s assertion that it is a general learning process.
However, for the shapes and target search tasks all the participants noticed the
change in regularity in the test block, whereas only a few did so for the multiple-
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triplet task. This suggests that in the former tasks Information Reduction had not 
been fully adopted, which is at odds with Haider and Frensch’s suggestion that the 
strategy is applied consistendy. However, many participants in these two tasks 
appeared unaware o f the regularity, so it could be that Information Reduction is only 
used consistently once some conscious awareness has developed. This latter position 
would be compatible with the Unexpected-Event hypothesis (Frensch et al., 2003).
In terms o f determining whether reducers could be distinguished from non­
reducers, this was the case for the multiple-triplet task, with 64% classified as 
reducers, but not for the shapes or target search tasks. Most o f those in the multiple- 
triplet task identified as reducers from their data could also be identified as such 
from their self-reports, although in a few cases the participant showed no awareness 
o f the regularity or having changed their processing. The figure of 64% reducers in 
the multiple-triplet task (22 participants, with 480 training trials) compares to 
approximately 41% found by Haider and Frensch (1999a) in the relevant-first 
condition and 55% in the relevant-last condition of the Alphabet Verification task 
(22 and 23 participants respectively, with 700 training trials). Whilst the number of 
participants is small in both Haider and Frensch’s experiment and the one reported 
here, the results point towards the number o f reducers varying from task to task, 
although it is possible that task differences might be confounded with differences in 
the amount of practice. The multiple-triplet task required participants to carry out 
several calculations for the longer strings and it would appear to be more efficient to 
use Information Reduction for this task than the Alphabet Verification task, where 
all strings incorporate a single calculation. Overall, the results from all three tasks are 
suggestive o f Information Reduction being differentially adopted depending on 
characteristics o f the tasks.
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Although it was not possible to determine a number of ‘reducers’ in the shapes 
and target search tasks, the aggregate data suggested Information Reduction had 
occurred and some participants indicated usage in their self-reports. It may be that it 
would require more practice for Information Reduction to become fully established 
in these tasks. It appeared that a number o f people were partially using the strategy 
but how many and to what extent could not be quantified. It is possible that 
participants learned where to look initially, and if they found a differing shape or 
target letter ceased checking, but for the matching shapes or target absent strings 
tended to continue with some level o f checking and thus spotted many o f the 
irregular items in the test block. The results from all three tasks point towards a basic 
classification o f four ‘types’ o f people: aware users who discover and use the 
Information Reduction strategy; aware non-users who discover but choose not to 
use it for some reason; non-aware users who are apparently not aware o f the 
regularity but still show signs in their data o f usage; and non-aware non-users.
Since all participants in the shapes and target search tasks noticed some o f the 
‘irregular’ stimuli in the test block then it would appear that no-one is an ‘always- 
reducer’, using the strategy exclusively whenever they spot a regularity. The variation 
in use between tasks also suggests that there is not a constant proportion o f people 
who are reducers. Some self-reports suggested awareness o f the regularity but a 
decision not to exploit it. The number o f ‘reducers’ varying from zero upwards and 
the existence o f ‘deliberate non-reducers’ supports the idea that using Information 
Reduction is a conscious decision. However, the fact that some reducers were unable 
to verbalise the strategy, the possibility o f partial reduction and the fact that the data 
for some ‘deliberate non-reducers’ also pointed towards partial usage, suggest that 
adoption of Information Reduction is not necessarily an all-or-nothing conscious
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move by participants and that there may be some automaticity involved, indicating it 
is more complex than hypothesised by Haider and Frensch.
There are a number o f possible reasons, which could exist in combination, 
why the numbers using Information Reduction differed across the tasks. Firstly, both 
the shapes and target search tasks were processed more quickly than the multiple- 
triplet task indicating that they were easier tasks. Doane et al. (1999) found that the 
strategy used varied with the difficulty of the task. They concluded that an 
Information Reduction-like strategy had occurred in the difficult version, and the 
current results tally with that. Secondly, the participants were more likely to notice 
the change in regularity in the test blocks for the shapes and target search tasks than 
for the multiple-triplet task, and this could be related to how much of the rest o f the 
stimulus was in the focal area or was perceived. Alternatively it may be related to the 
ease of the task, or it may be that Information Reduction requires more practice in 
these tasks before becoming fully established. Thirdly, it may be that Tull’ reduction 
is more likely to be seen when there is some sort o f calculation needed, as in the 
multiple-triplet task and Alphabet Verification task, rather than when the task is 
purely visual, as in the shapes and target search tasks. Fourthly, instance learning may 
be involved. With both the multiple-triplet task and the Alphabet Verification task 
the initial triplet occurs a number o f times within each block. If each o f these 
becomes an instance, even though the rest o f the stimulus may vary, then each can 
create many traces (Logan, 1988) or strengthen the representation (Rickard, 1997), 
increasing the chance of direct memory retrieval of the response needed. The 
structure of the shapes task meant that instances were not repeated within blocks, 
decreasing the chance of direct response retrieval. Where the required response is 
directly retrieved then processing o f any other parts of the stimulus may be less likely 
to occur, encouraging the development o f Information Reduction.
Doane et al (1999) explain their Information Reduction-like results in terms of 
a synthesised data-driven model o f automaticity incorporating both rule compilation 
and instance learning (Anderson et al., 1997). Lee and Anderson (2001) suggest that 
improvements in the speed of execution o f different elements o f a task are due to 
different mechanisms, some of which are due to attentional shifts, i.e. reducing 
fixation time, which occur below the level o f awareness. Some o f the participants in 
our experiments did not appear to be aware o f the potential strategy, although they 
may have been using it. Proponents o f the Information Reduction model reject the 
notion that theories o f automaticity are compatible with the top-down conscious 
processing observed in the Alphabet Verification task (Gaschler & Frensch, 2007). 
Instead they favour the idea that sometimes strategy change occurs as a result o f a 
continuous, implicit, data-driven and not verbally expressible mechanism and 
sometimes as a result o f abrupt, explicit, top-down and verbally expressible 
processing. The idea that the learning develops implicitly and then becomes available 
to conscious awareness, as the Information Reduction hypothesis would suggest, 
does explain some o f the results from this experiment, such as the presence o f non- 
aware users. However, it is not clear why those who become aware o f a shortcut to 
processing should make a conscious decision not to use it. For some, as with the 
questionnaire extract quoted above (section 4.3.4), it may be related to knowledge o f 
being in a psychology experiment and belief that it is necessary to maintain vigilance 
in case o f some ‘catch’. For others it may be that the instruction at the start, that 
errors could occur anywhere, and the instruction to be accurate as well as fast, kept 
them from ‘letting go’ (Hoyndorf & Haider, 2009).
Due to the limited number of potential participants for the rest o f the 
experiments it was decided that only two tasks could be carried forward. The string- 
length effect, as measured in the Block 1 regression slopes, was biggest in the
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multiple-triplet task and shapes task and these both showed a greater range of error 
rate in the test block. The existence of the string-length effect in all tasks indicates 
that all have potential for Information Reduction to occur and the size of the 
coefficient does not relate to how much additional speeding may be achieved by 
using the strategy. However, the combination of overall fast RTs even in the first 
block, low slopes and low error rates in the target search task suggests that it would 
have less sensitivity for detecting changes in the number of people using Information 
Reduction due to other manipulations. Additionally, this task had previously been 
used in a variety o f experiments (Edmunds, 2005). Consequently, the multiple-triplet 
and shapes tasks were selected for further experiments. The next two experiments, 
detailed in chapters 5 and 6, start to explore the third research question, o f whether 
alterations to training conditions change the number of people using Information 
Reduction.
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C h a p ter  5 EXPERIMENT 2
F e e d b a c k  M a n i p u l a t i o n 4
5.1 In t r o d u c t io n
Having established that Information Reduction occurs in the multiple-triplet 
task and the shapes task, with different numbers of participants using it in each, this 
experiment sought to test if  changing the training conditions would affect the 
numbers using it. It should be possible to affect a consciously-controlled strategy by 
alterations to external conditions, whereas Instance theory (Logan, 1988) would 
predict no change since the faster processing derives from a subconscious switch 
from using the steps o f an algorithm to direct memory retrieval as a result o f 
encounters with the specific stimuli. Similarly, the Production rules theory 
(Anderson, 1987) would not predict any change, since the productions to be used to 
carry out the task would be the same.
Skill training often involves feedback, although the amount and type can be 
variable, even over the duration o f learning. In the Alphabet Verification task 
experiments feedback has been applied in a number o f ways: either on a trial-by-trial 
basis (Haider & Frensch, 1996), at the end o f each block (Haider & Frensch, 1999b), 
or not at all (Haider et al., 2005). The initial series o f experiments (Haider & Frensch, 
1996) gave feedback in two ways: participants were informed of errors in their 
verification as they occurred by a screen prompt and an audible tone, both during 
the training blocks and during the transfer block, except for the transfer block in the 
no-feedback condition in experiment 2; in addition participants were informed o f
4 The experiment reported in this chapter was included in the paper: Information
Reduction— More than meets the eye? (2015), Nancy E. Rowell, Alison J. K. Green, Helen Kaye &
Peter Naish, Journal o f Cognitive Psychology, 27:1, 89-113, DOI:10.1080/20445911.2014.985300
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their error rate and mean response time per block, on a block-by-block basis. The 
same sort o f feedback was employed for the triplet-position manipulation (Haider & 
Frensch, 1999a), although in the test block only half o f the participants in the 
relevant-first and relevant-last conditions received feedback. However, in the eye- 
tracking experiment reported in the same paper, feedback was only given at the end 
o f each block, as mean response times and error rates for the block. This was also 
the way feedback was given in the speed-accuracy experiments (Haider & Frensch, 
1999b), with mean RTs followed by accuracy in the speed conditions and the reverse 
in the accuracy conditions. The later experiments, manipulating string frequency 
(Gaschler & Frensch, 2007; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009), gave trial-by-trial feedback 
on errors during training but not during test, as well as end-of-block feedback. In 
general no rationale has been given either for the use of feedback or the variations in 
particular experiments, although one could speculate that giving trial-by-trial error 
feedback in experiments emphasising speed may distract the participants and cause 
slowing in order to be accurate. In the inconsistent training experiment (Haider et al., 
2005), feedback may have been removed so as not to alert the participants to the 
manipulation. From the results o f the various experiments it would seem that 
Information Reduction is adopted whether or not trial-by-trial feedback is given. 
However, it is difficult to compare across the experiments due to other differences in 
procedures.
Edmunds (2005) ran a small-scale pilot to test the effect of having only end-of- 
block feedback instead of trial-by-trial. Results suggested that fewer adopt 
Information Reduction in the Alphabet Verification task with only end-of-block 
feedback, or that those who adopt do so less completely. Thus it could be surmised 
that reinforcement of a correct response in which the participant had used 
Information Reduction, which essentially occurs with lack of an error prompt, would
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encourage the further use of the strategy. If  this is the case it would help confirm its 
theorised conscious nature.
Experiment 1 (Chapter 4) gave trial-by-trial visual feedback on errors during 
training but not during test. However, some participants commented on the lack of 
error prompts there, and this may have alerted them to the block being different, 
thus increasing vigilance and noticing o f the irregular stimuli. Additionally, in the 
shapes task, there was a doubling o f errors to differing shapes from the final training 
block to the test block. The reason for this is not known, but this anomaly may have 
arisen because feedback was removed at this point. A line length estimation task 
carried out by Judd in 1905 (cited in Kluger and DeNisi, 1996) found an increase in 
errors when switching from no feedback to feedback. However, there is 
contradictory evidence from e.g. Arps (1920). Possible reasons for this may be 
differences in the order of giving and removing feedback or the type o f task. It was 
considered that removal of feedback from some of the training trials in the current 
tasks, to enhance contextual similarity between the conditions in practice and 
retention (the test block), may be beneficial.
It has been shown that feedback does not always improve learning (Kluger & 
DeNisi, 1996). For instance, it has been suggested that feedback can positively or 
negatively affect motivation, resulting in an increase or decrease in attempts to 
perform correctly, and /or it can cause a shift in attention. In the type o f tasks used 
in Information Reduction research error notification may cause attention to be 
redirected to consider the whole stimulus, negating any reduction occurring. In their 
meta-analysis of feedback interventions Kluger and DeNisi found that feedback on 
memory tasks is more effective than feedback on tasks requiring rules to be 
followed, which has implications for Information Reduction tasks that may involve 
both memory (e.g. instance acquisition) and rules e.g. the algorithm in the Alphabet
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Verification task and multiple-triplet task, or even the Information Reduction rule 
itself, once noticed.
In motor-skill learning, feedback can create a dependency, with performance 
breaking down without it (Buchanan & Wang, 2012). Buchanan and Wang suggest 
that the motor representation develops better when relying on internal 
proprioceptive feedback than on external ‘knowledge of results’, hence the 
performance decrement when an apparently learned task is performed without 
feedback. One way to prevent this dependency is to reduce the amount o f feedback 
given (Winstein & Schmidt, 1990). Feedback early on is thought to help the 
participant achieve the required responses, but a reduction later in the learning 
process is not considered detrimental and may even be beneficial. Many laboratory 
tasks have both a perceptual and motor representation, for instance when learning a 
sequence o f key presses in response to visual stimuli, and it has been hypothesised 
that these are learned independently by two different cortical systems (Hikosaka et 
al., 1999). Spatial learning relies on attention and working memory and tends to 
occur quickly and be flexible, whereas motor learning takes longer, being acquired 
with practice. The tasks used in this set o f experiments require learning o f the 
appropriate movement response for the ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ keys for each of the 
stimuli and this aspect may develop more readily if feedback is not given.
Considering these previous results it is unclear if trial-by-trial feedback is 
helpful or required throughout the whole training period. Thus it was decided that 
for Experiment 2 trial-by-trial feedback would cease halfway through the training 
phase, and participants were informed of this. If  removal of feedback for the test 
block in Experiment 1 caused an overall increase in errors then an earlier change 
should shift the increase to the point of removal. Having feedback for the first half 
o f the experiment means that if the regularity has been noticed and Information
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Reduction used then it will have been reinforced for 240 trials, but it is not clear 
whether this is sufficient to encourage the same levels o f adoption o f the strategy as 
Experiment 1. It was anticipated that participants who had discovered and 
implemented the strategy prior to removal o f feedback would continue to use it, 
although they may initially revert to full checking in case it was no longer valid.
Those who discovered the regularity after the removal o f feedback should adopt the 
Information Reduction strategy from then on.
5.2 Me t h o d
5.2.1 Participants
There was a total o f 47 participants, 18 students o f the Open University 
undertaking a psychology module and 29 members o f the Open University Virtual 
Participants Panel, who were mainly staff and psychology students o f the Open 
University. No participant had performed in Experiment 1. All participants carried 
out only one task. 10 were male and 37 were female. There were 25 (6 male) in the 
shapes task, and 22 (4 male) in the multiple-triplet task. Their ages ranged from 22- 
56, mean age 41.
5.2.2 D esign  and materials
For both the multiple-triplet and shapes tasks these were identical to 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 4).
5.2.3 Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 for the first 240 training trials. At 
this point, participants were informed that feedback on errors would cease. All 
stimulus screens from that point until the experiment was completed were followed 
by a blank screen for 500ms — this was 240 further training trials and then the test
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block. The test block had 60 trials for the multiple-triplet task and 80 for the shapes 
task.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Accuracy
Participants who had more than 10% per block errors throughout training 
were not included in the analysis. N o participants were excluded from the multiple- 
triplet task analysis but data from three were removed from the shapes task analysis, 
leaving 22 participants in each.
Table 5.1 shows that similar numbers of errors were made to the ‘regular’ 
strings and shapes in the final training block and the test block. Over four times 
more errors were made to the consistently placed differing shapes than the matching 
shapes in both blocks. Whilst the feedback manipulation removed the disparity 
between the final training block and the test block in this task for consistently placed 
differing shapes, this can be accounted for by the fact that there were more errors to 
this stimulus type at the end of training. In other words, the error rate had not 
declined as much over training as in Experiment 1. There was no increase in errors 
when the feedback was removed. In the multiple-triplet task there were fewer errors 
made overall than in Experiment 1.
For both tasks more errors were made to the irregular strings and 
inconsistently placed shapes, but whilst the error rate for inconsistently placed 
shapes was similar to Experiment 1, there was a considerable reduction in errors to 
irregular strings. Six participants made no errors and seven participants made just 
one error to these, suggesting that the cessation of feedback made the participants in 
this task more cautious overall.
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Table 5.1: Overall error rates in final training block and test block by stimulus type
Task ‘String type’ Final training 
block
Test
block
Multiple-triplet Correct strings 2.9% 2.4%
Incorrect strings 1% 2.3%
Irregular strings - 15.9%
Shapes Matching shapes 0.6% 1.1%
Differing shapes, consistent 
position
4.5% 5.9%
Differing shapes, inconsistent 
position
18.8%
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (String Type: regular correct, regular 
incorrect and irregular) on error rates for the test block showed a significant 
difference between the trial types for each task. For the multiple-triplet string types, 
F(2,42) = 5.55, MSE = 2629, p = 0.027, y]2 = 0.209, with the difference lying 
between the ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ strings (pairwise comparisons: regular correct vs 
regular incorrect p — 0.874; regular correct vs irregular p = 0.034; regular incorrect vs 
irregular p = 0.021). For the shapes task different shape types, F(2,42) = 19.92, MSE 
= 2884, p < 0.001, 0.487 with each significantly different from the others
(pairwise comparisons: regular correct vs regular incorrect p = 0.001; regular correct 
vs irregular p< 0.001; regular incorrect vs irregular p = 0.001). Again the effect sizes 
in both tasks are large, suggesting that some o f the variance in the error rates is 
explained by the difference in the stimuli types. For the multiple-triplet task the 
effect is smaller than Experiment 1, where the effect size was .785, but is very similar 
for the shapes task (.477 in Experiment 1).
In the multiple-triplet task 2 of the 22 participants (9%) incorrectly categorised
all 12 or almost all (11) of the irregular strings. In the shapes task the highest
proportion o f incorrect categorisations was just over half o f the irregular strings,
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however 7 out of the 22 participants (32%) made at least twice as many errors to the 
inconsistently placed as to the consistendy placed differing shapes, which may 
indicate that some degree of Information Reduction had occurred.
5.3.2 Response tim es
In neither task was there a significant correlation between overall mean RT 
and mean error rate in training, (multiple-triplet r(20) = 0.038, p = 0.867; shapes 
r(20) = -0.153, p = 0.497) suggesting that there was not a speed-accuracy trade-off.
Figure 5.1 shows that response times decreased during each task, with an 
increase in the test block, particularly in the multiple-triplet task.
Figure 5.1: change in response times over the course of each task. Error bars
represent the standard error of the means
Key: solid line — correct stimuli, broken line — incorrect stimuli
a) Multiple-triplet
b) Shapes
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The RTs for correct stimuli were slower than those for incorrect. Overall RTs were
slower for the multiple-triplet task. The RTs for correct and incorrect strings did
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begin converging in the first half o f the experiment, when feedback was being given, 
but once the feedback ceased so did the convergence.
Separate repeated measures ANOVA by Block for each task (Table 5.2) 
showed there was a significant decrease in overall RTs during training and a 
significant increase in RT between the final training block and the test block, with 
large effect sizes. RTs for matching shapes increased slighdy when feedback ceased, 
suggesting that the notified change caused more careful checking. This was more 
noticeable at the individual level with 10 participants (45%) showing an increase in 
RT at this point, in two cases to above the mean RT for their first block, whilst the 
others continued to show a steady decline in RT.
Table 5.2: ANOVA results for response times by Block
Multiple-triplet Over training 
(Blocks 1-8)
F(l,147) = 44.78, MSE = 
51258029, p < 0.001, r]p2 = 
0.681
Final training Block 
— test Block
F(1,21) = 37.98, MSE = 
7443453, p < 0.001, ^  = 0.644
Shapes Over training 
(Blocks 1-6)
F(l,105) = 21.79, MSE = 
2189050, p < 0.001, -np2 = 0.509
Final training Block 
— test Block
F(l,21) = 22.25, MSE = 417795, 
p <  0.001,r\p2 = 0.514
5.3.3 “String-length effect”
The regression slopes coefficient for ‘string length’ per participant and block 
were computed and subjected to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA by Block. 
This shows whether the RT for longer ‘strings’ decreased reliably more than that for 
shorter ‘strings’ which would be indicative o f a shortcut being applied to the longer 
‘strings’. The change in coefficient o f regression slopes for both tasks is shown in 
Figure 5.2.
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For correct strings in the multiple-triplet task there was a significant reduction 
in the slopes during training (Blocks 1-8), F(7,147) = 16.13, MSE = 1180079, p < 
0.001, r\p2 = 0.434 and a significant increase in the slopes between the final training 
block and the test block, F(l,21) = 14.58, MSE = 948463, p = 0.001, r \2 — 0.41. The 
large effect sizes, which for training was of the same order as Experiment 1, suggests 
that some o f the variance could be explained by an increased speeding for the longer 
strings during training and also a greater slowing in the test block. For incorrect 
strings there was no significant reduction in the regression slopes over the course of 
training (Blocks 1-8), F(7,147) = 1.46, MSE = 23897, p = 0.187, rj] 2 =0.065; however 
there was a significant increase in slopes between the final training block and the test 
block, F(l,21) = 80.38, MSE = 1451571, p < 0.001, ^  = 0.793. Figure 5.2 shows 
that there was less convergence of the slopes for correct and incorrect strings than in 
Experiment 1. There would seem to have been some Information Reduction 
occurring in this task, but not to the same extent as in Experiment 1.
For matching shapes there was no significant decrease in regression slopes 
over the course o f training (Blocks 1-6), F < 1, nor was there a significant increase in 
slopes between the final training block and the test block F(l,21) = 1.52, MSE = 
10432, p = 0.232, y\2 — 0.067. There was an increase in slopes for matching shapes 
when feedback ceased, suggesting that some, at least, o f the participants were 
disturbed by this change and reverted to full checking of the boxes. This increase is 
probably the reason that there was no significant decrease in regression slopes during 
training.
For differing shapes there was a significant reduction in the regression slopes 
over the course o f training (Blocks 1-6), F(5,105) = 3.29, MSE = 65889, p = 0.029, 
r\p2 =0.135 and a significant increase in slopes between the final training block and 
the test block F(l,21) = 19.43, MSE = 119085, p < 0.001, rjp2 = 0.481.
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Figure 5.2: The change in coefficient of regression slopes plotted by block for 
the different stimuli types in both tasks (error bars represent the standard 
error of the means)
Key:
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block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 blocks blocks test
The correlational analysis for the mean coefficient of the regression slopes for 
correct strings/matching shapes over the final two training blocks with the error rate 
for ‘irregular’ stimuli in the test block was almost significant for the multiple-triplet 
task, r(20) = -0.418, p = 0.053, and significant for the shapes task, r(20) = -0.622, p 
= 0.002. Scatterplots for these are shown in Figure 5.3, where it can be seen that 
there were two identifiable reducers (9%) in the multiple-triplet task. Once again 
there were no identifiable reducers in the shapes task, probably because all the 
participants noticed some o f the irregular stimuli in the test block.
5.3.4 Post-task questionnaires
One questionnaire for the multiple-triplet task was not returned. The 
responses were coded as before and are indicated in Figure 5.3. For the multiple-
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triplet task, the two participants already identified as reducers gave a self-report that 
showed they were aware of the regularity and used the strategy. Several other 
participants indicated in the questionnaire that although they were aware of the 
regularity and made some use o f it, they also carried out some checks on the rest of 
the string, so that their slopes generally remained high and they spotted the change in 
the test block. For those who indicated that they were aware of the regularity but had 
not used it the slopes suggest that they may have done so until the point at which the 
feedback ceased. They showed no sign of returning to use it after a block or two of 
checking that the rule still held.
Figure 5.3: Scatterplots showing the mean coefficient of regression slopes 
over the final two training blocks against the percentage of errors to the 
‘irregular’ stimuli, indicating categorisation from the questionnaire
Key ♦  - explicidy expressed regularity and indicated use of Information 
Reduction strategy
■ - aware of regularity, but continued checking irrelevant elements 
▲ - did not verbally express regularity 
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In the shapes task the data show that no participant was fully reducing. Nearly 
half the participants showed no explicit awareness o f any regularity in the 
questionnaire, although some may have been partially reducing, as suggested by their 
error rates. Once again it does seem that not all are sufficiently aware o f their 
strategy use to be able to explicitly verbalise it. Nonetheless it could be surmised that 
some partial reducing occurred, with a number of participants who were aware of the 
regularity and indicating they made use of it also indicating a degree o f residual 
checking.
5.4 D iscussion
This experiment was conducted to start investigating whether the numbers of
participants using Information Reduction vary if the training conditions are altered.
The change in coefficient o f the regression slopes suggests that, for the multiple-
triplet task and the differing shapes (although not the matching shapes), Information
Reduction was occurring at the aggregate level. The error rate to irregular strings
however, suggests that there was much less Information Reduction in the multiple-
triplet task than Experiment 1, and this is reflected in the fact that only two
participants could be identified as reducers from the scatterplot. For the shapes task,
the amount o f Information Reduction, as measured by the overall error rate to
irregular shapes and visually from the scatterplot, appears similar to Experiment 1.
Thus the two tasks seem to have been differentially affected by the removal o f
feedback halfway through training. Complete Information Reduction all but
disappeared from the multiple-triplet task, whereas for the shapes task the
manipulation merely seems to have slightly unsettled the participants, as shown by an
increase in RT and slopes at the point it was removed. These results tend to rule out
theories of automaticity as sole explanations for the processing occurring. If  either
instance learning (Logan, 1988) or creation o f production rules (Anderson, 1987)
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leads to Information Reduction, then there should have been the same level of 
reduction in both tasks as seen in Experiment 1, since the stimuli were identical, 
required the same processing and were seen for the same number of trials.
It has been suggested that Information Reduction is consciously and abruptly 
applied so that once the strategy has been noticed, it serves to change behaviour 
from that point onwards for all stimuli o f the same type (Gaschler & Frensch, 2009; 
Haider & Frensch, 2002). Therefore it would be expected that anyone who had 
noticed the shortcut and had started to use it, before the feedback was removed, 
would continue to do so. There might be a short period where they revert to 
checking the whole stimulus after removal o f feedback, but once satisfied that the 
rule still holds should re-implement the strategy. This does not seem to have 
occurred here. Although the slopes suggest that Information Reduction occurred 
throughout, it would seem that many o f the ‘reduction-aware’ participants were 
carrying out checking of some entire strings (which might be termed ‘partial 
reduction’), so the change in regularity in the test block was noticed. Additionally, 
inspection of individual slopes, for those indicating on the questionnaires that they 
had not used the strategy, suggests that a number of ‘aware users’ became ‘aware 
non-users’ on removal of feedback, deciding not to use the regularity for the rest of 
the experiment. This could indicate that use of Information Reduction is a 
consciously controlled process, as hypothesised. However, it also seems to be 
sensitive to changes in conditions and this is at odds with the idea that it is applied 
from the point at which it is noticed that a strategy can be used.
Comparing to previous experiments which have assessed the number of 
people using Information Reduction, the result for the multiple-triplet task in this 
experiment does seem to be an anomaly. The control experiment (Chapter 4) found 
64% of the participants in the multiple-triplet task could be classified as reducers.
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Haider and Frensch (1999a) gave feedback on errors throughout training in a triplet- 
position-altering experiment and found that 52% of those in the relevant-last 
condition and 41% of those in the relevant-first condition could be classified as 
reducers. Haider et al. (2005) gave no feedback at all in an inconsistent training 
experiment and found 63% of participants in the Always-regular condition could be 
classed as reducers, although they arrived at this result from analysis o f RT- 
discontinuities o f > Is between blocks. Edmunds (2005) found that using only end- 
of-block feedback resulted in less Information Reduction occurring in the Alphabet 
Verification task — whilst there was still a significantly higher error rate to irregular 
strings in the test block, the slopes did not decline significantly. So, when feedback is 
either fully present or fully absent, it would appear there are similar numbers who 
use the strategy. However, having intermittent feedback, either just at the end of 
each training block or, as in this experiment, having trial-by-trial feedback removed, 
seriously affects Information Reduction usage in a task where a computation is 
involved.
This anomaly, along with the differential results for the multiple-triplet and 
shapes tasks, may indicate that more than one mechanism is at work. The multiple- 
triplet task could involve either instance or working memory — a number o f 
participant questionnaires revealed that memory strategies were being used, 
particularly when the triplet seemed to make a word. For instance, B(4)G looks like 
BAG and H(4)M looks like HAM, making it easy to remember that those are correct 
triplets. Without feedback people may not have been willing to rely on their memory 
for the desired response. Touron and Hertzog (2004a, 2004b) demonstrated that a 
change to a memory retrieval strategy was affected by confidence in memory ability. 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found that feedback on memory tasks was more effective 
than for tasks with rules to be followed and this suggests the multiple-triplet task
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may be treated by participants as primarily a memory task. Thus even those who are 
aware o f the regularity may choose not to use it without reinforcement for correct 
answers when an algorithm is involved.
With the shapes task, however, instance learning was less likely and use of 
working memory unlikely, since the combination of shapes and their configuration 
within the boxes was unique in each of the 80 stimuli in each block. Therefore, 
although the removal of feedback unsetded some o f the participants, causing an 
increase in RT and slopes coefficient for matching shapes at that point, overall it 
does not seem to have affected the amount of Information Reduction seen. As with 
Experiment 1, there is no clear division between reducers and non-reducers in this 
task and nobody seemed to use the strategy completely, so that it was not possible to 
deduce the number o f reducers. The aggregate data suggested that Information 
Reduction had occurred and the self-reports support this. Thus it would seem that it 
was only partially used by some participants. The current Information Reduction 
model, which proposes that either the strategy is abrupdy and fully adopted for all 
stimuli at the same time (all) (Haider & Frensch, 2002; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009) or 
not adopted at all (nothing) would need to be extended to explain ‘partial reduction’. 
How ‘partial reduction’ might manifest in processing is not known, and this could be 
differendy in different people, or differendy in the same person under different 
conditions. For example, it could be that some stimuli were fully processed whereas 
only the relevant portion was processed in others. It could be that random parts of 
some stimuli were processed (Haider & Frensch, 1999b).
Although there were no non-aware users in the multiple-triplet task, unlike 
Experiment 1, there were several in the shapes task whose slopes and error rates 
suggest they were using the strategy as much as those who indicated awareness of it. 
So this again calls into question whether it is necessary for conscious awareness for
126
Information Reduction to occur. Taken with the results from this experiment 
indicating that the number of people who adopt the Information Reduction is 
affected by the training conditions, and that the effect of variable training conditions 
is not equivalent across tasks, the evidence is starting to suggest that modifications 
are needed to the hypothesis put forward by Haider and Frensch.
The next chapter considers another alteration to the training conditions, in 
which speed is emphasised over accuracy, to examine the effect that this 
manipulation may have on numbers using Information Reduction.
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C h ap ter  6 EXPERIMENT 3 
E m p h a s i s  o n  Sp e e d 5
6.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The evidence from Experiments 1 and 2 suggests that Information Reduction 
usage varies with task and training conditions. The results also call into question 
whether it is an abruptly adopted strategy and possibly whether it is completely 
under voluntary control. Therefore this experiment sought to explore this further by 
examining the effect o f altering another o f the conditions that can vary in practice 
learning, i.e. the instructions given. If it is an automatic process, such as those 
mechanisms proposed by Logan (1988) or Anderson (1987), no change to the 
numbers using Information Reduction would be expected. In most experiments 
investigating Information Reduction participants are requested to be as fast and as 
accurate as possible, however there have been some where either speed or accuracy 
have been emphasised and in one case the time allowed for making a decision was 
reduced. Haider and Frensch (1999b) demonstrated that changing the instructions to 
stress either speed or accuracy affects the extent o f reduction occurring, with 
Information Reduction being adopted more quickly under speed stress. However, it 
is not clear from their results whether more participants used the strategy, or if  it 
were just that those who did adopted it more quickly. Haider et al.'s (2005) results 
suggest that more might use the strategy when subjected to speed pressure. In this 
experiment the main training blocks were interspersed with blocks where a smaller 
number o f strings were used, with each string displayed for a limited amount o f time. 
Results suggest 63% of participants in the Always-regular condition used
5
The experiment reported in this chapter was included in the paper: Information Reduction— More 
than meets the eye? (2015), Nancy E. Rowell, Alison J. K. Green, Helen Kaye & Peter Naish, Journal 
o f Cognitive Psychology, 27:1, 89-113, DOI:10.1080/20445911.2014.985300
129
Information Reduction, as judged by a drop in RT of 1 second between blocks. This 
compares to 40-50% reported users in other experiments, although in those it was 
measured by the more standard methods o f attenuation of the string-length effect 
and increased errors to irregular strings. A large change in RT is suggestive of a 
strategy being employed but does not indicate which strategy and thus the 63% 
could include participants who were not using Information Reduction.
Haider and Frensch previously concluded that people can modify their 
behaviour to some extent. In other words, that ignoring redundant information is a 
strategy that is under voluntary control, with participants choosing to use the strategy 
under speed instructions but choosing not to use it under accuracy instructions. An 
alternative explanation would be that Information Reduction is an automatic process 
which can be overridden by participants making a conscious decision to check the 
whole string in the accuracy conditions. It has been suggested that speed stress can 
increase the rate at which a task becomes automatic, although empirical evidence for 
this seems lacking (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974). If this is the case most o f the results 
reported by Haider and Frensch, where the responses become faster more rapidly 
under speed stress, do not rule out either Anderson’s (1987) or Logan’s (1988) 
theories of automaticity, or Rickard’s (1997) variation of Instance theory, although 
Haider and Frensch take them as indications that the Information Reduction strategy 
is under conscious control. Touron and Hertzog (2004b) suggest that the strategy 
shift from algorithmic processing to memory retrieval, which may be either 
conscious or unconscious, occurs when the benefits of retrieval are greater than the 
cost o f memorisation o f the instance. They demonstrated that manipulating display 
and memory set size in the noun pair look-up task resulted in an earlier move to a 
retrieval strategy, and considered that their results were compatible with the 
Component Power Law theory (Rickard, 1997).
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It is known that people can consciously alter their response criteria depending 
on the demands of the task, being more liberal and checking less when the need is to 
be fast, at the expense of accuracy. This would seem to be borne out by Haider and 
Frensch’s results for their Experiment 1 (1999b), where a large number of 
participants in the speed condition (15/41) were excluded from the analysis due to 
making more than 15% errors, a cut-off which was higher than that generally used, 
and was likely to leave more in the analysis than if the normal 10% had been 
employed. A slighdy smaller proportion were excluded from the speed-accuracy and 
accuracy-speed conditions (9/40 and 8/41 respectively). This is in comparison with 
3/45 being excluded in the accuracy condition. N o data was given as to whether the 
errors were spread through all blocks or occurred predominantly in the speed-stress 
ones. It is reported that the remaining participants did not show a reliable speed- 
accuracy trade-off, however during the speed stress blocks this does seem to have 
occurred. In their Experiment 2, where the speed stress involved the strings being 
visible on screen for a reducing amount o f time as well as instruction manipulation, 
even more participants were excluded for their high error rate: 13/21 participants in 
the speed condition, 8/21 and 5/21 in the speed-accuracy and accuracy-speed 
conditions. In the accuracy condition just one participant out o f 20 was excluded. 
The relatively high numbers o f people making more errors when under speed stress 
does bring into question the types of strategy, if any, being employed and does 
strongly suggest that the excluded participants were showing a speed-accuracy trade­
off strategy. Haider and Frensch mention the possibility that under speed stress the 
participants may not have been ‘reducing’ by processing only the triplet but may 
have been reducing by randomly sampling parts o f the string to determine their 
response, which would have decreased their accuracy. In this experiment no trial-by- 
trial feedback was given, complicating comparison with most other experiments.
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Haider and Frensch do not give a reason for the absence o f feedback. It is possible 
that immediate feedback on errors could counteract the instruction to focus on 
speed, since it reminds participants about accuracy.
Having found that only giving end-of-block rather than trial-by-trial feedback 
caused less Information Reduction to occur, Edmunds (2005) gave instructions that 
emphasised being as fast as possible in his inconsistent-training experiment and this 
had the desired effect in restoring ‘normal’ levels of Information Reduction in the 
100% consistent condition. However, it is again not clear whether this was achieved 
by more people adopting Information Reduction or simply by it being more firmly 
established in those who did use it.
It would seem that further experiments to try and distinguish what the 
participants are doing when instructed to be as fast as possible would be useful. It 
may be that the same proportion use Information Reduction as in experiments 
where both speed and accuracy are instructed, but perhaps adopt it more quickly. 
Perhaps more might use Information Reduction, since this is a way to increase 
speed. Some of those who have not become aware of the regularity may use a speed- 
accuracy trade-off strategy instead. A first step towards distinguishing these 
possibilities would be to determine how many seem to be using Information 
Reduction under speed stress and to examine whether there is a speed-accuracy 
trade-off for participants who do not seem to be using Information Reduction. The 
experiment reported here investigated the effect o f applying speed pressure, using 
only altered instructions. To enable comparison with Experiment 1, trial-by-trial 
feedback on errors was given in training but not in the test block. Based on the 
evidence from Haider et al. (2005) and from Edmunds (2005) the hypothesis was 
that more participants would adopt the strategy when requested to be as fast as 
possible.
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6.2 M e t h o d
6.2.1 Participants
There was a total of 50 participants, 23 students of the Open University 
studying a cognitive psychology module and 27 members of the Open University 
Virtual Participants Panel, who were mainly staff and psychology students o f the 
Open University. N o participant had performed in Experiment 1 or 2. All 
participants carried out only one task. 9 were male and 41 were female. There were 
24 (3 male) in the shapes task and 26 (6 male) in the multiple-triplet task. Their ages 
ranged from 18-60, mean age 42.
6.2.2 D esign  and materials
For both the multiple-triplet and shapes tasks these were identical to 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 4).
6.2.3 Procedure
Apart from the wording of the instructions the procedure was identical to 
Experiment 1, with 480 training trials, followed by the test block. A t the start o f the 
experiment participants were, as before, instructed: “Please be as fast and as accurate 
as possible but pay close attention to the strings as errors can occur anywhere.” At 
the end o f each block the participants were given feedback on their mean RT for the 
preceding block and encouraged to take a short break. At the start o f the next block 
the participants were instructed: “Remember to be as fast as possible”.
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6.3 R e s u l t s
6.3.1 Accuracy
The analysis excluded participants with errors in training o f 10% or greater for 
each trial block. In the multiple-triplet task four were excluded, leaving 22 
participants’ data, and in the shapes task four participants were excluded, leaving 20 
participants’ data. Those excluded actually had more than 15% errors, so that this 
experiment included all who would have been included with the 15% criterion used 
by Haider and Frensch (1999b).
Similar numbers o f errors were made to the ‘regular’ strings and shapes in the 
final training block and the test block but more errors were made to the irregular 
strings and inconsistently placed shapes (Table 6.1). Fewer errors were made to 
irregular strings than in Experiment 1, but more than Experiment 2. However, for 
inconsistently placed differing shapes more errors were made than in both 
Experiments 1 and 2.
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (String Type: regular correct, regular 
incorrect and irregular) on error rates for the test block showed a significant 
difference among the trial types for each task. For the multiple-triplet string types, 
F(2,42) = 30.13, MSE = 26725, p < 0.001, 0.589, with the difference lying
between the regular and irregular strings (pairwise comparison: regular correct vs 
regular incorrect p = 0.885, regular correct vs irregular p < 0.001, regular incorrect vs 
irregular p < 0.001). For the shapes task different shape types, F(2,38) = 42.12, MSE 
= 8362, p < 0.001, ?]p2— 0.689 with each significantly different from the others 
(pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular incorrect p < 0.001, regular correct 
vs irregular p = 0.001, regular incorrect vs irregular p < 0.001). The effect sizes are 
large for both tasks, suggesting that much of the variance in the error rates is
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explained by the difference in the stimuli types. The effect size for the multiple- 
triplet task was smaller than for Experiment 1, but larger than Experiment 2, 
whereas the effect size for the shapes task was larger than for both previous 
experiments.
The overall error rates indicate that the irregular letter/shape in the test block 
was not noticed by participants some o f the time, suggesting some degree of 
Information Reduction. In the multiple-triplet task 5 o f the 22 participants (22.7%) 
incorrectly categorised all 12, or almost all (11), o f the irregular strings, with another 
7 participants (31.8%) incorrectly categorising at least half the irregular strings. There 
were 5 who made no errors at all to the irregular strings. In the shapes task the 
highest proportion o f irregular incorrect categorisations was two-thirds, however 13 
participants out o f 20 (65%) made at least twice as many errors to the inconsistently 
placed as to the consistently placed differing shapes, almost double the number who 
did so in Experiment 1.
Table 6.1: Overall error rates in final training block and test block by stimulus type
Task ‘String type’ Final training 
block
Test block
Multiple-triplet Correct strings 4.5% 5.9%
Incorrect strings 2.1% 5.6%
Irregular strings - 50.6%
Shapes Matching shapes 1.3% 1%
Differing shapes, 
consistent position
6.5% 5.6%
Differing shapes, 
inconsistent position
29.4%
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6.3.2 Response tim es
In the shapes task there was a significant correlation between overall mean RT 
and mean error rate in training, (r(18) = -0.461, p = 0.041), but not if per block mean 
RT and error rates were compared (r(118) = -0.006, p = 0.948), so it is possible that 
some participants used a speed-accuracy trade-off strategy, although it did not prove 
possible to identify any as solely using this strategy. In the multiple-triplet task the 
overall correlation was not significant, r(20) = -0.364, p = 0.096.
Figure 6.1 shows that response times decreased during each task, with RTs for 
correct stimuli being slower than those for incorrect. In both tasks there was some 
convergence of the RTs, suggesting that there was greater speeding for correct 
stimuli than for incorrect.
Figure 6.1: change in response times over the course o f each task 
Key: solid line — correct stimuli, broken line — incorrect stimuli
a) Multiple-triplet
2000
b) Shapes
7000 -I
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2000
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In both tasks a repeated measures ANOVA by Block showed there was a 
significant decrease in overall RTs during training and a significant increase in RT 
between the final training block and the test block (Table 6.2). The effect sizes seen 
for the reduction in RT over the course o f training were greater than in Experiment 
1, indicating that the instruction from block two onwards to be as fast as possible 
was effective.
Table 6.2: ANOVA results for response times, by Block
Multiple-
triplet
Over training 
(Blocks 1-8)
F (1,147) = 87.38, MSE = 101600000, p < 
0.001, -np2 = 0.806
Final training 
Block — test 
Block
F(l,21) = 5.95, MSE = 417675, p = 0.024,
yjp2 = 0.221
Shapes Over training 
(Blocks 1-6)
F(5,95) = 103.85, MSE = 9156501, p < 
0.001, -np2 = 0.845
Final training 
Block — test 
Block
F(l,19) = 19.239, MSE = 223926, p < 
0.001, 7ip2 = 0.503
6.3.3 “String-length effect”
The regression slopes coefficient per participant and block were computed and 
subjected to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA by Block. This shows whether 
the RT for longer ‘strings’ decreased reliably more than that for shorter ‘strings’ and 
thus if a shortcut was applied to the longer ‘strings’.
For correct strings in the multiple-triplet task there was a significant reduction
in the slopes during training (Blocks 1-8), F(7,147) = 22.62, MSE = 2655917, p<
0.001, 0.519. There was a significant increase in the slopes between the final
training block and the test block, F(l,21) = 11.94, MSE = 184804, p = 0.002, ?]p2 =
0.362. These are both large effect sizes, suggesting that some o f the variance in
training could be explained by an increased speeding for the longer strings and
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slowing during the test block. For incorrect strings the reduction in slopes during 
training (Blocks 1-8) approached significance, F(7,147) = 2.68, MSE = 158060, p = 
0.053, 7]p2 = 0.113, and there was a significant increase in slopes between the final 
training block and the test block, F(l,21) = 9.3, MSE = 182292, p = 0.006, r]p2 =
0.307. The effect during training was medium, but in the test block was large, 
suggesting that there was some speeding during training but more slowing during the 
test block. The increase in slopes for the test block suggests that participants noticed 
the change in regularity and reverted to full, or fuller, checking o f the stimuli.
For both matching and differing shapes a significant reduction in slopes was 
found in training (Blocks 1-6), (F(5,95) = 11.31, MSE = 194001, p < 0.001, y\p =
0.373 and F(5,95) = 22.58, MSE = 122175, p < 0.001, r\p2 = 0.543 respectively). The 
effect sizes are large for both o f these, suggesting that much o f the variance could be 
explained by an increased speeding for the stimuli with more shapes. The increase in 
the slopes between the final training block and the test block was not significant (F < 
1 in both cases).
Figure 6.2 shows the change in the coefficient o f the regression slopes for 
both tasks. The mean o f the regression coefficient for each block was higher for the 
‘correct’ stimuli than for the ‘incorrect’. Compared to Experiment 1 there was 
slightly less convergence between correct and incorrect in the multiple-triplet task, 
although there was more than Experiment 2. There appeared to be little convergence 
in the shapes task.
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Figure 6.2: The change in coefficient o f regression slopes plotted by block for 
the different stimuli types in the two tasks (error bars represent the standard 
error o f the means)
Key: solid line - correct stimuli, broken line - incorrect stimuli
a) Multiple-triplet task
b)
The correlational analysis for the mean coefficient o f the regression slopes for 
correct strings/matching shapes over the final two training blocks with the error rate 
for ‘irregular’ stimuli in the test block was significant for both the multiple-triplet 
task, r(20) = -0.658, p = 0.001, and the shapes task, r(18) = -0.671, p = 0.001. 
Scatterplots showing these two measures, with coding for questionnaire response, 
are shown in Figure 6.3.
6.3.4 Post-task questionnaires
Five questionnaires for the multiple-triplet task and one for the shapes task 
were not returned. The responses were coded as before and are indicated in Figure 
6.3.
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Figure 6.3: Scatterplots showing the mean coefficient o f regression slopes 
over the final two training blocks against the percentage o f errors to the 
‘irregular’ stimuli, indicating categorisation from the questionnaire
a) Multiple-triplet task
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In the multiple-triplet task 7 participants (32%) could be classified as reducers, 
with all o f those who indicated that they used the strategy having an error rate above 
70%. For this task there was less of a distinct split between reducers and non­
reducers than the two previous experiments, which could indicate partial use of 
Information Reduction.
In the shapes task those with the highest number of errors had the lowest 
slopes, and there were more compared to previous experiments — 4 here, 2 in 
Experiment 2 and 1 in Experiment 1. This would suggest more participants used
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Information Reduction more consistently when trying to be as fast as possible. Once 
again about half the participants lacked awareness of the regularity.
6.3.5 Correlation between response time and error rate
A correlation between the per block error rate and RT, for each participant 
separately, was carried out to examine whether it was possible to determine any 
strategies in use. If  a participant used a speed-accuracy trade-off then it would be 
expected that as RTs decreased the error rate would increase, giving a negative 
correlation. With an Information Reduction strategy a positive correlation might be 
expected, with RTs and error rates declining together. The correlations are shown in 
Appendix 9. In the multiple-triplet task there was one participant who seemed to 
have used a speed-accuracy trade-off strategy, and this person showed no awareness 
o f the regularity on their questionnaire. In this task there was also one person who 
had a significant positive correlation and therefore seemed to have used Information 
Reduction, and this was also derived from their questionnaire. One other participant 
with a significant correlation had not indicated any awareness o f the regularity on 
their questionnaire. In the shapes task, there were three participants with a significant 
positive correlation who had indicated use o f Information Reduction on their 
questionnaires. For all other participants the correlations were not significant and 
therefore revealed nothing about any strategy they might be using.
6.4 D iscussion
This experiment was conducted in order to investigate further the effect that 
altered training conditions have on the numbers o f people using Information 
Reduction, specifically emphasising speed rather than accuracy. The attenuation o f 
the string-length effect over training and more errors being made to ‘irregular’ than 
to ‘regular’ stimuli in the test block, plus the return o f the string-length effect for the
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multiple-triplet task, indicate that Information Reduction was occurring. It was 
hypothesised that more participants would adopt the strategy when requested to be 
as fast as possible and it does appear that Information Reduction was used more 
consistently in the shapes task. The string-length effect did not reappear in the test 
block and more participants produced an increased number of errors to 
inconsistently placed differing shapes than in Experiment 1, suggesting that speed 
stress caused Information Reduction to be used more. Additional support for this 
was provided by the self-reports and the per participant RT/ error-rate correlation, 
where several had a significant positive correlation. However, once again no 
complete reduction was seen in the shapes task and it was not possible to determine 
a number of ‘reducers’. Nonetheless the shapes task result is in line with the results 
obtained by Haider et al. (2005) that speed pressure encouraged use o f Information 
Reduction, and with those of Touron and Hertzog (2004a) that making the scanning 
to memory strategy shift more beneficial increased the numbers switching.
The results for the multiple-triplet task did not support the hypothesis, with 
32% identified as reducers, compared to 64% in Experiment 1. This was rather 
different to previously reported findings (Haider et al., 2005), on which the 
hypothesis was based, and the results from Touron and Hertzog (2004b). The result 
is particularly surprising since self-reported levels o f awareness o f the strategy were 
very similar (77% aware in Experiment 1, 71 % in Experiment 3) and therefore it 
would be expected that all those who were aware would use Information Reduction. 
However, whilst all except one of those who self-identified as a reducer on the 
questionnaire had over 75% errors to the irregular stimuli and low slopes at the end 
of the task, there was not a clear division between reducers and non-reducers, unlike 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. There were many participants who exhibited low 
regression slopes at the end o f the experiment, but with a more continuous spread of
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error rates to the irregular stimuli. This is similar to the results for the shapes task in 
all three experiments reported so far. It is also similar to the relevant-first condition 
o f Haider and Frensch’s triplet-position-varying experiment (Haider & Frensch, 
1999a), which they attribute to noticing an alphabetic inaccuracy in an irregular string 
part-way through the test block and then reverting to checking entire strings. They 
do acknowledge that some participants noticed a few of the irregularities but missed 
some later ones. Examination o f the test blocks for the multiple-triplet task revealed 
that four (18%) participants incorrectly classified irregular stimuli at the start o f the 
block and then appeared to notice that the regularity no longer held and correctly 
classified most o f the irregular stimuli from then onwards. In the shapes task it was 
just two participants (10%). Since the majority showed no pattern to the irregular 
stimuli verified correctly or incorrectly, this may suggest that some form o f partial 
reduction was occurring. Why people should choose not to use Information 
Reduction exclusively in a situation, such as speed pressure, where it might be 
thought more efficient, is not clear and again suggests that perhaps usage is not 
completely under voluntary control.
Only one participant in the multiple-triplet task could be identified as having 
used a speed-accuracy trade-off strategy from the per block RT/ error-rate 
correlation. As their error-rate in each block did not exceed 10%, it would seem that 
not too much accuracy was abandoned. In both tasks it is possible that some 
participants reduced on some trials and used another strategy, such as a speed- 
accuracy trade-off, for others. Such inconsistent use o f Information Reduction may 
be another way that partial reduction manifests itself, as well as the possibility 
mentioned in Chapter 5, that some stimuli may be fully processed and others only 
the relevant part. Partial reduction is contrary to Haider and Frensch’s idea that 
Information Reduction is consciously adopted at one point in time and affects
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behaviour reasonably consistently from then on. If  participants were switching 
strategies between trials then it did not affect their overall accuracy, as similar 
numbers were excluded due to high error rates as in Experiment 1 and Experiment
2. Haider and Frensch (1999b) had to exclude many more in their speeded 
conditions. Since their experiment 1 only used instruction to optimise speed, as was 
done here, it is hard to see why the results are so different, although they do not 
specify the exact phrasing o f the instructions. One explanation could be that this 
experiment used feedback on trials where an error was made, which may have 
negated the instruction to be as fast as possible and reminded the participants about 
accuracy. This however, would make the apparent increased use o f Information 
Reduction in the shapes task an anomaly. It is suggested that further exploration of 
the effect o f instructional change combined with feedback change, on both tasks, is 
required.
Unlike Experiment 1, there do not seem to be any non-aware users of 
Information Reduction in the multiple-triplet task, although it is possible that some 
o f those who did not return the questionnaire could fall into this category, and some 
o f the potential ‘partial users’ certainly do. In the shapes task there are some 
potential ‘partial reducers’ who seemed unaware of any regularity and the numbers of 
unaware users seem similar to Experiment 1 and 2.
It would seem from the results of Experiment 2 (Chapter 5) and this 
experiment that Information Reduction is more easily abandoned than increased in 
the multiple-triplet task, but there are indications that it can be increased in the 
shapes task. The results for both tasks would seem to rule out the theories of 
automaticity as a sole explanation, since these would not predict a variation in the 
amount o f Information Reduction seen, whether more or less. Both Instance theory 
(Logan, 1988) and Production rules (Anderson, 1987) assert that performance
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improvements are data-driven and an inevitable result o f practice. The same number 
o f instances were seen as in Experiment 1 and the same processes were required to 
respond to the stimuli, with the same amount o f practice. It could be speculated that 
the instruction to work quickly interfered with formation and compilation of 
productions, and this could account for the decrease in the number o f reducers seen 
in the multiple-triplet task, but not the apparent increase in reduction in the shapes 
task. The Component Power Law model (Rickard, 1997) does not fully specify the 
mechanism for strategy selection and is able to accommodate subjective influences, 
such as an emphasis on being fast (Touron & Hertzog, 2004b). However, one would 
assume that the instruction would have the same effect in both tasks, so automaticity 
does not seem to be an adequate explanation for any o f the results so far.
Overall, the results from all three experiments reported so far suggest that 
there is variability in the usage o f Information Reduction both between tasks and 
training conditions. Although the fact that not all participants use Information 
Reduction leads to the conclusion that it is not an inevitable consequence o f task 
structure, supporting Haider and Frensch’s theory that it is consciously applied, it 
may be more sensitive to task and training conditions than previously reported and 
not as simple or as robust as they have suggested. There is also a question about 
whether it is possible to use Information Reduction and have no awareness o f doing 
so. The next experiment investigated the consciousness aspect in an alternative 
manner by encouraging the participants to engage in explicit hypothesis testing about 
the stimuli.
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C h a p ter  7 EXPERIMENT 4
E x p l i c i t  i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  f i n d  s h o r t c u t
7.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The experiments described in previous chapters have demonstrated that 
participants often become aware o f the regularity in the stimuli and make use o f it, 
applying the Information Reduction strategy to improve their performance. 
However, a number appear to use Information Reduction without apparently being 
aware of so doing — or at least, they are unable to verbally express the regularity, and 
even after prompting show no awareness o f having changed their processing. This 
experiment sought to further investigate participants’ awareness by informing 
participants that it was possible to carry out the task more quickly by using a 
shortcut, but without informing them of its nature.
There have been a variety o f experiments in the implicit learning literature
which have compared the effect o f explicit instruction with no instruction about a
regularity. For instance, Curran and Keele (1993) carried out an experiment whereby
one-third of participants, the intentional learning group, were explicitly informed
beforehand o f the 6-item repeating sequence used in the serial reaction time task and
the remaining two-thirds, the incidental learning group, had no such instruction.
Following a 6-block learning phase the participants were given a questionnaire which
asked if they thought there was a pattern or if the sequence was random, and this
was used to divide the incidental group into those who were ‘more aware’ (19/30 or
63% of the incidental group) and those who were ‘less aware’ (11/30 or 37% of the
incidental group). Two-thirds of the ‘less aware’ reported the sequence to be
random. Results showed that whilst learning of the sequence occurred in all groups,
they all differed significantly in the amount o f learning shown, as measured by an RT
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difference between the sequence blocks and a random block. The ‘less aware’ 
showed the least learning and the explicit group showed the most learning. 
Subsequently all groups received four more blocks, three random and one consisting 
o f the previously presented sequence, under dual-task conditions. There was no 
statistical difference between the groups in the amount of sequence knowledge 
shown. This was taken to suggest that there are two separate learning mechanisms 
and that the conscious knowledge acquired by the intentional and more aware 
groups could not be transferred to the nonattentional learning system, when the 
dual-task prevented the attentional system from implementing its knowledge of the 
sequence. No explanation was offered as to how or why some participants in the 
incidental learning group came to be aware o f the sequence, where others did not, 
but it is interesting to note that the percentages of ‘more aware’ as opposed to ‘less 
aware’ are similar to those found for the multiple-triplet task in Experiment 1 
reported in Chapter 4.
Willingham and Goedert-Eschmann (1999) carried out a serial reaction time 
experiment where one group of participants were explicitly shown the 12-unit 
repeating sequence during training and told to learn it, and another group of 
participants were simply told to respond as quickly as possible. Both groups showed 
a significant improvement in RT over the course of the experiment. For half o f each 
group, the final transfer block contained the sequence used in training, amongst 
some random trials, and for the other half the transfer block was essentially a series 
o f random trials. Both explicit and implicit groups were able to transfer the 
sequence, and respond more quickly to it than the random trials, if it appeared in the 
transfer block, although the explicit group did better in a subsequent free recall test. 
The results were taken to mean that implicit and explicit learning can occur in 
parallel and are mediated by two separate mechanisms, with implicit learning being
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based on regularly-repeated motor behaviour. Although there was some explicit 
knowledge o f the sequence shown by the implicit learning group, again no 
explanation was offered as to how this knowledge became explicit, nor was it 
reported how many were able to express any explicit knowledge.
Some past research using the Alphabet Verification task has informed 
participants beforehand o f what the strategy is (Gaschler & Frensch, 2009; Haider & 
Frensch, 1996). Haider and Frensch (Experiment 1, 1996) had three conditions: 
‘Informed’, ‘Informed + ignore’ and ‘N ot informed’, where the participants were 
either told that errors could occur only within the initial ‘letter—digit—letter’ triplet, or 
were additionally instructed to try to ignore any letters following, or were told to 
evaluate the whole string as alphabetic inaccuracies could occur anywhere. Results 
showed that there was no ‘string-length effect’ for correct strings in the informed 
conditions suggesting that with explicit instruction, participants can and do process 
simply the triplet. Gaschler and Frensch (Experiment 1, 2009) informed participants 
that it was possible to ignore the trailing letters for some o f the strings. Their results 
suggest that participants came to realise that this held true for all the strings in the 
training phase. However they did not report results for correct and incorrect strings 
separately, so it is not clear if there was less attenuation o f the string-length effect for 
correct strings and this is masked by the aggregation o f the data. Nonetheless, it 
seems that explicit instruction o f the regularity leads very quickly to Information 
Reduction occurring but it does also occur when no instruction about the regularity 
is given.
As an alternative to giving participants explicit instructions about the task 
structure and the sequence or regularity, Gebauer & Mackintosh (2007) instructed 
their participants that there was an underlying rule, in the three implicit learning tasks
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they used (artificial grammar, sequential learning and process control), and asked the 
participants to do their best to discover this rule. An example of the instructions was:
“Letters are presented on the computer screen. Your task is to press as 
fast as you can the corresponding button on the keyboard without 
making errors. Please try to increase your speed o f responding from  
one block to the next, but without making any more incorrect responses.
There is a single fixed sequence underlying the task. Throughout the 
task the same sequence is repeated. Please try to discover the sequence.
It is not easy to discover the sequence but please try hard to do so. Even 
i f  you do not discover the complete sequence, you can at least find out 
about parts o f the sequence. The more you find out about the sequence, 
the faster you will become and the fewer errors you will make. ”
(Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, p40)
Although the purpose of the experiment was to investigate whether there was any
correlation between implicit learning and intelligence, some results o f the
instructional manipulation were reported. For artificial grammar learning explicit
instruction reduced performance compared to implicit instruction, whereas for
sequential learning performance improved. There was no difference between
instruction type for process control. Gebauer and Mackintosh suggest that these
differences arose because under explicit instruction to discover the underlying rule
participants were relying on explicit memory for the artificial grammar task, but were
using reasoning and transfer of acquired problem-solving strategies for the sequential
learning and process control tasks. However they considered that none o f these
cognitive processes were employed under implicit instruction. No data was presented
to show how many participants did actually discover the rule in any of the tasks, nor
did they investigate any verbally reportable knowledge acquired in the implicit
learning groups. However, the experiment does suggest that, for some tasks at least,
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participants are able to successfully engage in hypothesis testing to improve 
performance, when instructed to find a rule. Since the participants were, for the most 
part, teenagers at school it may be that this result would not be replicated with 
adults.
Information Reduction has been proposed as a top-down consciously 
implemented strategy, which follows implicit learning o f a regularity. Some empirical 
evidence has been presented to support this idea. Haider and Frensch (1996) and 
Haider et al. (2005) demonstrated that, having learned the strategy on one set of 
stimuli, it could be transferred to a novel set o f similar stimuli. The two sets of 
stimuli started with different letters in the alphabet: D-H and I-M with the triplet at 
the start o f the string for Haider and Frensch (1996) and E-L and M-T with the 
triplet being located at the end o f the string for Haider et al. (2005). The later 
experiment used a drop in latency o f > 1 s between blocks on the first set o f stimuli 
as a measure o f a strategy switch. Using this method approximately half the 
participants were classed as reducers and they were found to return to the 
performance level o f the first set of stimuli within two blocks o f transfer, whereas 
those classed as non-reducers did not. The transfer phase only had two blocks and 
there was no block in which irregular strings occurred. A post-testing questionnaire 
asked participants to describe the characteristics o f the strings and any strategies used 
to process them, both at the beginning and the end o f the experiment. This yielded 
results suggesting that most o f those who had the abrupt drop in latency were able to 
verbalise the Information Reduction strategy. However, there were a few who did 
not, or could not, describe the regularity or any strategy used. This could mean that 
the method used to determine a strategy switch was not 100% reliable, or it could 
mean that some people lack awareness o f their strategy use or are unable to verbalise 
it. Gaschler and Frensch (2007) varied the frequency with which strings were
presented and found that the string-length effect attenuated at the same rate for both 
frequendy-presented and infrequendy-presented strings, suggesting that Information 
Reduction was applied regardless of how often a stimulus was seen. However, this 
experiment did not assess explicit knowledge. These item-general findings would 
therefore seem to rule out Information Reduction being a result o f instance learning 
and may suggest that it is only used when a participant becomes aware o f the 
regularity.
A number of theories have been proposed about the relationship between 
explicit and implicit learning but for the most part these offer no coherent 
explanation as to why or how some participants show awareness o f any incidentally 
learned sequence or regularity whilst others do not. It has been noted in the implicit 
sequence learning literature that whilst many participants are unable to verbally 
report what has been learned, there are always some who can (Haider & Frensch, 
2009). Depending on the experimental conditions, this can vary from 10% to 70% 
(Frensch et al., 2003). There is evidence, such as that from Curran and Keele, and 
Willingham and Goedert-Eschmann, outlined above, that implicit and explicit 
processes are separate learning systems, although there may be some brain regions 
common to both. Generally it is considered that the two types of learning can occur 
in parallel but it is not clear whether they occur independently or whether there can 
be transfer of knowledge from one system to the other, and whether this is uni- or 
bidirectional. Other theories suggest that implicit learning occurs first and is 
transformed into explicit verbal knowledge. One idea is that performance gains can 
only occur when the knowledge becomes explicit, which does appear to be at odds 
with experimental results indicating that some people do not apparently possess 
explicit knowledge. However, it is notoriously difficult to assess whether a 
participant is aware or not o f the regularities they have learned (Frensch & Runger,
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2003). Verbal reports do not satisfy the information criterion (what is tested is not 
the thing which led to the learning) or the sensitivity criterion (the test is less 
sensitive than those which demonstrated that learning has occurred). Nonetheless 
Riinger and Frensch (2010) argue that verbal report is the most sensitive and valid 
measure o f conscious awareness of an implicitly learned sequence. Alternative 
methods to test awareness include using a recognition memory probe and asking the 
participants after individual trials whether they had used a particular strategy or not 
(Touron & Hertzog, 2004a; Touron & Hertzog, 2004b).
One theory about how implicit learning becomes explicit knowledge that can 
be verbally expressed suggests that it is due to the strength of the representation 
(Cleeremans and Jimenez, 2002). As practice proceeds then the representation 
becomes more stable, strong and distinct in quality. A t some point it crosses a 
threshold and is available to consciousness and can guide intentional behaviour, 
although behaviour may have adapted to an environmental regularity before this 
point is reached. This theory would explain differences between participants in 
verbal knowledge by differences in amount o f practice required to reach the 
threshold.
Another suggestion as to how an implicitly or incidentally learned regularity 
can enter conscious awareness, which builds on previous theoretical ideas and is 
based on empirical data from the Alphabet Verification task and from the Num ber 
Reduction Task, is the Unexpected-Event hypothesis (Frensch et al., 2003). Support 
for this, over the representational-strength hypothesis, was provided from an SRT- 
task which manipulated the amount of practice received and found that this did not 
significantly affect the number of participants with verbalisable knowledge o f the 
sequence (Schwager et al., 2012). The Unexpected-Event hypothesis suggests that 
the implicit learning changes behaviour and it is the conflict between what is
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expected and what is performed, such as a rapid or premature response before a 
stimulus has been fully processed, that leads to an examination and attribution of 
causes for this occurrence. This can subsequently manifest itself in verbal report. The 
Unexpected-Event hypothesis is able to explain the fact that some do not become 
aware o f the regularity either by the fact that no conflict between performance and 
expectation of performance is noticed or that no attributable cause is found. Haider 
and Frensch also note that participants who can report a sequence have shown a 
large and abrupt latency drop during the course of the experiment, and link this to 
the point at which the knowledge moves into declarative memory — in other words 
that performance does not consistently improve until after knowledge about a 
regularity that can be exploited becomes available to consciousness. It would 
therefore seem worthwhile to investigate further whether everyone who appears to 
use the Information Reduction strategy is able to report that they do so.
Experiments which compare groups given either explicit instruction about the 
nature of any sequence or regularity or no instruction provide little information 
about differences within the incidental learning group, and, in particular, about those 
who are able to give a verbal report compared to those who cannot (Frensch et al., 
2003). Therefore a methodology similar to that employed by Gebauer and 
Mackintosh was adopted for this experiment, with the participants instructed to try 
and discover a way to improve their performance. In addition they were asked to 
indicate when they had done so and then were instructed to use the strategy found 
for two more blocks — a final block o f training and an unannounced test block 
containing irregular stimuli.
In line with the results from Experiment 1 and those o f Curran and Keele 
(1993) it was predicted that in the multiple-triplet task about two-thirds of 
participants would discover and be able to indicate the Information Reduction
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strategy. As it has proved impossible to determine usage o f Information Reduction 
with the shapes task no prediction about numbers for this was made. Additionally, 
from the Unexpected-Event hypothesis, it was predicted that everyone who had a 
high rate o f errors to irregular stimuli in the test block would have indicated that they 
had discovered the Information Reduction strategy.
7.2 M e t h o d
7.2.1 Participants
There were 67 participants, all Open University students studying psychology, 
none of whom had participated in other experiments. There were 31 participants (5 
male) in the multiple-triplet task and 36 (10 male) in the shapes task. All participants 
carried out one task only. Their ages ranged from 21 — 60, mean age 42.
7.2.2 Materials
The materials for the multiple-triplet and shapes tasks were as in previous 
experiments.
7.2.3 Procedure
The procedure until the end o f the practice trials was as previous experiments. 
After being instructed to “pay close attention to the [stimuli] as errors can occur 
anywhere” as in all previous experiments, the participants were then instructed:
When carrying out this experiment, some people find a shortcut which helps them 
to respond more quickly.
I f  you feel that you have found a shortcut, please press Y on your keyboard, 
instead ofM  or Z, and you will be asked a question about what you have 
discovered, before having two more blocks to complete.
Please do not worry i f  you do not find a shortcut.
There will be a maximum of [number] blocks to complete.
The first training block was presented and participants could indicate at any time 
during this block or the following six (multiple-triplet task) or four (shapes task) 
blocks if they had found a shortcut. If  they did so then they were presented with the 
following screen:
Multiple-triplet task: Please select the option which you think is the shortcut
1. A string is correct i f  you can make a word e.g. B(4)G = BAG
2 .1 only need to process the first letter-digit-letter
3. The longer strings are always correct
4. Every alternate one is correct
5. Other
6 .1 couldn't work out a shortcut
Shapes task: Please select the option which you think is the shortcut
1. The boxes match when there are more shapes in them
2 .1 only need to look at the shape on the middle right
3. It is correct if  there is a triangle in the box
4. Every alternate one is correct
5. Other
6 .1 couldn't work out a shortcut
After indicating which option applied to them, the participants were informed:
You will now have two more blocks to complete.
Please use the shortcut you have identified when deciding on your response.
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The final two blocks consisted o f one more training block and the 
unannounced test block, so that all experienced one full training block where they 
could apply their shortcut, before the test block. Participants who did not indicate 
they had found a shortcut received the full number o f training blocks — eight for the 
multiple-triplet task and six for the shapes task. This was followed by the 
unannounced test block and they did not see the screen of questions about the 
shortcut.
Participants also received a post-testing questionnaire investigating functional 
and dysfunctional impulsivity, trust in memory and distractibility, which is fully 
described and results presented in chapter 8.
7.2.4 D esign
The within-participants independent variables were ‘string length’ and type o f 
‘string’: regular correct, regular incorrect or irregular. For the multiple-triplet task the 
string length was one, two or three triplets and for the shapes task it was 3-6 shapes.
There were 60 strings per block in the multiple-triplet task, with a maximum of 
8 training blocks, giving up to 480 trials during training. There were 80 shape stimuli 
per block in the shape matching task, with a maximum o f 6 training blocks, giving up 
to 480 training trials. In each task half o f the training strings in each block were 
correct and half were incorrect. Each task had one practice block of 10 stimuli at the 
beginning and one test block after the training blocks. The test block had some 
regular incorrect stimuli replaced with irregular ones — 12 for the multiple-triplet task 
and 16 for the shapes task.
The dependent variables were response time (RT) to each stimulus and 
number of stimuli incorrectly responded to in the first and last training blocks and 
the test block.
7.3 R e su l t s
7.3.1 Accuracy
The analysis excluded participants with errors in training of 10% or greater for 
each trial block. In the multiple-triplet task two were excluded, leaving 29 
participants’ data, and in the shapes task seven participants were excluded, leaving 29 
participants’ data.
Table 7.1 shows that similar numbers of errors were made to the ‘regular’ 
strings and shapes in the final training block and the test block but more errors were 
made to the irregular strings or inconsistently placed shapes. Error rates to the 
irregular stimuli ranged from 0% to 100% for both tasks.
In the multiple-triplet task 5 o f the 29 participants incorrectly categorised all 12 
o f the irregular strings, with another 9 incorrectly categorising 10 or 11 of the 
irregular strings. Thus 48.3% of the participants made a high number o f incorrect 
categorisations. The other 15 participants had 3 or fewer irregular strings incorrectly 
categorised. In the shapes task one person incorrectly categorised all 16 irregular 
stimuli and one other incorrectly categorised 15. Nine other participants incorrectly 
categorised at least half o f the irregular stimuli. Overall, 17 participants (58.6%) made 
at least twice as many errors to the inconsistently placed as to the consistently placed 
differing shapes.
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (String Type: regular correct, regular
incorrect and irregular) on error rates for the test block showed a significant
difference among the trial types for each task. For the multiple-triplet task string
types, F(2,56) = 25.3, MSE = 34.262, p <.001, T]p2=.475, with the difference lying
between the regular and irregular strings (pairwise comparison: regular correct vs
regular incorrect p = 0.773, regular correct vs irregular p < .001, regular incorrect vs
158
irregular p < .001). For the shapes task different shape types, F(2,56) = 39.03, MSE 
= 17,718, p <.001, rjp2 =.582 with each significantly different from the others 
(pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular incorrect p <.001, regular correct vs 
irregular p <.001, regular incorrect vs irregular p <.001). The effect sizes are large, 
suggesting that much o f the variance in the error rates is explained by the difference 
in the stimuli types. The size o f the effect for the multiple-triplet task is smaller than 
Experiment 1, whereas it is larger for the shapes task.
T able 7.1: O verall error rates in  final training b lo ck  and test b lo ck  by stim ulus type
Final training block Test block
Multiple-triplet task correct 7.5% 5.3%
regular incorrect 3.4% 4.8%
irregular - 48.3%
Shapes task matching 0.8% 0.5%
differing 7.9% 9.9%
irregular - 36.4%
7.3.2 Indication o f shortcut
In the multiple-triplet task fifteen participants indicated they had found a 
shortcut, with six o f those choosing the Information Reduction option from the list. 
Thus 21% of participants found the Information Reduction strategy, 31% thought 
they had a different performance-enhancing strategy and 48% did not indicate a 
shortcut and carried out the entire experiment. The number of trials completed, 
before indicating, ranged from 23-148 for those choosing the Information Reduction 
option and 20-301 for those choosing any o f the alternative options.
In the shapes task eighteen participants indicated they had found a shortcut,
with ten of those choosing the Information Reduction option from the list. Thus
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34.5% of participants found the Information Reduction strategy, 27.6% thought they 
had a different performance-enhancing strategy and 37.9% did not indicate a 
shortcut and carried out the entire experiment. The number of trials completed, 
before indicating, ranged from 9-375 for those choosing the Information Reduction 
option and 26-280 for those choosing any o f the alternative options.
In the shapes task the range o f trials experienced before indicating a shortcut 
had been found was wider than for the multiple-triplet task. In particular some 
participants waited longer before indicating. There were more who selected the 
Information Reduction option, but this is accounted for by there being fewer who 
did not notice a strategy at all. It is striking that one-third o f participants in both 
tasks thought they had found a shortcut, but selected the ‘other’ option. This does 
not seem to be due to responding more rapidly, as the range o f trials experienced 
was similar to those who selected the Information Reduction option. Only two 
people, both in the multiple-triplet task, selected a different option to either 2 
(Information Reduction) or 5 (Other) and only one person stated after the 
experiment that despite thinking he had found a shortcut, it wasn’t until he saw the 
list that he realised what it actually was. This suggests that even reading the ‘correct’ 
shortcut in the list o f options did not prompt participants to re-evaluate their 
strategy.
7.3.3 Response tim es
There was no significant correlation between overall mean RT and mean error 
rate across the first and final training blocks for the multiple-triplet task, r(56) = .007, 
p = .956; however, there was a significant correlation overall for the shapes task, 
r(56) = .27, p = .04. The correlation was not significant in the first block, r(27) = - 
.128, p = .508, but was significant in the final block, r(27) = .441, p = .017,
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suggesting there may have been some speed-accuracy trade-off in this block for this 
task.
Since the number o f blocks for each participant varied, changes in RT were 
only tested, by one-way ANOVA, between the first training block and the final 
training block, and the final training block and the test block. Table 7.2 gives the 
mean RTs for these blocks in both tasks and shows that the RTs decreased over the 
course o f the experiment, although they increased in the test block for the shapes 
task.
T ab le 7.2: m ean  R T s in  m s for  b lock s u sed  in  the A N O V A
First training block Final training block Test block
Multiple-triplet task 5187 3527 3423
Shapes task 2268 1352 1643
In the multiple-triplet task there was a significant decrease in RTs between 
block 1 and the final training block, F(l,28) = 73.15, MSE = 39,982,067, p < .001, 
y\p — .723, and a non-significant decrease between the final training block and the 
test block, F < 1. This indicates that participants got faster during the training they 
carried out, even though they completed different numbers of trials, and that they 
did not slow down in the test block. Slowing in the test block would indicate that 
they resorted to fuller checking o f the strings.
In the shapes task, there was a significant decrease in RTs between block 1 and 
the final training block, F(l,28) = 51.2, MSE = 12,146,415, p < .001, r]jp2 = .646, and 
a significant increase between the final training block and the test block, F(l,28) = 
5.63, MSE = 1,223,540, p =.025, rjp2 =.167. Participants got faster during training,
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but slowed during the test block, probably indicating that fuller checking o f the 
stimuli took place in the test block.
7.3.4 “String-length effect”
For correct strings in the multiple-triplet task there was a significant reduction 
in the slopes from first to final training block, F(l,28) = 13.89, MSE = 698,771, p = 
.001,rjp2 = .331, but no significant increase from the final training block to the test 
block, F < 1. For incorrect strings there was a non-significant reduction in slopes 
during training (first-final training block), F(l,28)= 1.94, MSE = 279,713, p = .174, 
7]p2 = .065, but a significant increase in slopes from the final training block to the test 
block, F(l,28) = 12.53, MSE = 593.108, p = .001, ^  = .309. The effect size was 
large for correct strings, although smaller than for Experiment 1, and medium for 
incorrect strings. This is consistent with the use o f Information Reduction by many 
o f the participants, and only some o f them reverting to fuller checking in the test 
block.
For matching shapes a significant reduction in slopes was found from first to 
final training block, F(l,28) = 20.11, MSE = 692,531, p < .001, r \2 — .418. For 
differing shapes there was also a significant reduction in slopes during training (first- 
final training blocks), F(l,28) = 8.1, MSE = 251,835, p = .008, r\ 2 = .224. These are 
large effect sizes, suggesting that some of the variance could be explained by an 
increased speeding for stimuli containing more shapes, and they are o f similar order 
to Experiment 1. For matching shapes there was a significant increase in the slopes 
between the final training block and the test block, F(l,28) = 5.43, MSE = 138,380, 
p = .027, r]p2 = .163, but for differing shapes there was a non-significant increase in 
the slopes between the final training block and the test block, F(l,28) = 2.06, MSE =
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42,737, p = .163, 7]p2 — .068. These effect sizes are large and medium respectively and 
are consistent with Information Reduction being used.
The correlation o f the regression coefficient for the final block and the error 
rates to irregular stimuli was significant for the multiple-triplet task, r(27) = -.601, p 
= .001, and for the shapes task, r(27) = -.376, p = .045. Figure 7.1 shows scatterplots 
o f the two measures, also indicating whether the participant spotted the Information 
Reduction shortcut, thought they had found another shortcut or carried out the full 
experiment.
Figure 7.1. Scatterplots showing the coefficient o f regression slopes for the final 
training block against the percentage o f errors to the irregular stimuli, indicating 
whether they found a shortcut or not
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It can be seen that there are ten reducers in the multiple-triplet task (34%), 
with another four possibly using it (high error rate but their slopes are higher than 
would be expected if full reduction was occurring), and two reducers in the shapes 
task. Half the reducers in the multiple-triplet task did not apparendy notice the 
shortcut. Those who chose the ‘other’ option from the list mostly had high slopes 
and low error rates, suggesting that whatever strategy they had found did not make 
them faster at the longer ‘strings’ and enabled them to spot all or most o f the 
irregular stimuli in the test block.
Comparisons o f the percentages of participants who indicated that they 
were aware of the Information Reduction strategy with those in Experiment 1 
whose questionnaire responses were categorised as aware (whether or not they 
used Information Reduction) are given in table 7.3.
Table 7.3: comparison o f percentage o f participants aware o f 
Information Reduction strategy with Experiment 1: control
Multiple-triplet task Shapes task
Experiment 1: control 73% 41%
Experiment 4: explicit instruction 21% 35%
7.4 D iscussion
The most noticeable result from this experiment, which was not predicted, is
that one-third of participants in both tasks erroneously thought they had found a
shortcut. Consequently the hypothesis that, in the multiple-triplet task, two-thirds of
participants would discover and be able to indicate the Information Reduction
strategy was not supported. Although the set-up of the experiment did not allow for
descriptions of these apparent strategies to be garnered, it is clear from the fact that
for the most part in both tasks these participants had steep regression slopes in the
final training block that the ‘shortcuts’ employed were not effective in allowing
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greater speeding for longer strings. It can also be concluded that these participants 
were not prompted by reading the ‘correct’ shortcut in the list o f options to realise 
what it was and that they maintained their own processing. One participant indicated 
post-hoc that reading the list o f options revealed what the ‘true’ strategy was and that 
processing was changed accordingly for the final two blocks. This participant was 
counted as having discovered the Information Reduction strategy. All the 
participants who indicated another strategy did show some speeding at all ‘string 
lengths’, but this could have been solely the speeding due to practice. It is possible 
that these participants would have discovered the Information Reduction strategy if 
they had received more practice, but the range o f trials experienced by them was the 
same as the participants who did discover the strategy. This suggests that the amount 
o f practice may not be a factor. One possibility is that some, at least, did not receive 
sufficient practice to enable them to notice the ‘true’ regularity and a future 
experiment could give all participants one full block o f training before allowing them 
to indicate they had found a shortcut. Haider et al. (2005) had an experimental 
procedure which tracked whether there was an abrupt reduction in RTs between 
blocks, rather than the cessation o f practice being participant-led. This may ensure 
that only those who find the Information Reduction strategy and can process all 
‘strings’ equally quickly exit from practice early, although participants who discover it 
in the first block may not be picked up. A future experiment could use this 
methodology but also test participants’ knowledge of any strategy they were using, to 
see if more are aware of Information Reduction when they are not explicitly trying to 
discover a shortcut.
One aspect o f the results that is apparent, from table 7.3, is that the results for 
the multiple-triplet task and shapes task differ from each other when compared to 
the control experiment (Experiment 1). Whilst for the shapes task the percentages o f
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Information Reduction aware participants was similar in both experiments, the 
proportions differ markedly for the multiple-triplet task, with far fewer showing any 
knowledge of the strategy. This could suggest that it is more important in the 
multiple-triplet experiment to have more practice. This may be related to the 
additional processing required in the calculation, adding to working memory load, 
and thus preventing the hypothesis-testing needed to determine the most efficient 
strategy.
The representation-strengthening theory o f how implicit learning becomes 
explicit knowledge (Cleeremans and Jimenez, 2002) would suggest that amount of 
practice is crucial to being able to indicate awareness o f the regularity, although the 
amount o f practice needed to reach the threshold may vary between participants. It 
does not easily account for those who mistook the regularity and erroneously 
thought they had discovered the shortcut. However, it could be speculated that 
inducing hypothesis-testing meant that this processing masked the implicit learning 
occurring, thus preventing it from gaining sufficient strength to become available to 
consciousness.
Nevertheless, the finding that one-third o f participants did not choose the
Information Reduction option from the list does suggest that even when deliberate
hypothesis-testing is induced, some participants do not notice the regularity built-in
to the task. Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) suggested that the differential results
they obtained by type o f implicit-learning task were due to different cognitive
processes utilised to discover the rule. Whilst all participants here carried out the
same task, it could be speculated that whether they primarily used working memory
or reasoning processes to try and elucidate the shortcut varied, perhaps due to
individual differences in intelligence, personality, emotional state or other factors.
Future experiments might investigate what kinds of shortcut these participants
166
thought they had discovered: were they similar or was each unique to the participant? 
For instance, the post-testing questionnaires suggested that a few participants 
believed there was a regularity underlying the presentation order o f the stimuli, 
although this was in fact random. A future experiment could also explore if it is 
possible to identify any consistent individual differences between those who found 
the regularity which enables Information Reduction and those who developed 
another strategy. The measures tested here (distractibility, impulsivity and trust in 
memory; see chapter 8) did not distinguish between the three types of participant: 
aware Information Reduction users; non-aware users; and other shortcut.
This finding o f approximately one-third aware users, one-third non-aware 
users and one-third incorrect hypothesisers does reflect results found by Lambert 
and Roser (2001) in a spatial cueing experiment. They used a subtle difference in 
colour between non-centrally located cues to indicate a relationship between cue and 
target position on a high percentage o f trials and a post-testing questionnaire to test 
awareness. They found 23% were explicitly aware o f the relationship and had faster 
RTs to valid than invalid test trials, 40% who showed no awareness o f the 
relationship but had faster RTs to valid test trials and 37% who they categorised as 
semi-aware but who did not exhibit faster RTs. It was suggested that this latter group 
were aware there was some sort o f relationship between cue and target but had not 
correctly identified what it was and were forming and testing incorrect hypotheses 
about the relationship. However, they did not vary the amount o f practice so it is not 
clear if increasing it would mean more participants finding the correct hypothesis.
Those who picked the Information Reduction option from the list had, in
general, low slopes in the final training block and a high error rate to irregular
‘strings’ in the test block. They could thus be categorised as reducers from the
scatterplots. As the participants who indicated discovery o f a shortcut were asked to
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use it for the final two blocks, this would be expected. In the multiple-triplet task all 
except one o f those who indicated Information Reduction are seen to have reduced 
by the measures used. This provides converging evidence for these measures being 
indicative of Information Reduction. In the shapes task most who selected the 
Information Reduction option are further towards the reducer side of the plot than 
seen in previous experiments, but a couple still managed to spot most o f the irregular 
stimuli. This experiment confirms that some people in the shapes task can know 
what the regularity is, and apply the shortcut, but are still able to spot some or most 
o f the irregular stimuli and reasons for this need to be explored. Nonetheless, results 
here demonstrate that it is possible to get Tull’ reduction in the shapes task. The 
results can also be taken as confirmation that what has been seen in the shapes task 
in previous experiments, reported in chapters 4-6, is Information Reduction, albeit 
perhaps ‘partial’. Again there may be individual differences between participants, 
possibly in attentional processes, which mean some are better at applying the 
shortcut or focussing solely on the relevant area of the stimulus and this could be 
explored in future experiments.
The Unexpected-Event hypothesis predicted that everyone who had a high 
rate o f errors to irregular stimuli in the test block would have indicated that they had 
discovered the Information Reduction strategy but this is not the case. In the 
multiple-triplet task half of those whose RT data and error rate suggests use o f the 
Information Reduction strategy never indicated that they had discovered a shortcut. 
In the shapes task it is harder to determine but it would appear that some of those 
who did not indicate discover)7 o f a shortcut were using Information Reduction to 
some extent. These results suggest that some people can use the strategy without 
apparently being aware of it, although it cannot be ruled out that non-indicators were 
aware but lacked the confidence to indicate this, or did not understand the
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instructions. Alongside the evidence from experiments 1-3 reported in chapters 4-6, 
and those of Curran and Keele (1993), where one-third o f their incidental learning 
group showed less or no awareness o f a regularity, it does seem that some 
performance improvement from implicit learning can occur separately from any 
explicit knowledge. Schwager et al. (2012) did find that there was some implicit 
learning and performance improvement amongst those who were categorised as 
non-verbalisers, despite their overall conclusion that their results supported the 
Unexpected-Event hypothesis. In general, the implicit learning literature suggests 
that some can verbally report regularities and some cannot. Overall these results are 
compatible with the basic premise of the Unexpected-Event hypothesis, which deals 
with a mechanism by which implicit knowledge may become explicit. However, the 
results would appear to be at odds with Haider and Frensch’s idea that performance 
does not consistently improve until after knowledge about a regularity that can be 
exploited becomes available to consciousness, since some of those who showed no 
awareness in the multiple-triplet task had very low slopes and did not spot any o f the 
irregular strings.
Finding that some participants appear to use the strategy despite not being able 
to verbalise their knowledge is compatible with the representational-strength 
hypothesis, since that does not require verbal knowledge for behaviour to have been 
affected. Therefore these results do not distinguish between the basic idea o f the 
Unexpected-Event hypothesis or the representational-strength hypothesis. Other 
theoretical ideas, such as implicit learning being separate and independent from 
explicit learning may be supported by the results o f this experiment, although these 
theories generally offer no explanation o f why some people become explicitly aware 
of implicitly learned regularities. It may revolve around whether attention has been 
involved. Curran and Keele (1993) suggested that there can be nonattentional
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learning which is associative, nonaware attentional learning and aware attentional 
learning. However it is not clear under what conditions these processes might 
operate and whether they occur differentially in individuals, although reportable 
knowledge may be influenced by individual differences in attention allocation and 
short term memory capacity (Cleeremans, 1993). Shanks suggests that implicit 
learning may require some attentional resource and result in some level of awareness 
o f the relationship between the stimuli (Shanks, 2003), as well as suggesting that 
implicit and explicit learning may be neither functionally nor neurally separate. 
Common brain regions for implicit and explicit learning could explain why equal 
levels o f performance are seen in both aware and non-aware participants, but again 
offer no explanation as to why some can verbally express the regularity and some 
apparently cannot.
It has been proposed that the implicit learning occurring in different tasks is 
not necessarily comparable and may involve different learning mechanisms leading 
to different representations (Frensch & Riinger, 2003; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 
2007). If  this is the case then it becomes very difficult to theorise both about 
mechanisms o f implicit learning and links between implicit and explicit learning.
Nonetheless, this experiment does clearly show that participants who 
discovered the Information Reduction shortcut did so after differential amounts of 
practice, with some needing less than one block of trials and some needing two or 
more blocks. The range of trials experienced was wider for the shapes task, although 
it is not known why this should be the case. The fact that different amounts of 
practice are needed supports the results obtained by Haider and Frensch (2002) 
where the performance discontinuities for their six participants occur at different 
times during the 30 practice blocks and the results of Haider et al. (2005) who
monitored change in latency between consecutive blocks and ceased practice for
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participants who showed an RT drop of > ls , although they only report the average 
number of training blocks completed. The amount o f practice required to discover 
Information Reduction may be due to individual differences and this is something 
which future experiments could investigate. It is a matter o f speculation as to 
whether all would come to use and /or be aware of Information Reduction if given 
sufficient practice, but if willing participants could be found then this would be a 
useful avenue to explore.
The next chapter reports the results from the individual difference 
questionnaires employed alongside this experiment and also those used with the 
transfer experiment which is detailed in chapter 9.
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Chapter 8 T e s t in g  In d iv id u a l  D if f e r e n c e s
8.1 In t r o d u c t io n
It has long been known that people leatn at different rates (Bryan & Harter,
1899) and it has also been shown that implicit learning is not an inevitable 
consequence o f task presentation (Karpicke & Pisoni, 2004). These results may arise 
due to processing differences between people, either due directly to differences in, 
for example, working memory capacity, or indirectly due to factors such as 
personality traits impacting on cognition. Although such differences apply to groups 
i.e. people can be divided into those with low, medium or high working memory 
capacity or a particular personality trait, they are referred to as individual differences.
Individual differences may be apparent in the learning, application and 
modification o f strategies (Sohn, Doane, & Garrison, 2006; Taatgen, 2013). For 
instance, Sohn et al. found that cognitive ability affected both which strategy was 
used and ease o f transfer in the polygon discrimination task. This series of 
experiments, along with previous research (Haider & Frensch, 1999a) has shown that 
some people are aware o f the regularity that can lead to Information Reduction and 
some are not. Both some of the aware and some o f the non-aware have been noted 
as users o f the strategy (‘reducers’), and it is also noted that knowledge o f the strategy 
does not necessarily lead to its use. This gives rise to four broad categories: aware 
users, aware non-users, non-aware users and non-aware non-users. Having 
established these groups from Experiment 1, and in subsequent experiments, the 
question arises as to whether there is some particular individual difference which 
could identify these groups. For example, variations in attentional focus, motivation 
and emotion regulation as a result of personality traits may affect training and
practice (Kluge, Ritzmann, Burkolter, & Sauer, 2011). There is also the question of 
whether it would be possible to identify those who are able to transfer from one set 
o f stimuli to another (Haider & Frensch, 1996; Haider et al., 2005) (Chapter 9). 
Individual differences in general cognitive capacities and aspects of general 
intelligence are thought to play a part in whether or not skill successfully transfers 
from one task to another (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). Consequently a variety of 
psychometric variables were explored alongside Experiments 4 and 5, to examine 
aspects o f personality and processing.
Previous research examining individual differences in skill acquisition and 
transfer has looked at the general cognitive abilities o f general reasoning, spatial 
visualisation, perceptual speed, spatial problem solving and verbal comprehension 
(Sohn et al., 2006). It was found that overall level of ability affected which strategy 
was adopted initially in a visual discrimination task and also whether transfer to new 
stimuli was successful. The different cognitive abilities were not examined separately, 
so it is not known if one, several, or all of the factors measured are relevant to 
strategy usage. Edmunds (2005), using the target search task, employed the State- 
Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) and the matrix- 
reasoning sub-test o f the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale o f Intelligence (WASI, 
Wechsler, 1999) to examine whether reducers could be distinguished from non­
reducers by either anxiety or intelligence. He analysed a variety o f measures arising 
from the task that could potentially be indicative of whether someone is reducing: 
the difference between the regression coefficients for the first and last training 
blocks; mean errors in the final training block; errors to irregular stimuli in the test 
block; the difference in RT between the last training block and the test block; and 
the difference in RT between the final training block and the test block for the 
longest strings only. Using linear regression he found that neither state nor trait
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anxiety nor total IQ score were predictive o f the values for any of the variables 
tested and that all the measures gave similar results. When the IQ  score was broken 
down into spatial and pattern-matching components, the pattern-matching was 
found to be predictive o f the errors made to irregular stimuli in the test block, 
suggesting that those who are good at focussing on detail are less likely to be 
reducers. This trait could be referred to as thoroughness, perfectionism or perhaps 
conscientiousness.
For this study a number of potential individual difference areas were 
considered, with the provisos that testing would not take long, since the main task 
already occupied up to an hour o f the participant’s time, and that testing could be 
carried out remotely. Auditory digit span has been linked to individual differences in 
implicit learning (Karpicke & Pisoni, 2004). Working memory capacity, and its role 
in attentional control, has been suggested as possibly involved in inattentional 
blindness (Seegmiller et al., 2011). However, testing working memory span or 
auditory digit span remotely was ruled out, as was using Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
to measure fluid intelligence, since this would need to be purchased, but factors for 
which questionnaires have been developed were possible. Personality differences are 
known to be associated with differences in cognitive processing, including 
probability learning (Dickman, 1990) and learning a regularity could be compared to 
this type o f learning. Personality is often subdivided into the traits o f agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience (McCrae & 
Costa, 1987), although there are other sub-factors which can be considered, such as 
impulsivity and distractibility. In addition, it was noted in a number o f the post­
testing questionnaires returned for the multiple-triplet task in Experiments 1-3, that 
some participants used a memory strategy, whereas others said they did not trust
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their memories and consequently counted through the alphabet each time. Therefore 
another potential area to explore was trust in memory.
This was an exploratory study and no hypotheses were made about potential 
factors which may be implicated in usage o f Information Reduction.
8.2 T h e  measures u sed
Initially some fairly specific individual differences were investigated. These 
were impulsivity, using the Dickman functional and dysfunctional impulsivity scales 
(Dickman, 1990); distractibility, using the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
(Broadbent et al., 1982); and trust in memory, using the Squire Subjective Memory 
Questionnaire (Squire et al., 1979). Subsequendy, a more general test o f personality, 
using the 10-item scales o f the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 
2006; h ttp ://ip ip .ori.org/) and a test o f ‘cognitive miserliness’, using the 10-item 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005; personal communication, 2014) were 
administered.
8.2.1 Impulsivity
Impulsivity is the tendency to deliberate less than others of equal ability and 
may include risk taking behaviour. It has been suggested as the component of 
extraversion which is most closely associated with observed individual differences in 
signal detection, vigilance and retrieval from short- and long-term memory 
(Dickman, 1990), possibly because accuracy is sacrificed in favour of speed. 
Impulsivity is also related to a deficit in the ability to inhibit actions (Logan, 
Schachar, & Tannock, 1997). Therefore it may potentially be a factor in whether 
someone is a reducer or not. However, impulsivity is not linked to whether or not 
participants learn the good decks in the Iowa gambling task (Glicksohn et al., 2007),
so it would seem that it does not affect implicit learning.
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Dickman presented evidence that impulsivity itself consists o f two distinct 
facets, functional and dysfunctional, which can be distinguished by self-report. This 
was supported by the cross-scale analysis carried out by Miller, Joseph and Tudway 
(2004). Whilst dysfunctional impulsivity always gives rise to negative consequences 
such as a high error rate, functional impulsivity may be an optimal response in some 
situations, because it leads to better overall performance. That is, increased speed 
allows more items to be processed, even if there are errors for some o f them. 
Functional impulsivity may be useful in situations where not all information is 
relevant, as in Information Reduction tasks. Functional impulsivity has been related 
to extraversion and dysfunctional impulsivity to conscientiousness on the five-trait 
model o f Costa and McCrae. Functional impulsivity also correlates with the 
venturesomeness component o f Eysenck (Miller et al., 2004), whereas dysfunctional 
impulsivity correlates with impulsiveness on that scale. These factors can be 
designated as trait impulsivity (Leshem & Glicksohn, 2007). These differing 
correlations suggest that the two facets o f impulsivity should be assessed separately. 
Given the relationship to other personality factors, as well as the possibility that 
impulsivity may lead to less of a stimulus being processed, it seemed worthy o f 
investigation in relation to Information Reduction usage.
Examples o f questions used are:
For functional impulsivity — People have admired me because I can think
quickly
For dysfunctional impulsivity — I often get into trouble because I don’t think
before I act
Participants respond with a true/false answer. The full scales can be found in 
Appendix 2.
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8.2.2 Distractibility/Cognitive Failures
Distractibility is an inability to ignore task-irrelevant stimuli (Forster & Lavie, 
2007), and thus would appear to be relevant to whether someone is a reducer or 
non-reducer. Distractibility can be assessed using the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (CFQ) (Broadbent et al., 1982; Forster & Lavie, 2007). It has been 
shown that individual differences in cognitive abilities such as attention control and 
working, retrospective and prospective memory can predict these type o f everyday 
failures (Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012), with cognitive failures being negatively 
related to vigilance and positively related to attentional problems (Wallace & 
Vodanovich, 2003). The CFQ is a well-validated scale, being internally consistent and 
having test-retest reliability (Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003). Forster and Lavie found 
that those scoring more highly on distractibility, as measured by the CFQ, 
experienced greater distractor interference in perceptual load tasks. Therefore it 
might be anticipated that non-reducers would be more distractible.
However, studies investigating the relationship between distractor effects in 
selective attention and CFQ have given mixed results, with some finding a 
correlation (Bloem & Schmuck, 1999) and some finding no relationship (Kane, 
Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994). Additionally, some accidents have been 
linked to not noticing that usually irrelevant information is now relevant. For 
instance, an account o f the Three Mile Island incident suggested that “operators simply 
didn't look at the other [indicator lights], never expecting the [valves] to be closed because they were 
always open during operation ” (Johnson, n.d.). It has been suggested that an increased 
number o f accidents is linked to a high score on the CFQ (Larson, Alderton, 
Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997) and the CFQ can be used to predict accidents (Wallace 
& Vodanovich, 2003). Wallace and Vodanovich suggest that accidents may occur 
due to a failure to process information, as the attentional capacity has been exceeded.
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This may suggest that a high score on the CFQ could be correlated with being a 
reducer.
Either way it would seem that the CFQ could predict an individual’s likelihood 
of using Information Reduction. The CFQ asks participants to rate on a scale from 
Very often’ to ‘never’ the frequency with which they have made minor mistakes in 
the last six months.
An example question is:
Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are doing something
else?
The full set o f 25 questions can be found in Appendix 3.
8.2.3 Trust in memory
Since some participants in the multiple-triplet task indicated on their 
questionnaires that they continued to count through the alphabet because they did 
not trust their memory, it was thought that it might be useful to explore whether this 
had a bearing on the use of Information Reduction. It has previously been suggested 
that trust in memory affected performance on an alphabet arithmetic task (White, 
Cerella, & Hoyer, 2007). Although initially developed for use with a patient 
population, the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ) (Squire et al.,
1979) has been used to examine trait trust in memory in non-clinical populations as 
well (Van Bergen, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2009; van Bergen, Brands, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach, 2010). It has been shown to have a one-dimensional structure, with 
internal consistency and satisfactory test-retest reliability. It correlates positively with 
an objective measure o f memory (the Auditory Verbal Learning Test) (Van Bergen et 
al., 2009), showing that in general people are well-calibrated. The SSMQ correlates 
negatively with the CFQ — as trust in memory increases, then self-reported cognitive
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failures decrease. In other words, people who are aware that they make everyday 
cognitive failures are more likely to distrust their memories. Thus if distractibility, as 
measured by the CFQ, is linked to using Information Reduction, then trust in 
memory should also be linked. The SSMQ is an 18-item self-rating scale ranging 
from -4 (disastrous), through 0 (average), to +4 (perfect).
An example question is:
My ability to hold in my memory things I have learned is ...
The full set of questions can be found in Appendix 4.
8.2.4 Cognitive miser
Some cognitive processes occur quickly and intuitively, with little attention or 
deliberation, whereas others occur more slowly, involving active and conscious work 
(Frederick, 2005). These two processes have been referred to as System 1 and 
System 2. System 1 processing is characterised by being unconscious, rapid, effortless 
and automatic (Bockenholt, 2012), is thought to be involved in implicit learning and 
could be considered equivalent to automatic processing in Schneider and Shiffrin’s 
(1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) classification, referred to in the literature review 
(Chapter 2). A cognitive miser is someone who saves cognitive resources when 
possible, relying on intuitive reasoning (heuristics) even if this results in errors 
(Bockenholt, 2012). They do not suppress the response that first comes to mind 
(Frederick, 2005). Thus misers are considered to only use System 1 processing 
(Evans, 2008). Whilst Information Reduction has been posited as a conscious 
process, there would appear to be parallels between the idea of being a cognitive 
miser, defaulting to the simplest cognitive mechanism (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 
2011), and being a reducer, which involves simplifying stimulus processing and using 
the response which first comes to mind. Thus this seemed a potential avenue to
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explore as a way to differentiate reducers from non-reducers. The basic test for a 
cognitive miser, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), is a performance measure 
rather than a self-report measure. It involves three questions (Frederick, 2005), 
however, this has been increased in recent years with additional items. Frederick now 
uses a 10-item test (personal communication, 2014), and this was used in this study. 
The CRT can be used to predict performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (Toplak 
et al., 2011), although it is not related to measures o f cognitive ability or executive 
function. The difference between the questions used in the CRT and insight 
problems is that participants generally have no problem generating a plausible 
answer, however, this answer is incorrect. The correct answer can be obtained by 
reasoning and does not require a re-representation o f the problem, as for instance 
the insight box and candle problem (Duncker & Lees, 1945).
An example question from the CRT is:
Mary’s mother has 4 children. The younger three are called Spring, Summer
and Autumn. What is the name o f the oldest?
The intuitive, cognitive miser, response to this is ‘Winter’, but the correct answer is 
o f course ‘Mary’. The full set o f questions can be found in Appendix 5.
8.2.5 Personality
Broader aspects o f personality may affect the usage o f Information Reduction. 
Personality has been noted to influence cognitive performance (Costa, Fozard, 
McCrae, & Bosse, 1976) and to be involved in skill development (McCrae & Costa, 
1995). The five-factor model (McCrae & Costa, 1987) consists o f agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience. These have 
been shown to be stable across the lifespan (Costa et al., 1986; McCrae & Costa, 
1994) and to be universal (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Relationships between these
1 8 1
factors and cognitive processes have been found, for example an association 
between vigilance and openness and extraversion (Utd, White, Gonzalez, McDouall, 
& Leonard, 2013). Uttl et al. attribute the correlations in part to being able to 
determine strategies for task success, so these could be relevant to using a strategy 
such as Information Reduction. Agreeableness has been found to predict RTs on the 
Stroop test and scores on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, the latter also being 
predicted by conscientiousness (Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002). Jensen-Campbell et al. 
link their findings to effortful control: the ability to sustain and shift attention and 
the ability to voluntarily initiate and inhibit actions. Conscientiousness has been 
shown to interact with training method, with a method involving repeated practice 
being more beneficial for knowledge acquisition in less conscientious individuals 
(ICluge et al., 2011). Those with lower conscientiousness may be less persistent and 
need a more highly structured situation, such as that provided by practice training, in 
order to perform well.
Neuroticism but not extraversion was related to performance on a ‘difficult’ 
serial learning task, in which less time was allowed (Jensen, 1962). Those scoring 
more highly for neuroticism performed less well, although neither trait affected the 
easier task. Nonetheless, it would seem that neuroticism could have an effect on 
implicit learning. Extraversion has been shown to correlate consistently with 
differences in remembering and learning (Allsopp & Eysenck, 1975). Extraversion 
predicted worse performance on two theoretical forms of learning strategy, model 
free and model-based (Skatova, Chan, & Daw, 2013). The model-free strategy 
consists o f learning to repeat rewarded actions whereas model-based algorithms 
learn a map or model of the task structure to guide action. Either of these could 
potentially be related to using Information Reduction. In relation to motor 
movements, extraverts have been reported to value speed more than accuracy, whilst
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introverts value accuracy over speed (Eysenck, 1967). If  this also applies to other 
tasks, this would suggest that extraverts would be more likely to be reducers. 
Unsworth et al. (2012) found that extraversion was negatively related to the ability to 
sustain attention on a task, which could suggest that extraverts might more readily 
adopt a strategy like Information Reduction, if they attend long enough to discover 
it.
Such results suggest that aspects o f personality could have an influence on 
Information Reduction. The actual inventory, which consists o f 240 items is not 
freely available, however an open source with similar questions has been established 
— the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006; 
h ttp://ipip.ori.org/). This offers a 50-item scale (10 per factor, with 5 positively 
keyed and 5 negatively keyed) and a 100-item scale (20 per factor, with 10 positively 
keyed and 10 negatively keyed). In order to keep the questionnaire to a reasonable 
length, the 50 item scale was chosen for this study. The full set o f questions can be 
found in Appendix 6.
8.3 M e t h o d
The questionnaires were set up in Qualtrics (Qualttics, Provo, UT) and
followed the post-testing questionnaire which was administered to all participants
(Appendix 1). After participants had returned their datafiles they were sent a link to
the questionnaires. All participants in Experiment 4, explicit instruction, and some o f
the participants in Experiment 5, near transfer, were asked to complete the Dickman
impulsivity scale, the CFQ and the SSMQ. For the impulsivity scale questions were
presented to participants with functional and dysfunctional alternated. Participants in
Experiment 5, far transfer, and some o f those who took part in near transfer, were
asked to complete the IPIP scale and the CRT. For the five personality types the
questions were presented to participants in mixed order: a positively keyed item for
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each facet (5 questions, one for each attribute), then a negatively keyed item for each 
type, followed by another positively keyed item for each etc.
A t the start of the survey the participants were told:
In this survey you will be asked some questions about the way you feel and 
act, which will be analysed along with your data from the experiment you 
have already completed, to determine if  particular personality types perform 
in certain ways on the task.
The survey consists o f several pages and there will be a progress bar at the 
bottom to show how fa r through you are. Some are multiple-choice 
questions, and some require you to indicate your response on a scale - 
please answer with your first thought and try to answer all questions.
Sometimes you may feel that you want to give a broader response than is 
allowed, but only one response can be recorded, so give the response which 
reflects your first inclination.
They were also reminded of their right to withdraw, that their data would be held 
confidentially and that it would not be possible for them to be identified from the 
results.
The Dickman Impulsivity questions were simply introduced as multiple-choice 
questions, and each had a radio button to select for true or false. The CFQ was 
introduced by:
The following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes 
from time to time, but some o f which happen more often than others. Please 
indicate how often these things have happened to you in the last six months.
Answers to the CFQ were by selecting the appropriate radio button for one out of:
Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Quite often, Very often. The SSMQ was introduced by:
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The following questions ask you to rate your memory on a scale o f -4 
(disastrous) to +4 (perfect)
and each question had radio buttons to select for the response on a nine-point scale. 
The introduction to the personality questions was:
Phrases describing behaviours
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people’s behaviours.
Please use the rating scale below each to describe how accurately each 
statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as 
you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself 
in relation to other people you know o f the same gender as you are, and 
roughly your same age. Please read each statement carefully, and then fill in 
the bubble that corresponds to the number on the scale.
The response options were: Very Inaccurate; Moderately Inaccurate; Neither 
Inaccurate nor Accurate; Moderately Accurate; Very Accurate. The CRT was 
preceded by:
Below are 10 problems that vary in difficulty. Try to answer as many as you can.
The answers were given in free-text boxes.
Some questionnaires were not completed at all and o f those returned, some 
questions were omitted by some participants, so not all could be included in all the 
analyses. There were a total of 46 participants in shapes tasks and 49 participants in 
multiple-triplet tasks who returned questionnaires examining impulsivity, 
distractibility and trust in memory. There were a total o f 52 participants in shapes 
tasks and 46 participants in multiple-triplet tasks who returned questionnaires 
examining personality and cognitive miserliness.
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8.4 R e s u l t s
Since these experiments have indicated that there is not a simple dichotomous 
split between reducers and non-reducers, and that some do not appear to be aware 
o f Information Reduction, despite apparently using it, it was not felt appropriate to 
analyse the data by using median splits to create categorical variables for logistic 
regression. The analyses carried out previously (Edmunds, 2005) showed that all the 
variables tested, such as error rates, differences in RT or slopes, gave similar results. 
Therefore it was decided to continue with using error rate to irregular stimuli in the 
test block, as a proxy measure o f whether or not someone was a reducer, and this 
was correlated with the score from each o f the scales.
The possible ranges of scores for the various questionnaires and the ranges 
obtained are shown in Table 8.1. The correlations for each measure with the error 
rate to irregular stimuli are shown in Table 8.2.
As can be seen in Table 8.2, only one significant result was obtained: there was 
a significant negative correlation between extraversion and error rate for those who 
had taken part in the shapes tasks, r(41) = -.482, p = .001. As the error rate increased 
the extraversion score reduced — in other words, those showing more reduction by 
ignoring the irregular shapes in the test block were more introverted. A scatterplot 
showing the scores by self-report type is shown in figure 8.1. All other correlations 
for shapes tasks yielded p > .2. For multiple-triplet no significant correlations were 
found, but distractibility, agreeableness, trust in memory and CRT may be worthy of 
further investigation. All other correlations for multiple-triplet tasks yielded p > .1, 
with most having p > .4.
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Figure 8.1: extraversion score and error rate to irregular shapes by self-report type
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Key: ♦  explicidy expressed regularity and indicated use of Information
Reduction strategy
■ aware of regularity but continued checking irrelevant elements 
A  did not verbally express regularity
8.5 D is c u s s io n
Overall, it would seem that none o f the personality or processing traits tested 
have any bearing on whether someone is a reducer or not, which is surprising given 
the range o f other areas where these individual differences have been detected. 
However, results from the various experiments reported in chapters 4-9 suggest that 
the exact nature o f task and training conditions have a considerable effect on the use 
o f Information Reduction. Therefore it may be that all differences observed in 
whether reduction is used or not are due to the type o f task or to the training 
conditions. On the other hand, the effect o f changes to task and training conditions 
could mask any individual differences, or they may only be evident in certain 
situations. For example, Forster and Lavie (2007) found that distractibility accounted 
for differences in participant performance at low perceptual load, but high 
perceptual load eliminated measurable differences.
Implicit learning is thought by some to be an evolutionarily old process (Reber 
and Allen, 2009) and less subject to individual difference effects and it has been
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shown that there is no relationship between extraversion and incidental learning 
(Imam, 1974). So it would seem that if individual differences do have an effect on 
Information Reduction they must act either at the stage where the implicitly learned 
regularity becomes part of conscious awareness or when the decision to make use of 
the strategic knowledge is made. If deciding to adopt Information Reduction is 
mainly a conscious decision which depends largely on judgement of whether it is 
useful in the particular circumstances, as would be deduced from Haider and 
Frensch’s Information Reduction hypothesis, then this could be more significant 
than any individual difference between groups.
It is possible that the one significant result seen here, for extraversion in the 
shapes task, is a statistical artefact created by having one reducer with a relatively low 
extraversion score. In the multiple-triplet task, which had more reducers, there was 
no correlation at all between extraversion score and number of errors to irregular 
stimuli. However, as the two tasks involve diverse cognitive processes and are 
differentially affected by changes to training conditions, it would not be surprising to 
find that the tasks were differentially affected by individual differences. If  the 
significant correlation does mean that introverts are more likely to reduce in the 
shapes task, then reasons why this might be should be explored. Earlier research, 
outlined in section 8.2.5, was equivocal about whether extraverts or introverts would 
potentially be the best at reduction.
It has been suggested that introverts have a higher level o f cortical arousal and 
a lower level o f inhibition (H. J. Eysenck, 1963). Introverts may be able to make finer 
discriminations than extraverts, as shown in masking and experiments where a flash 
o f light has to be detected under difficult conditions (H. J. Eysenck, 1967; 
McLaughlin & Eysenck, 1966). Unsworth et al. (2012) found that introverts were 
more vigilant than extraverts. This suggests that introverts have better selective
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attention, with a better ability to process relevant information and ignore irrelevant, 
which would explain why introverts may be more able to reduce. Arousal increases 
in extraverts as the task becomes more demanding, bringing their performance to the 
same level as introverts (M. W. Eysenck, 1975), and extraverts learn more rapidly 
than introverts on difficult or complex tasks (M. W. Eysenck, 1976). This could 
explain why there was no difference seen between extraverts and introverts in the 
multiple-triplet task.
It could be that the individual measures used, such as the CFQ, are not fine­
grained enough, and that measures distinguishing more closely areas such as 
working, retrospective and prospective memory, and attentional control are required 
(Unsworth et al., 2012). It may be that individual differences in the various modules 
o f working memory, posited in the Baddeley (1983) model, are important in different 
tasks — the phonological loop for the multiple-triplet task and the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad for the shapes task.
Although trait impulsivity was not found to affect whether someone reduces 
or not, cognitive impulsivity (Leshem & Glicksohn, 2007), which can be assessed by 
the Matching Familiar Figures test (Carrillo-de-la-Pena, Otero, & Romero, 1993; 
Kagan, 1966; Leshem & Glicksohn, 2007) and the Trail-Making test (Leshem & 
Glicksohn, 2007; White et al., 1994), may be relevant. Executive function, a 
theoretical construct of the higher-order cognitive processes involved in thought and 
action, such as planning, sequencing and monitoring (Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 
2003), is another area where individual differences may affect the use o f Information 
Reduction. Here again, it may be more useful to examine each cognitive operation 
separately, as executive function may not be a unitary construct. Inhibition o f 
prepotent responses, which can be assessed with the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), is 
one such process that may be relevant to Information Reduction. Another construct
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which could be relevant to the varied use o f Information Reduction seen is that of 
cognitive style. This is a person’s tendency or preference for representing and 
processing information in a particular way (Newton and Roberts, 2000) such that 
different strategies for learning and for making inferences are used (Roberts and 
Newton, 2001). This results in individual differences in strategy use. A number of 
dichotomies have been suggested between dominant styles, for example, visualisers 
vs verbalisers and holists vs serialists. There are many other cognitive styles that have 
been suggested, so careful examination o f the literature would be needed before 
embarking on examining this construct.
Haider and Frensch’s Information Reduction hypothesis would seem to 
suggest that in the right conditions everyone could become a reducer. Consequently, 
it could be that the area to examine is whether individual differences apply to the 
length of training required before Information Reduction is adopted, that is, 
distinguishing those who are ‘early’ reducers from ‘late’ reducers. The explicit 
instruction experiment (Experiment 4, chapter 7) could prove a means by which this 
could be tested, if a larger number of participants could be recruited. It would 
probably also need more blocks, to maximise the chances o f late reducers finding the 
strategy — of the six participants tested in the 30-block experiment (Haider & 
Frensch, 2002), two appeared to need over 15 blocks before discovering the strategy.
Whilst the results presented here serve mainly to eliminate various areas of 
individual difference as factors involved in whether someone is a reducer or not, this 
does not mean that other factors, such as working memory or selective attention, or 
processing styles, do not act at some point in the various cognitive processes 
occurring.
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The next chapter describes the final set o f experiments carried out, which 
examine whether Information Reduction can be transferred from one set o f stimuli 
to another similar set.
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C h a p ter  9 EXPERIMENT 5 
T r a n s f e r  t o  n e w  s t i m u l i / r u l e
9.1 In t r o d u c t io n
One method used to determine the processes involved in skill acquisition is 
the use o f a transfer design: one task is practised and subsequently another task 
which shares features is introduced (Proctor & Vu, 2006). The learned response 
from the first task influences responses in the second (Adams, 1987). Positive 
transfer occurs when the skill is applicable to the second task and is used to maintain 
or improve performance. Negative transfer occurs when the skill transferred causes a 
decrement in performance. The use o f the test block in the Alphabet Verification 
task, the multiple-triplet task and shapes task could be considered examples o f 
transfer tasks in which negative transfer occurs. That is, the skill developed 
throughout training, o f ignoring irrelevant information, is applied even though it 
(unknowingly) reduces accuracy.
The notion that positive transfer occurs is fundamental to many educational 
and other training programmes — that what is learned in the ‘classroom’ can be 
applied to other situations. However, from early days in psychology, it has been clear 
that there are limitations to transfer. The stimuli, the task, the responses and the 
generality of any strategy employed, as well as the nature o f the practice involved and 
the generality, and shared nature, of the procedural memory productions required, 
determine whether, or how successfully, transfer occurs (Adams, 1987; Barnett & 
Ceci, 2002; Speelman & Kirsner, 1997; Strayer & Kramer, 1994; Taatgen, 2013). For 
instance, Thorndike and Woodworth found that training in size estimation of 
rectangles did not enable more accurate estimation o f size for other shapes such as
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triangles and circles (Woodworth & Thorndike, 1901), although the rather rigid 
conclusions they came to about the non-involvement o f “general faculties” have 
since been shown to be over-generalisations. Other experiments have shown that 
transfer can even occur across modalities: pre-training with verbal labels can be 
transferred to motor responses (McAllister, 1953). However, the performance 
improvement between modalities is less than that seen within a modality (Proctor et 
al., 2013). Transfer may also be affected by the development of flexible knowledge or 
concepts about a task (Muller, 1999), such as an awareness of a strategy like 
Information Reduction, although if a strategy is stimulus- or task-specific it may not 
be transferable (Strayer & Kramer, 1994).
One distinction that has been made is between near and far transfer, although 
the precise nature o f what constitutes ‘far’ transfer is a matter o f debate (Barnett & 
Ceci, 2002). When the content and outcomes o f training and task are closely 
matched and both use specific concepts and skills, then near transfer is said to occur 
(Kim & Lee, 2001). Far transfer could be defined as any type o f transfer in which the 
content differs or where general principles or problem-solving rules need to be 
employed. In the suggested taxonomy of far transfer outlined by Barnett and Ceci 
(2002) it is suggested that both the content (what is transferred) and the context 
(when and where transfer occurs) should differ. Thus the Thorndike and 
Woodworth experiment may or may not be classified as far transfer, whereas the 
McAlhster one could be. Results from experiments considered by their authors to be 
‘far transfer’ are equivocal as to whether transfer occurs or not.
Applying these ideas to Information Reduction tasks, we could categorise the 
research that has been done so far as ‘near transfer’. Previous experiments which 
tested transfer in the Alphabet Verification task used structurally similar strings 
varying only by the initial letters used for the triplet (Haider & Frensch, 1996; Haider
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et al., 2005). Thus the training and transfer tasks were very close in terms of both 
content and in the ‘rule’ which needed to be transferred: that the validity o f the string 
was determined by the initial triplet. These studies were designed to test whether 
specific stimuli were being recalled, as Instance Theory would suggest, or if the 
strategy developed was item-general. The results indicated that the strategy 
transferred and it was concluded that the speeding seen could not be attributed to 
automatic instance recall. Hence Information Reduction is seen as a separate and 
consciously controlled strategy, although as we have shown, not everyone who uses 
Information Reduction appears to be aware of so doing.
Speelman and Kirsner (2001) investigated whether the performance gains on 
one task would transfer and indeed lead to further skill improvement on a second, 
related task, which contained some additional components. They found that skill 
improvement was disrupted when the second task was introduced and that this 
effect was exacerbated if the task complexity had increased, but that the amount o f 
prior practice did not seem to be a factor. It was considered that a need to 
reconceptualise the task on transfer stalled the improvement in the already-learned 
skill, but that performance did return to pre-transfer levels and then continued to 
improve as would be predicted by a power-law curve.
Skill acquisition theories such as Logan’s (1988) would predict that there 
would be no positive transfer of the skill, since the instances are different.
Anderson’s Production rules theory (1987) could accommodate both near and far 
transfer, since productions developed for one task may also be used in another — 
transfer will occur more positively the more the productions for the various 
components overlap (Speelman & Kirsner, 2001) or if productions consist o f 
combinations o f task-general ‘primitive elements’ or ‘partial task-general rules’ 
(Taatgen, 2013). This theory would not predict a loss o f performance, such as an
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increase in RTs, on transfer, since the productions being used would be similar. 
However, the context in which productions are acquired may affect the efficiency of 
transfer. Transfer could also be explained by analogical reasoning from declarative 
knowledge, which could occur for Information Reduction if the participant is 
consciously aware o f using the strategy, although experiments testing analogical 
transfer suggest that it is not spontaneously used (Gick, 1986). Consequendy, 
transfer tasks could also be used to determine whether there is conscious knowledge 
of the regularity^: if the participant is aware o f its existence and what that rule is, then 
encountering new stimuli which use the same rule, or which also conform to some 
regularity, would be theorised to result in transfer of the knowledge (‘near transfer’). 
Far transfer could also occur if, being aware o f a regularity in the first set of stimuli, 
participants used this knowledge to search for a new regularity to speed responses to 
a second set (‘far transfer’). This possibility was the basis for the following 
experiments.
9.2 N e a r  T r a n s f e r
9.2.1 Introduction
Haider and Frensch (1996) and Haider et al. (2005) demonstrated that, having 
learned the Information Reduction strategy on one set o f stimuli, it could be 
transferred to a previously unseen set o f similar, structurally equivalent stimuli. The 
two sets o f stimuli started with different letters o f the alphabet: D-H and I-M with 
the triplet at the start of the string for Haider and Frensch (1996) and E-L and M-T 
with the triplet being located at the end of the string for Haider et al. (2005). The 
first experiment repeated each stimulus twice per block, with 400 trials with the first 
set o f stimuli and 400 with the second. As expected, RTs dropped over the first four 
blocks, rose a little on the unannounced change of stimuli and then fell, although not
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to much less than had been achieved at block 4. However, the string-length effect 
was virtually unaffected by the change in stimuli, demonstrating that the strategy of 
ignoring the trailing letters had been transferred, even though the participants were 
taking longer due to having to compute a new set o f triplets. The 2005 experiment 
used a drop in latency o f > 1 s between blocks on the first set o f stimuli as a measure 
o f a strategy switch. Participants received between 320 and 640 training trials, 
depending on whether they were deemed to have started using the strategy or not 
during the experiment, followed by 160 transfer trials. Again latencies increased 
when the new stimuli were introduced. However, the approximately half of 
participants classed as reducers were found to return to the performance level, in 
terms of RT, o f the first set o f stimuli within two blocks of transfer, whereas those 
classed as non-reducers did not. There was no block in which irregular strings 
occurred in either o f these experiments, but they do demonstrate that positive 
transfer can occur in Information Reduction tasks, when the stimuli are very similar. 
In both experiments the ‘rule’, the position o f the triplet and the digit used, was the 
same both before and after the stimuli change.
Another implicit learning transfer experiment used the serial reaction time 
(SRT) task (Schwager et al., 2012). Participants either received 300 trials with no 
sequence, followed by 180 trials with a 6-item repeating sequence, or 300 trials with 
one repeating 6-item sequence followed by 180 trials with a different 6-item 
repeating sequence. Significantly more participants could verbalise at least 4 
sequential items from the sequence used at the end of the experiment if they had 
firstly had experience with another sequence than if they had initially experienced 
random trials. This was taken as evidence in support o f the Unexpected-Event 
hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that an unexpected event, such as a feeling o f 
familiarity7 or a rapid motor response prior to the processing of a stimulus (or even
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the appearance of a stimulus in the SRT), triggers an intentional search for an 
explanation of that event by an explicit reasoning system or, in other words, explicit 
hypothesis testing. Once the cause of the rapid response has been determined, then 
the knowledge is applied from that point onwards, resulting in an RT discontinuity at 
the point o f application.
In further analyses, which also showed support for the Unexpected-Event 
hypothesis, Schwager et al. excluded those who were judged, by a drop in RT, to 
have explicitly learned the repeating sequence during the first 300 trials, since they 
could have carried over knowledge o f there being a sequence. They did not analyse 
whether this group were faster at discovering the second sequence they were 
exposed to than those who showed an RT drop during the second sequence but did 
not appear to have noticed the first sequence. However, Schwager et al. did show 
that the RT slowing at transfer was the same for both the ‘verbaliser’ and the ‘non- 
verbaliser’ groups and took this as evidence of implicit learning of the sequence.
Thus it seems that an implicitly learned regularity can be positively transferred from 
one set o f stimuli to another structurally similar set.
A further set o f studies has examined the effects of transfer between different 
levels o f complexity o f otherwise similar stimuli (Doane et al., 1996; Doane et al., 
1999; Pellegrino et al., 1991). These experiments required participants to make 
same/different judgements regarding a set o f random polygons of increasing 
complexity, where complexity referred to the number of vertices. In the first 
experiment participants were trained with 960 trials where the polygons were either 
highly similar (difficult group) or less similar (easy group) and this was followed by 
960 trials where both the highly similar and less similar polygons were presented to 
all. Results were that the difficult group were able to adjust rapidly when the new, 
easier-to-discriminate stimuli were introduced, but that the easy group were
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disrupted by the inclusion o f the harder-to-discriminate polygons. A ‘string-length 
effect’ related to the complexity o f the polygons was noted for the difficult group, 
but at this stage not linked to a strategy. Instead, it was considered that the difficult 
group had acquired holistic representations and that this was the determining factor 
in smoothing ease o f transfer. The later experiments examined the type o f strategy 
being employed and concluded that those exposed initially to the difficult stimuli 
were using an Information Reduction-like, but unconscious, strategy whereas those 
exposed initially to easy stimuli employed an early-terminating feature search. The 
former strategy facilitated positive transfer whereas the latter resulted in negative 
transfer effects. In other words, a strategy like Information Reduction could transfer 
from more difficult stimuli to easy ones, but transfer might not successfully occur 
with other strategies.
The experiments reported so far all introduced stimuli which were structurally 
very similar to those initially encountered. This experiment sought to test whether 
transfer could occur with stimuli that may appear slighdy more different, but which 
utilise the same rule or regularity. In the case o f multiple-triplet, the digits o f letters 
to be skipped were changed from being 4-2-2 to 3-3-3 (see Table 9.1), but the initial 
triplet was always relevant for determining whether the string was correct or not. 
There is very little published literature where the digit has been changed, but it has 
been found that the RT to ‘3’ is faster than to c4’ and slower than ‘2’ (Brigman & 
Cherry, 2002), so overall this change was not anticipated to increase the time taken 
to complete the task. In the case of shapes, the shapes were substituted by ‘block’ 
letters, but the different shape was still situated middle right. It was felt from the 
control experiment (Experiment 1) that Information Reduction was reasonably well 
established after six blocks o f the multiple-triplet task (360 trials) and four blocks of 
the shapes task (320 trials). However, it was difficult to predict how many transfer
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blocks might be needed and this had to be balanced with keeping the experiment to 
a reasonable length. Consequently there were three transfer blocks (180 trials) for the 
multiple-triplet task and four transfer blocks (320 trials) for the shapes task. To 
enable comparison with other experiments, the training blocks were followed by a 
test block, with irregular versions of the most recendy encountered stimuli type. It 
was hypothesised that transfer of the Information Reduction strategy would occur 
from the first set of stimuli to the second.
9.2.2 M ethod
9.2.2.1 Participants
There were 101 participants, all Open University students studying psychology, 
none of whom had participated in other experiments. There were 51 participants (12 
male) in the multiple-triplet task and 50 (8 male) in the shapes task. Their ages 
ranged from 26-59, mean age 41.
9.2.2.2 M aterials
For each task, one set o f stimuli were as used in previous experiments. One 
new set o f stimuli was devised for each. In the multiple-triplet task the interval 
between each letter was changed from an initial digit o f 4, with digits of 2 
subsequently, to be 3 throughout. The original stimuli are henceforward referred to 
as ‘422-letters’ and the new set as ‘333-letters’. In the shapes task each shape was 
substituted with a ‘block’ letter, which was rotated to create the incorrect shape. 
These are subsequently referred to as ‘shapes’ and ‘letters’. Piloting suggested that 
both o f these new stimuli sets would give Information Reduction. Examples of the 
various stimuli used are given in Table 9.1.
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9.2.2.3 Procedure
The procedure for the practice trials was as in Experiment 1 and these 
reflected the first stimuli set to be seen. Half the participants in the multiple-triplet 
task saw the first set o f stimuli (422-letters) followed by the second set (333-letters) 
and half saw 333-letters followed by 422-letters. In the shapes task half the 
participants saw the shapes first followed by the letters and half saw the letters 
followed by the shapes. The instructions were as in Experiment 1 and the change of 
stimuli set was unannounced, as was the test block. The stimuli used in the test block 
were the most recently encountered stimulus set.
Participants also received a post-testing questionnaire asking questions about 
the task carried out, to gauge awareness and use of the regularity, and also to 
investigate aspects o f individual differences. These individual difference tests were 
fully described and results presented in chapter 8.
9.2.2.4 D esign
The within-participants independent variables were ‘string length’ and type of 
‘string’: regular correct, regular incorrect or irregular. For the multiple-triplet task the 
string length was one, two or three triplets and for the shapes task it was 3-6 shapes.
There were 60 strings per block in the multiple-triplet task, with 9 training
blocks, giving 540 trials during training. These were divided into 6 blocks with the
first set o f stimuli (360 trials) and 3 blocks with the second set o f stimuli (180 trials).
There were 80 shape stimuli per block in the shape matching task, with 8 training
blocks, giving 640 training trials. These were given as 4 blocks with each stimulus set
(320 trials). For each task half the training stimuli in each block were correct and half
were incorrect. Each task had one practice block of 10 stimuli at the beginning and
one test block after the training blocks. The test block had some regular incorrect
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stimuli replaced with irregular ones — 12 for the multiple-triplet task and 16 for the 
shapes task.
The dependent variables were response time (RT) to each stimulus and 
number o f stimuli incorrecdy responded to in the training blocks and the test block.
9.2.3 Results
The results for the different orders o f stimuli sets in each task are presented 
separately.
9.2.3.1 Accuracy
The analysis excluded participants with errors in training o f 10% or greater for 
each trial block. In the multiple-triplet task one was excluded from 422-letters, 
leaving 23 participants’ data, and four were excluded from 333-letters, leaving 23 
participants’ data. In the shapes task two participants were excluded from shapes, 
leaving 23 participants’ data and two participants were excluded from letters, leaving 
23 participants’ data.
Table 9.2 shows that similar numbers o f errors were made to the ‘regular’ 
strings and shapes in the final training block and the test block but more errors were 
made to the irregular strings or inconsistently placed shapes. Error rates to the 
irregular stimuli ranged from 0% to 100% for both stimuli sets in the multiple-triplet 
task. For the shapes task, the overall error rates to the irregular stimuli were 0 to 94% 
where letters were the second set and 12.5% to 81% where shapes were the second 
set. Figure 9.1 shows that the total number of errors increased at all changes o f 
stimuli except for the shapes to letters change. The letters to shapes change caused a 
five times increase in the number o f errors, which is far in excess o f the increase in 
errors at the change o f stimuli in the multiple-triplet task, which only doubled for
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both stimuli sets. However, the number of errors to shapes did reduce in the letters- 
first shapes task, to the level seen in the shapes-first. Overall though processing the 
letters was less error-prone than the shapes.
Figure 9.1: change in total number of errors made per block 
a) multiple-triplet task
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In the multiple-triplet task, 422-letters-first, 3 o f the 23 participants incorrectly 
categorised all 12 o f the irregular strings, with another 6 incorrectly categorising 
more than half o f the irregular strings. For 333-letters-first, 2 participants incorrectly 
categorised all 12 irregular strings, 4 incorrectly categorised 10 or 11 strings and a 
further 4 had more than half incorrect. Thus 39% of the participants in 422-letters- 
first and 43% of the participants in 333-letters-first made a high number of incorrect 
categorisations.
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In the shapes task, shapes-first, 7 out o f 23 participants had twice as many 
errors to irregular than differing letters in the test block, although all except one 
spotted nearly all o f them. One participant incorrectly classified 15 of the irregular 
stimuli. In letters-first 11 out o f 23 participants had twice as many errors to irregular 
than differing shapes in the test block, with 5 having more than half incorrectly 
categorised. 30% of participants in shapes-first and 48% in letters-first made at least 
twice as many errors to the inconsistently placed as to the consistently placed 
differing stimuli.
Table 9.2: Overall error rates in final training block and test block by stimulus type
Final training 
block
Test block
Multiple-triplet task
422-letters-first (final 
training block and test 
block used 333-letters)
correct 4.1% 5.5%
regular incorrect 2.8% 3.9%
irregular - 37.3%
333-letters-first (final 
training block and test 
block used 422-letters)
correct 7.% 8%
regular incorrect 3.9% 9%
irregular - 40.9%
Shapes task
Shapes-first (final training 
block and test block used 
letters)
matching 1.3% 1.1%
differing 2.8% 3.1%
irregular - 13.6%
Letters-first (final training 
block and test block used 
shapes)
matching 1.6% 1.7%
differing 7% 11.6%
irregular - 35.6%
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (String Type: regular correct, regular 
incorrect and irregular) on error rates for the test block showed a significant 
difference among the trial types for each task. For the multiple-triplet task, 422-
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letters-first, string types F(2,44) = 14.77, MSE = 15,367, p = .001, \  — .402, with 
the difference lying between the regular and irregular strings (pairwise comparison: 
regular correct vs regular incorrect p = .365, regular correct vs irregular p =.001, 
regular incorrect vs irregular p = .001). For 333-letters-first, F(2,44) = 19.8, MSE = 
13,920, p < .001, 7]p2 = .474, with the difference lying between the regular and 
irregular strings (pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular incorrect p = .296, 
regular correct vs irregular p < .001, regular incorrect vs irregular p < .001). The 
effect sizes for both were large, although smaller than Experiment 1, suggesting that 
some o f the variance in the error rates is explained by the difference in the stimuli 
types.
For the shapes task, shapes-first, different shape types, F(2,44) = 8.83, MSE = 
2,156, p < .006, Tip2 = .286 with the difference lying between the regular and irregular 
stimuli (pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular incorrect p = .071, regular 
correct vs irregular p = .004, regular incorrect vs irregular p = .011). For letters-first, 
F(2,44) = 42.36, MSE = 11,970, p < 0.001, rjp2 = .658, with all shape types being 
significantly different to each other (pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular 
incorrect p < .001, regular correct vs irregular p < .001, regular incorrect vs irregular 
p < .001). Both effect sizes are large; that for shapes-first is smaller than Experiment 
1, whereas that for letters-first is larger than Experiment 1. This suggests that when 
the stimuli were letters there was not such an effect of varying the type from regular 
to irregular, but when the stimuli were shapes there was a large effect o f varying the 
type from regular to irregular.
9.2.3.2 Response tim es
In the multiple-triplet task for 422-first there was a significant correlation 
between overall error rate in training and overall RT: r(21) = -.597, p = .003,
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indicating that some or all o f the participants may have been using a speed-accuracy 
trade-off strategy. This is particularly surprising since the first 6 blocks were the same 
task as has been used in previous experiments, where no correlation has been seen. 
For 333-first there was no correlation between overall error rate and RT in training: 
r(21) = -.208, p = .342, indicating that there was no speed-accuracy trade-off in this 
task.
In the shapes task, shapes-first, there was a significant correlation between 
overall error rate in training and overall RT: r(21) = -.488, p = .018, which indicates 
that some or all o f the participants may have been using a speed-accuracy trade-off 
strategy. Again this is surprising for the same reason as the 422-first multiple-triplet 
task. For letters-first there was no significant correlation: r(21) = -.342, p = .111, 
indicating that there was no speed-accuracy trade-off in this task.
Figure 9.2 shows that response times decreased overall during each task, 
although there was an increase at the change in stimuli. RTs for correct stimuli were 
slower than for incorrect, although all tasks showed some convergence between 
them, indicating a greater speeding for the correct stimuli.
Figure 9.2: change in response times over the course of each task. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.
Key: solid line — correct stimuli, broken line — incorrect stimuli
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The results of repeated measures ANOVA on the RTs by Block for each 
stimulus set are given in Table 9.3. RTs reduced across blocks with similar stimuli, 
but tended to increase when the stimuli set changed and in the test block when 
irregular stimuli were introduced. At both points this increase was not always 
significant. The only exception was the change from shapes to letters in the shapes
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task, where there was a significant decrease, indicating that the letters were easier to 
process.
9.2.3.3 (iString length effect”
The relative changes in RT for the different ‘string lengths’ is used as a measure of 
whether Information Reduction occurs: if participants learn to process only the 
relevant part of the stimulus then the RT for longer correct stimuli should reduce to 
a greater extent than that to shorter correct stimuli. On the whole all incorrect 
stimuli should be processed equally quickly, since processing can cease once the 
inaccuracy/difference has been determined. This relative change can be tested by 
carrying out a linear regression with stimulus length as predictor to obtain a slope per 
participant and block, followed by a one-way ANOVA on these slopes.
9.2.3.3.1 Multiple-triplet task
For correct strings in 422-letters-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes 
over the first set o f stimuli, block 1 — 6, F(5,110) = 18.68, MSE = 621,678, p < .001, 
r\^ — .459 and a non-significant decrease in slopes over the second set o f stimuli, 
block 6 - 9 ,  F(2,44) = 2.28, MSE = 124,539, p = .13, ^p2 = .094. At the change in 
stimuli there was a non-significant decrease in slopes block 6 — 7, F < 1 and there 
was a significant increase in slopes from the final training block to the test block, 
block 9 -  test, F(l,22) = 12.57, MSE = 922,432, p = .002, = .364.
For incorrect strings in 422-letters-first, there was a significant decrease in 
slopes for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —6, F(5,110) = 7.14, MSE = 132.522, p < 
.001, 7]p2 = .245 but a non-significant decrease in slopes for the second set o f stimuli, 
block 7 — 9, F(2,44) = 2.12, MSE = 28,184, p = 0.143, rjp2 = .088. At the change in 
stimuli there was a non-significant increase in slopes block 6 — 7, F(l,22) < 1 and
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there was a significant increase in slopes from the final training block to the test 
block, block 9 -  test, F(l,22) = 29.13, MSE = 991,735, p < .001, r\p2 = .57.
The effect size for both correct and incorrect strings over the first part o f 
training was large and similar to that seen in Experiment 1, so here it can be 
suggested that there was an effect o f increased speeding for the longer strings. 
Although the reduction in slopes was not significant over the second part of training, 
there was a medium-sized effect, which suggests that there was some speeding 
happening.
For correct strings in 333-letters-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes 
over the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —6, F(5,110) = 15.85, MSE = 1,327,607, p < 
.001, r)p2 = .419 and a significant decrease in slopes over the second set o f stimuli, 
block 6 — 9, F(2,44) = 24.74, MSE = 630,656, p < .001, r]p2 = .529. A t the change in 
stimuli there was a non-significant decrease in slopes, block 6 — 7, F(l,22) < 1 and 
block 9 — test, F(l,22) < 1. The effect sizes were large, suggesting that there was an 
effect o f more speeding for the longer strings with both stimuli sets.
For incorrect strings in 333-letters-first, there was a non-significant decrease in 
slopes for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —6, F(5,110) = 1.81, MSE = 96,852, p = 
.076, r \2 = .168. There was a non-significant increase in slopes for the second set o f 
stimuli, block 6 — 9, F(2,44) < 1, as well as a non-significant increase at the change o f 
stimuli, block 6 — 7, F(l,22) < 1, and a significant increase from the final training 
block to the test block, block 9 — test, F(l,22) = 5.69, MSE = 422,333, p = .026,y\p2 
= .206.
These results suggest that Information Reduction was established with both 
the 422-letters-first and the 333-letters-first and transferred to the second set o f 
stimuli, at least for some o f the participants. The changes in regression slopes are 
presented graphically in figure 9.3. The slopes for correct and incorrect strings did
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not fully converge by the end of training for either 422-letters-first or 333-letters- 
first.
F igure 9.3: M ultip le-trip let task, the ch ange in  coe ffic ien t o f  regression  slop es  
p lo tted  by b lo ck  (error bars represen t th e  standard error o f  the m eans)
Key: so lid  line - correct strings, broken  line - incorrect strings
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The correlation o f the regression coefficient averaged over the final two 
training blocks and the error rates to irregular stimuli was significant for 422-letters- 
first, r(21) = -.564, p = .005 but not for 333-letters-first, r(21) = -.208, p = .342. 
Figure 9.4 shows scatterplots o f the two measures, also indicating whether the 
participant spotted the Information Reduction shortcut and whether they used it or 
not.
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Figure 9.4: Scatterplots showing the regression slopes averaged over the final two 
training blocks against the percentage of errors to the irregular stimuli, indicating 
whether they found a shortcut or not.
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It can be seen that there are nine reducers (39%) in 422-letters-first, although 
three of those may have only been partially using the strategy, and eight reducers 
(35%) in 333-letters-first, although two o f these may have only partially used the 
strategy. It was not possible to distinguish from the questionnaire answers if the 
strategy had been noticed on the first stimuli set, but was not applied, or only 
partially applied, on the second set. Looking at the scatterplots, this may have been 
the case with some participants. Overall, there were fewer participants who seemed
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unaware o f the strategy than in previous experiments and there was only one non- 
aware user.
9.2.3.3.2 Shapes task
For matching stimuli in shapes-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes 
for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,66) = 8.2, MSE = 70,320, p < .001, r \2 = 
.272 and a significant decrease in slopes for the second set o f stimuli, block 5 — 8, 
F(3,66) = 14.59, MSE = 131,447, p < .001, rjp2 = .399. At the change in stimuli there 
was a significant decrease in slopes, block 4 — 5, F(l,22) = 28.22, MSE = 247,677, p 
< .001, y\p2 = .562, and there was a significant increase in slopes from the final 
training block to the test block, block 8 — test, F(l,22) = 8.06, MSE = 20,116, p =
.01, rjp2 = .268. The effect sizes for the decrease over training were large for both 
stimuli types but greater for the letters than for the shapes, suggesting that there was 
greater speeding for the stimuli with more components.
For differing stimuli in shapes-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes 
for the first set of stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,66) = 12.25, MSE = 211.136, p < .001, r \2
— .358 and a non-significant decrease in slopes for the second set o f stimuli, block 5
— 8, F < 1. At the change in stimuli there was a significant decrease in slopes, block 4
— 5, F(l,22) = 25.23, MSE = 77,891, p < .001, r\2 — .534 and there was an almost 
significant increase in slopes from the final training block to the test block, block 8 — 
test, F(l,22) = 4.185, MSE = 15,408, p = .053, r|p2 = .16.
These results suggest that Information Reduction was established with the first 
set o f stimuli, the shapes, and was carried over to the second set, the letters, but that 
many o f the irregular stimuli were spotted in the test block. The changes in 
regression slopes are presented graphically in figure 9.4.
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For matching stimuli in letters-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes 
for the first set of stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,66) = 15.3, MSE = 235,085, p < .001, r \2 
= .41 and a significant decrease for the second set of stimuli, block 5 — 8, F(3,66) = 
7.25, MSE = 77,880, p = .001, r \2 — .248. A t the change in stimuli there was a 
significant increase in slopes, block 4 — 5, F(l,22) = 49.26, MSE = 1,079,561, p < 
.001, r \2 — .691 and there was a non-significant increase in slopes from the final 
training block to the test block, block 8 — test, F(l,22) = 3.24, MSE = 30,340, p = 
.086, r]p2 — .128. The effect sizes for the decrease over training were large for both 
stimuli types but greater for the letters than for the shapes, suggesting that there was 
greater speeding for the stimuli with more components.
For differing stimuli in letters-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes 
for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,66) = 8.69, MSE = 36,400, p = .001, t] 2 = 
.283 and a significant decrease for the second set o f stimuli, block 5 — 8, F(3,66) = 
6.95, MSE = 53,718, p = .001, r \2 — .24. A t the change in stimuli there was a 
significant increase in slopes, block 4 — 5, F(l,22) = 44.14, MSE = 369,071, p < .001, 
y\2 — .667 and there was a significant increase from the final training block to the test 
block, block 8 -  test, F(l,22) = 5.4, MSE = 29,228, p = .03, t^2 = .197.
These results suggest that Information Reduction was established in the first 
set o f stimuli, the letters, but that the change in stimuli caused processing, especially 
o f the boxes containing more shapes, to slow. Overall, Information Reduction did 
seem to have been transferred, at least by some o f the participants, to the shapes.
The changes in slopes are presented graphically in figure 9.5. It can be seen that 
there was more convergence between the slopes for matching and differing stimuli 
when the stimuli were block letters than when they were shapes, for both orders o f 
stimuli.
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Figure 9.5: Shapes task, the change in coefficient of regression slopes plotted by 
block (error bars represent the standard error of the means)
Key: solid line — matching stimuli, broken line — differing stimuli
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The correlation of the regression coefficient averaged over the final two 
training blocks and the error rates to irregular stimuli was not significant for shapes- 
first, r(21) = -.128, p = .562 but was significant for letters-first, r(21) = -.676, p < 
.001. Figure 9.6 shows scatterplots of the two measures, also indicating whether the 
participant spotted the Information Reduction shortcut and whether they used it or 
not.
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Figure 9.6: Scatterplots showing the regression slopes averaged over the final 
two training blocks against the percentage of errors to the irregular stimuli, 
indicating whether they found a shortcut or not.
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It can be seen that all participants who saw shapes followed by letters had low 
slopes and low numbers o f errors to the irregular stimuli, apart from one who had a 
high number o f errors. Those who indicated use o f Information Reduction on the 
questionnaire had a higher number o f errors, along with some who showed no 
awareness. There was one participant who could be classified as a reducer and who 
had indicated this on the questionnaire. It was apparent from the questionnaires that 
over-familiarity with letters meant that the differing ones were very easy to spot. O f 
those who saw letters followed by shapes seven participants seemed to have used
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Information Reduction at least partially with the shapes stimuli, although the 
questionnaire response for one showed no awareness of having done so. There are 
three (13%) who can be classed as definite reducers, with very low slopes and a very 
high number of errors to irregular stimuli in the test block.
9.2.4 D iscussion
Although it is not possible to establish how many participants were using 
Information Reduction during presentation o f the first set o f stimuli, it does appear 
from the fact that regression slopes significantly declined in all four tasks that it was 
occurring. For the second set of stimuli the regression slopes in all tasks continued to 
decline significantly, hinting there was positive transfer o f the strategy. This is further 
support for the results found by Haider and Frensch (1996) and Haider et al. (2005) 
and is strongly suggestive that Information Reduction is an item-general strategy. For 
all tasks except letters-first the regression slopes were not affected by the change in 
stimuli type, although error rates and RTs increased. The increase in error rates and 
RTs are due to the participants needing to adjust to a new set o f stimuli, and for the 
multiple-triplet, slightly change the computation carried out. This is in line with the 
results reported by Speelman and Kirsner (2001), where there was disruption on 
transfer, but then further improvement in skill was seen. The lack of increase in 
slopes accords with the result found by Haider and Frensch (1996) in their transfer 
experiment and is evidence that, for three o f the tasks, Information Reduction was 
successfully discovered by some participants in the first set of stimuli and transferred 
to the second set. If  the strategy was not transferred then processing of all elements 
o f the second set o f stimuli would occur, resulting in an increase in the regression 
slopes across the ‘string lengths’. These results support the hypothesis that the 
Information Reduction strategy would transfer to a new set of stimuli when the rule
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for applying reduction remains the same, even when the stimuli appear slightly 
different.
The significant increase in slopes on the change from letters to shapes in the 
letters-first task, could simply be indicative o f the difference in complexity between 
the two and not of a lack o f transfer o f the strategy. However, it is possible that a 
different strategy or type o f processing was being used for the letters, which did not 
transfer successfully, and that the participants had to develop a new strategy with the 
shapes. Doane et al. (1996; 1999) suggested from their results that the strategy 
developed depends on the difficulty o f the stimuli. The letters proved easy to 
process, probably due to their familiarity, and may not have led to Information 
Reduction. Instead it could be that the altered orientation “popped-out” and this 
gave the impression of being Information Reduction, as the individual letters were 
no longer processed and thus caused an apparent attenuation of the ‘string length 
effect’. Nonetheless, it does seem that the strategy used with the shapes in the 
second part of this task was Information Reduction, since participants were able to 
verbalise this on their questionnaires and some had a high rate o f errors to the 
irregular stimuli. It is possible that Information Reduction did only develop with the 
second set o f stimuli (shapes), although Doane et al. did not find that the 
Information Reduction-like strategy occurred overall on transfer from the easy to the 
difficult stimuli. However their analyses did not test if some participants were able to 
develop this strategy after transfer. Since there were some definite reducers in our 
experiment, this suggests that some form o f Information Reduction was used with 
the first set o f stimuli, transferred to the second set and became more firmly 
established.
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In comparison with previous experiments, the number of identifiable reducers 
in the multiple-triplet task (21% for both orders of stimuli) was similar to 
Experiment 3, speed pressure (23%), and slightly fewer than Experiment 4, explicit 
instruction (34%). However it was less than half that for Experiment 1, control 
(64%). In the shapes task, a similar proportion of reducers to the explicit instruction 
experiment were evident, suggesting that not only was transfer occurring, but also 
that some of the participants were making full use o f Information Reduction. This is 
unlike Experiment 1, control, where only partial reduction was seen. So it seems that 
the change in stimuli encourages the use o f the strategy in this type o f task and 
future experiments using stimuli where a calculation is not needed could investigate 
this further. One problem with the current experiment is that the two sets of stimuli 
in the shapes task were not equally complex and other types of processing may have 
been occurring, so first o f all it would be necessary to equalise the complexity.
In line with Schwager et al.’s results (2012), where experience with one 
sequence enhanced knowledge of the second, almost all o f the identifiable reducers 
who returned questionnaires were able to verbalise the strategy, in each of the four 
tasks. This could suggest that successful transfer depends on the participant being 
consciously aware of the strategy. Nonetheless, there was still one reducer in 422- 
letters-first and one possible partial reducer in letters-first shapes task who appeared 
unaware o f their use of Information Reduction. A future experiment should aim to 
determine awareness o f the regularity in the first set of stimuli, to explore this further 
and establish whether some aware participants fail to transfer or whether some non- 
aware do transfer. It may be that non-aware reducers do not transfer Information 
Reduction, although given enough practice on the second set o f stimuli it may 
develop again, and this could also be tested in a future experiment. If conscious
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knowledge of the regularity is required for transfer to occur, then this supports 
Haider and Frensch’s idea that it is primarily a conscious strategy.
The fact that transfer occurred, even though the stimuli were different in the 
two parts o f each task, and less similar than the stimuli used by Haider and Frensch 
(1996) and Haider et al. (2005), cannot be explained by one-step retrieval o f 
instances as the driver o f the attenuation o f the string-length effect. I f  retrieval of 
instances were involved then the string-length effect would increase on the change of 
stimuli in all tasks, until such time as the new instances were memorised and retrieval 
was faster than carrying out the algorithm. The Production rules theory, or variants 
of it, such as the PRIMS theory (Taatgen, 2013), can account for the transfer seen, 
by assuming that many of the productions required for the two sets o f stimuli would 
overlap, although if productions have become composed then the individual steps 
and overall goal must remain the same for transfer to occur (Speelman & Kirsner, 
2001). It would appear to be the case that the productions required overlapped, as 
attention needs to be focussed on the same place and either a shape examined for a 
change in orientation or an algorithm executed to count through the alphabet, 
although the number of counting steps changed from four to three or three to four.
It is not known if this slight alteration to the steps required in the production could 
account for the increase in RT and errors seen at the change in stimuli. However, if 
an unconscious automatic process, such as the formation o f production rules, does 
wholly or partly underlie the performance improvement and transfer seen (Lee & 
Anderson, 2001), a mechanism by which the unconscious knowledge becomes 
verbalisable is required. Schwager et al. (2012) also found an increase in RT on 
transfer to the new sequence, and took their overall results to be evidence for the 
Unexpected-Event hypothesis, which explains the conscious knowledge as arising
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from explicit hypothesis testing once the performance improvement has been 
consciously noted.
Overall, then, the results from this experiment support the Information 
Reduction hypothesis of Haider and Frensch, with implicit learning of a regularity, 
followed by conscious knowledge that this can be exploited to improve speed on the 
task. It is not possible to determine which mechanisms are in use, but a combination 
of Production rules theory and the Unexpected-Event hypothesis might provide an 
adequate explanation.
9.3 F ar  t r a n s f e r
9.3.1 Introduction
There is much debate in the psychological literature about whether Tar 
transfer’ occurs, since many consider that skill transfer can only occur narrowly, 
where content and context are similar (Rosenbaum et al., 2001). This was the view 
adopted by Thorndike and Woodworth (1901), who developed a theory o f identical 
elements which suggested that whether, and how much, transfer occurs depends on 
the extent of commonality and overlap of the elements involved in the two tasks. 
Barnett and Ceci (2002) consider that one of the reasons for the lack of consistency 
in far transfer results across the literature is that some experiment tasks are further 
from the original than others. Transfer may be ‘further’ in applied tasks (eg simulator 
to real equipment) rather than basic stimulus-response tasks (Proctor et al., 2013), 
however it does still occur. The amount o f practice given or strategy training may 
also be a factor in how well far transfer occurs (Zelinski, 2009).
Far transfer in Information Reduction could involve transferring knowledge 
about using a regularity from one set o f stimuli to a different set of stimuli which
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obey a different rule. There are no known studies testing this kind o f transfer. 
However, there have been other experiments testing transfer of a skill from one 
domain to another, which could be argued to be further than the transfer of a skill to 
a similar but not identical set o f stimuli. For example, Green and Bavelier (2006) 
found that the improved visuospatial attention o f experienced action-video gamers, 
and o f novices trained with such a game, transferred to improved performance on a 
perceptual load task and to a test o f ‘useful field o f view’, showing that skill on a 
specific task can be transferred more generally. Karbach and Kray (2009) found that 
training on task-switching transferred positively to other executive function tasks, 
such as the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), to verbal and spatial working memory tasks 
and to fluid intelligence, measured by tests o f figural reasoning and Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices. Another study (Chein & Morrison, 2010) found that four 
weeks of working memory training not only resulted in improved temporary memory 
but also generalised to improved performance on the Stroop task and in reading 
comprehension, although fluid intelligence and reasoning did not improve. The 
results o f these latter two studies suggest that training can affect domain-general 
mechanisms.
Partial transfer has been shown to occur when a similar task, but with new
instances and presented in a different way, is used (Speelman & Kirsner, 1997). In
this case, transfer performance was better than at the start o f training, but less
efficient than at the end of training. This cannot be explained by Instance theory,
which would predict that transfer can either be complete, where transfer instances
are already available, or does not occur at all. However, it can be accommodated
within Production rules theory, as some, but not all, productions developed during
training can be used on transfer. Speelman and Kirsner also suggest that strategies
may have been acquired in training that were not relevant for the transfer task,
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contributing to the partial decrement in performance. Skill and strategy acquisition 
may depend on the constraints of training, with few variations in stimuli leading to 
strategies involving retrieval of solution from memory as in Instance theory, whereas 
a wider range of stimuli in training may lead to more general, more transferable 
strategies being developed, as suggested by the Production rules theory.
Taatgen (2013) suggests that far transfer can be explained by a model in which 
‘primitive information processing elements’ or PRIMS are combined to make general 
procedures, and these learned procedures can then be used for other tasks enabling 
faster learning. The procedures can also be ‘composed’ into more task-specific 
procedures, which can only be transferred to very similar tasks. Far transfer is seen 
to occur when the task-general procedures of cognitive control can be used in 
another task, which may seem to be very different. For instance, the model has 
explained the improved performance seen by Chein and Morrison (2010) and 
Karbach and Kray (2009).
Applying the learned idea that a strategy exists, rather than the specific nature 
of what to ignore, could be considered to be akin to analogical problem solving. 
However, evidence suggests that, at least in the experimental context, analogical 
reasoning is not spontaneously used (Gick, 1986). Using analogies would be making 
use o f declarative knowledge, and Information Reduction is posited to be a 
consciously controlled strategy. Testing for far transfer may give further insight into 
whether there is conscious awareness of the strategy and also metacognition of the 
ability to transfer what has been learned. Transfer may involve both procedural and 
declarative knowledge.
In this experiment the stimuli remain very similar to the training set, and 
performance can be improved by applying a strategy, although the particular ‘rule’
226
changes. According to the suggested taxonomy o f far transfer outlined by Barnett 
and Ceci (2002), the type o f transfer being tested here may not qualify as far transfer. 
Here the content o f transfer would have to be the general principle o f the existence 
o f a strategy, rather than the specific nature o f that strategy, and the participants 
must recognise that it is appropriate to use the strategy — they are not given a hint. 
Both o f these are required by the taxonomy. However the context o f transfer being 
tested does not encompass a change o f domain, the physical or temporal location, 
the modality or the social or functional context and thus according to their 
taxonomy, it could be considered that this transfer, if it occurred, is not very far 
along the continuum of near-far transfer. Nonetheless, for our purposes it is 
necessary to distinguish what was tested in this experiment from what was tested in 
the previous one, so this experiment is designated as being far transfer.
Two new tasks, one using triplets and one using shapes, were devised, which 
could lead to Information Reduction, as both corresponded to the structural criteria 
specified in Chapter 4 (Experiment 1):
i) one element that is relevant to fulfilling the task and at least one other
element that is irrelevant
ii) a variable number o f irrelevant elements so that the equivalent of the string-
length effect can be detected
iii) a method o f introducing relevance into the formerly redundant element(s) to
test for increased errors/return o f the string-length effect
For the multiple-triplet task the new rule was that the final letter indicated
whether a string was correct or incorrect and for the shapes task the new rule was
that the shape bottom  left was missing. These tasks are henceforward referred to as
end-letters and missing-shapes. Piloting suggested that both o f these tasks on their
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own led to Information Reduction. The new tasks were combined respectively with 
the existing 422-letters and orientation-change tasks as used in all previous 
experiments. As with the near-transfer experiment the order of the two tasks was 
counterbalanced, with the first task being used in the practice trials and the second
task being used in the test block.
0
The hypothesis was that some participants would successfully transfer the skill 
to a new set of stimuli, but that fewer would do so than in the near transfer 
experiment.
9.3.2 M ethod
9.3.2.1 Participan ts
There were 101 participants, all Open University students studying psychology, 
none o f whom had participated in other experiments. There were 53 participants (14 
male) in the multiple-triplet task and 48 (10 male) in the shapes task. Their ages 
ranged from 22-60, mean age 41.
9.3.2.2 M aterials
For each task, one set of stimuli were as used in previous experiments. One 
new set o f stimuli were devised for each. In the multiple-triplet task the final letter 
indicated if it was correct or incorrect. Three letters from near the end of the 
alphabet were used for each (T, V and X for correct and S,U, and W for incorrect), 
immediately preceded by digits 2-5. To minimise the overall complexity (as a result 
o f piloting), the digit 2 was used for the first one or two triplets in the longer strings. 
The original stimuli are henceforward referred to as ‘422-letters’ and the new set as 
‘end-letters’. In the shapes task the differing trials were created by removing the 
shape from bottom left o f the left-hand box. No shape changed orientation in this
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set. The two sets are subsequently referred to as ‘orientation-change’ and ‘missing- 
shape’. Piloting suggested that both o f these new stimuli sets would give Information 
Reduction. Examples of the various stimuli used are given in Table 9.4.
9.3.2.3 Procedure
The procedure for the practice trials was as in Experiment 1 and these 
reflected the first stimuli set to be seen. Twenty-seven participants in the multiple- 
triplet task saw the first set o f stimuli (422-letters) followed by the second set (end- 
letters) and twenty-five saw end-letters followed by 422-letters. In the shapes task 
half the participants saw the orientation-change shapes first followed by the missing- 
shape stimuli and half saw the missing-shape stimuli followed by the orientation- 
change shapes. The instructions were as in Experiment 1 and the change o f stimuli 
set was unannounced, as was the test block. The stimuli used in the test block were 
the most recendy encountered stimulus set.
Participants also received a post-testing questionnaire asking questions about 
the task carried out, to gauge awareness and use o f the regularity, and also to 
investigate personality factors: conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to 
experience, extraversion and neuroticism; as well as the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Frederick, 2005) which aims to establish if the participant is a cognitive miser. These 
individual difference tests were fully described and results presented in chapter 8.
9.3.2.1 D esign
The within-participants independent variables were ‘string length’ and type o f 
‘string’: regular correct, regular incorrect or irregular. For the multiple-triplet task the 
string length was one, two or three triplets and for the shapes task it was 3-6 shapes.
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In the multiple-triplet task there were 60 strings per block of 422-letters for the first 
set o f training blocks. The 72 stimuli created for end-letters were presented as 60 
randomly selected in each o f 6 blocks, with all stimuli used 5 times each throughout 
the experiment. Thus the first set of training blocks had 360 trials for both stimuli 
types. The second set o f training blocks consisted o f 3 blocks each with 72 stimuli 
(216 trials). Twelve o f the 422-letters, with 4 from each length, were selected for the 
additional trials in each block. There were 80 shape stimuli per block in the shape 
matching task, with 8 training blocks, giving 640 training trials. These were given as 4 
blocks with each stimulus set (320 trials). In each task half the training strings in each 
block were correct and half were incorrect. Each task had one practice block o f 10 
stimuli at the beginning and one test block after the training blocks. The test block 
had some regular incorrect stimuli replaced with irregular ones — 12 for the multiple- 
triplet task and 16 for the shapes task.
The dependent variables were response time (RT) to each stimulus and 
number o f stimuli incorrectly responded to in the training blocks and the test block.
9.3.3 Results
The results for the different orders o f stimuli sets in each task are presented 
separately.
9.3.3.1 Accuracy
The analysis excluded participants with errors in training o f 10% or greater for 
each trial block. In the multiple-triplet task five were excluded from 422-letters-first, 
leaving 23 participants’ data, and two were excluded from end-letters-first, leaving 23 
participants’ data. In the shapes task one participant was excluded from orientation- 
change-first, leaving 21 participants’ data and four participants were excluded from
missing-shape-first, leaving 22 participants’ data.
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Table 9.5 shows that similar numbers of errors were made to the ‘regular’ 
strings and shapes in the final training block and the test block but more errors were 
made to the irregular strings or inconsistendy placed shapes. Generally more errors 
were made to the regular incorrect stimuli in the test block than in training but still 
fewer than the errors to the irregular stimuli. Error rates to the irregular stimuli 
ranged from 0% to 43% for 422-letters-first and from 0% to 100% for end-letters- 
first in the multiple-triplet task. For the shapes task, the overall error rates to the 
irregular stimuli were 0 to 81% for orientation-change-first and 0% to 50% for 
missing-shape-first.
Table 9.5: Overall error rates in final training block and test block by stimulus type
Final training 
block
Test block
Multiple-triplet task
422-letters-first (final 
training block and test 
block used end-letters)
correct 6.2% 5.2%
regular
incorrect
6% 14.8%
irregular - 18%
end-letters-first (final 
training block and test 
block used 422-letters)
correct 6.6% 9.4%
regular
incorrect
5.4% 6.9%
irregular - 37.9%
Shapes task
orientation-change-first 
(final training block and 
test block used missing- 
shape)
matching 1% 3.2%
differing 3.5% 3.2%
irregular - 30.1%
missing-shape-first (final 
training block and test 
block used orientation- 
change)
matching 0.8% 2.3%
differing 7.2% 11.2%
irregular - 23.9%
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In the multiple-triplet task, 422-letters-first, 3 of the 23 participants had twice 
as many errors to irregular than incorrect strings in the test block and no participant 
had more than half of the irregular stimuli incorrectly categorised. For end-letters- 
first, 10 out o f 23 participants had twice as many errors to irregular than to incorrect 
strings in the test block, with 4 incorrecdy categorising all the irregular stimuli and a 
further 2 having more than half o f the irregular stimuli incorrecdy categorised. Thus 
13% of the participants in 422-letters-first and 43.5% of the participants in end- 
letters-first made a high number o f incorrect categorisations. The change in 
proportion o f errors made per block is shown in figure 9.7, which indicates that the 
participants were affected by the change in rule, and had not fully adjusted to the 
new rule so that they spotted many o f the irregular strings. Although the overall 
changes in error rate are similar for both tasks, the way these errors were distributed 
across the participants varies.
In the shapes task, orientation-change-first, 17 out o f 21 participants had twice
as many errors to irregular than differing missing-shapes in the test block, with 3
having more than half o f the irregular stimuli incorrectly categorised. In missing-
shape-first 8 out o f 22 participants had twice as many errors to irregular than
differing shapes in the test block, with 2 having half the irregular shapes incorrectly
categorised. Thus 81% of participants in orientation-change-first and 36% in
missing-shape-first made at least twice as many errors to the inconsistently placed as
to the consistently placed differing stimuli. The change in errors made per block is
shown in figure 9.7, which indicates that those in orientation-change-first do not
seem to have been affected by the change in rule, and in fact adopted the new rule so
that more irregular stimuli were missed, whereas in missing-shape-first there was a
increase in errors from block 4 to block 5 and it seems as if the four blocks o f
changed orientation was not enough to become totally used to what the changes
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were, so they still had quite a high error rate to differing shapes in the final training 
block.
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (String Type: regular correct, regular 
incorrect and irregular) on error rates for the test block showed a significant 
difference among the trial types for each task. For the multiple-triplet task, 422- 
letters-first, F(2,44) = 6.53, MSE = 1,213, p = .008, r]p2 = .229, with significant 
differences between the correct strings and the incorrect ones, but not between the 
regular incorrect and the irregular (pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular 
incorrect p = .037, regular correct vs irregular p < .001, regular incorrect vs irregular 
p = .419). For end-letters-first, F(2,44) = 13.67, MSE = 12,361, p = .001,7]p2 = .383, 
with the difference lying between the regular and irregular strings (pairwise 
comparison: regular correct vs regular incorrect p = .177, regular correct vs irregular 
p = .002, regular incorrect vs irregular p = .001). The effect sizes were large, 
although smaller than Experiment 1, suggesting that some o f the variance in the 
error rates is explained by the difference in the stimuli types.
For the shapes task, orientation-change-first, different shape types, F(2,40) = 
34.67, MSE = 9,671, p < .001, r]p2 = .634 with the difference lying between the 
regular and irregular stimuli (pairwise comparison: regular correct vs regular incorrect 
p = .97, regular correct vs irregular p < .001, regular incorrect vs irregular p < .001). 
For missing-shape-first, F(2,42) = 32.73, MSE = 2,677, p < .001, r|p2 = .609, with all 
shape types being significantly different to each other (pairwise comparison: regular 
correct vs regular incorrect p = .001, regular correct vs irregular p < .001, regular 
incorrect vs irregular p < .001). The effect sizes were large, and larger than 
Experiment 1, suggesting that some o f the variance in the error rates is explained by 
the difference in the stimuli types.
234
F igure 9.7: change in  percen tage o f  errors m ad e as a p rop ortion  o f  total n u m ber  
o f  trials p er b lock .
a) M ultip le-trip let task
Key: ♦  so lid  line 422-letter-first
■  dashed  line end-letters-first
b) Shapes task
10 -j
b lo ck  1 b lo c k 2  b lo c k 3  b lo c k 4 b lo c k 5 b lo c k 6  b lo c k 7  b lo c k s  te s t
K ey: A  so lid  line orien tation -ch ange-first
X  dash ed  line m issing-shape-first
9.3.3.2 Response tim es
There was no significant correlation between overall error rate in training and 
overall RT for any o f the tasks: multiple-triplet 422-letters-first, r(21) = .084, p = 
.703; end-letters-first, r(21) = .046, p = .836; shapes task, orientation-change-first, 
r(19) = -.02, p = .932 and missing-shapes-first, r(20) = -.065, p = .775. This indicates 
there was no speed-accuracy trade-off in any of the tasks.
Figure 9.8 shows that response times decreased during each task. For the 
multiple-triplet task, with end-letters, the RTs for the incorrect stimuli were slighdy 
slower than the correct stimuli, reflecting the fact that each stimulus had to be fully
processed for both correct and incorrect, unlike 422-letters, where incorrect stimuli
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could be decided after the first triplet. For 422-letters there was some convergence 
of RTs for correct and incorrect stimuli, indicating greater speeding for the correct 
stimuli. For the shapes task, the matching stimuli were always slower than the 
differing stimuli and there was more convergence between matching and differing 
for the missing-shape part o f each task.
Figure 9.8: ch ange in  resp on se  tim es over  the cou rse  o f  each task. E rror bars 
represen t th e  standard error o f  th e m eans
Key: so lid  line — correct stim uli, b rok en  line — in correct stim uli
a) M ultiple-triplet: 4 2 2 -first
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\  block
b) M ultiple-triplet: end-letters first Change of stimuli
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c) Shapes: orientation-change-first
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d) Shapes: m issin g-sh ap es-first
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The results of repeated measures ANOVA on the RTs by Block for each 
stimulus set are given in Table 9.6. RTs reduced across blocks with similar stimuli 
but tended to increase when the stimuli set changed and in the test block when 
irregular stimuli were introduced. At both points this increase was not always 
significant. The only exception was the test block in the 422-letters-first task, which 
was a significant decrease.
9.3.3.3 “String-length effect”
One of the indicators o f Information Reduction is an increased speeding in 
trials using longer strings or stimuli containing more shapes compared to the shorter 
ones over the course of the task. This can be ascertained by computing the 
regression slopes coefficient for ‘string length’ per participant and block and then 
subjecting these to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA by Block.
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9.3.3.3.1 Multiple-triplet task
For correct strings in 422-letters-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes 
over the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —6, F(5,110) = 20.81, MSE = 827,128, p < .001, 
?]p2 = .486 and a non-significant decrease in slopes over the second set o f stimuli, 
block 6 — 9, F < 1. A t the change in stimuli there was a significant increase in slopes 
block 6 — 7, F(l,22) = 10.39, MSE = 388,046, p = .004, rjp2 = .321, and there was a 
non-significant decrease in slopes from the final training block to the test block, 
block 9 — test, F < 1. The effect size for the decrease with the 422-letters was large 
and o f a similar order to Experiment 1, suggesting that much o f the variance here 
could be explained by an increased speeding for the longer’ stimuli, however, the 
change in stimuli disrupted the effect.
For incorrect strings in 422-letters-first, there was a significant decrease in 
slopes for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —6, F(5,110) = 3.72, MSE = 73,141, p = 
.009, r]p2 = .145 and a non-significant increase in slopes for the second set o f stimuli, 
block 7 — 9, F < 1. At the change in stimuli there was a significant increase in slopes 
block 6 — 7, F(l,22) = 52.21, MSE = 1,770,603, p < .001, r]p2 = .704 and there was a 
significant decrease in slopes from the final training block to the test block, block 9 — 
test, F(l,12) = 9.13, MSE = 155,420, p = .006, r]p2 = .293.
These results would suggest that Information Reduction was established with 
the 422-letters but it did not transfer to the end-letters, for most participants, and 
consequendy participants were more able to spot the irregular stimuli in the test 
block. The changes in regression slopes are presented graphically in figure 9.9.
For correct strings in end-letters-first, there was a significant decrease in slopes
over the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —6, F(5,110) = 12.68, MSE = 761,893, p < .001,
7]p2 = .366 and a non-significant decrease in slopes over the second set o f stimuli,
block 6 - 9 ,  F(2,44) = 1.52, MSE = 43,295, p = .231, ?]p2 = .064. A t the change in
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stimuli there was a significant increase in slopes, block 6 — 7, F(l,22) = 4.85, MSE = 
135,714, p = .038, r\p2 = .181, and there was a non-significant increase from the final 
training block to the test block, block 9 — test, F(l,22) < 1. The effect sizes for the 
decrease in slopes over training was large with the first set o f stimuli and medium 
with the second set, suggesting that variance with both sets could be explained by an 
increased speeding for the longer strings.
For incorrect strings in end-letters-first, there was a significant decrease in 
slopes for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —6, F(5,110) = 15.75, MSE = 879,417, p < 
.001, r\ 2 = .417. There was a non-significant decrease in slopes for the second set of 
stimuli, block 6 - 9 , F < 1 ,  but a significant decrease at the change o f stimuli, block 6 
-  7, F(l,22) = 17.78, MSE = 609,137, p < .001, ?ip2 = .447 and a significant increase 
from the final training block to the test block, block 9 — test, F(l,22) = 11.61, MSE 
= 299,408, p = .003,7]p2 = .345.
These results suggest that Information Reduction may have been established, 
in some participants at least, with the end-letters but not carried over to the second 
set o f stimuli. However, Information Reduction may have become established in the 
second set of stimuli (422-letters) for some participants. The changes in regression 
slopes are presented graphically in figure 9.9. The slopes for correct and incorrect 
strings were very similar when the stimuli were end-letters, because those not using 
Information Reduction had to process the whole string for both types. With the 422- 
letters-first the slopes had started to converge by block 6, but when 422-letters were 
the second set of stimuli there was litde convergence, which could suggest that any 
Information Reduction occurring in the first set o f stimuli was not transferred to the 
second set.
The correlation of the regression coefficient averaged over the final two
training blocks and the error rates to irregular stimuli was not significant for 422-
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letters-first, r(21) = .03, p = .892, suggesting that Information Reduction was not 
established in the second set o f stimuli (end-letters). For end-letters-first the 
correlation was almost significant, r(21) = -.4, p = .059, suggesting that for some 
participants Information Reduction was occurring with the second set o f stimuli.
Figure 9.9: Multiple-triplet task, the change in coefficient of regression slopes 
plotted by block (error bars represent the standard error of the means)
Key: solid line - correct strings, broken line - incorrect strings
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1000
Change of stimuli900
800
700
600
S00
400
300
200
100
>lock lblock 2block 3block4block 5block6block 7block8block 9 tes t
b) end-letters-first
1000
900
Change of stimuli800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100 i — 1‘
block lb lock  2block3block4block5block6block  7block8b lock9 tes t
Figure 9.10 shows scatterplots o f the two measures, also showing whether the 
participant indicated on their questionnaire that they had spotted the Information 
Reduction shortcut and whether they used it or not. It can be seen that there are no 
reducers in 422-letters-first, not even any who may have only been partially using the 
strategy, but also half o f the participants showed no awareness o f the strategy in their 
questionnaire answers. There were three reducers (13%) in end-letters-first, with low
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slopes and a high number of errors to irregular stimuli, although one of these may 
have only partially used the strategy. A further five participants had higher slopes and 
a high number o f errors, so may have been partial reducers. Again, half the 
participants showed no awareness of any strategy, including three o f the partial 
reducers.
Figure 9.10: Scatterplots showing the regression slopes averaged over the final 
two training blocks against the percentage of errors to the irregular stimuli, 
indicating whether they found a shortcut or not.
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It was not possible to distinguish from the questionnaire answers if the strategy had
been noticed on the first stimuli set, but was not applied, or only partially applied, on
the second set, although this did seem to be the case for some participants. Only one
person was able to identify that with end-letters whether the string was correct or
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not could be determined simply from the final letter, so it is possible that some 
thought it was the final triplet.
One additional analysis that was possible with the end-letters task was to check 
for a decline in the string-length effect for the final triplets. The step-like nature of 
the stimuli, using gaps o f 2-5 between the letters o f the final triplet, meant that a 
longer time should be taken for longer gaps, but if participants noticed that they only 
needed to check the final letter, then this should disappear. This would be the case 
for both correct and incorrect strings, and was best analysed by examining only the 
stimuli with a single triplet. Due to the small number o f stimuli at each length the 
correct and incorrect strings were analysed together. Regression slope coefficients 
were computed per participant and block and then subjected to a one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA by Block. For end-letters-first (6 blocks) this showed a significant 
decrease in this additional ‘string-length’, F(5,110) = 4.54, MSE = 320,950, p = .004, 
y]p2~  .171. From examining the participants’ individual slopes, it would seem that 
two had realised they could use the final letter and a further three had slopes which 
declined throughout, but never reaching a level that showed no string-length effect. 
This suggests that they were making use of one or more letters as a guide, but had 
not realised that all strings could be categorised as correct or incorrect by the final 
letter. For the other participants, slopes either remained similar throughout the task 
or fluctuated. For 422-letters-first there was not a significant decrease in the 
‘gaplength’ slopes, over the 3 blocks o f transfer to the end-letters task. However, 6 
participants showed a steady decrease and one person appeared to have noticed that 
it was possible to use the final letter only, although this did not translate into not 
noticing the irregular stimuli in the test block.
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9.33.3.2 Shapes task
For matching stimuli in orientation-change-first, there was a significant 
decrease in slopes for the first set of stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,60) = 4.81, MSE = 
59,324, p = .011, 7]p2 = .194 and a significant decrease in slopes for the second set of 
stimuli, block 5 - 8 ,  F(3,60) = 20.08, MSE = 119,188, p < .001, ^p2 = .501. A t the 
change in stimuli there was a non-significant increase in slopes block 4 — 5, F(l,20) < 
1, and there was a significant increase in slopes from the final training block to the 
test block, block 8 — test, F(l,20) = 6.71, MSE = 20,108, p = .018, pp2 = .251. 
Although the effect sizes for the decrease in slopes over training was large using 
Cohen’s classification (cited in Richardson, 2011), that for the first set o f stimuli was 
small compared to Experiment 1, whereas that over the second set was larger, so 
that there was a greater effect seen with the missing-shapes.
For differing stimuli in orientation-change-first, there was a significant 
decrease in slopes for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,60) = 7.97, MSE = 
68,704, p < .001, r)p2 = .285 and a significant decrease in slopes for the second set of 
stimuli, block 5 - 8 ,  F(3,60) = 9.56, MSE = 74,212, p < .001, r]p2 = .323. At the 
change in stimuli there was a significant increase in slopes, block 4 — 5, F(l,20) = 
15.18, MSE = 109,164, p = .001, rjp2 = .431 and there was a significant increase in 
slopes from the final training block to the test block, block 8 — test, F(l,20) = 9.87, 
MSE = 72,092, p = .005, r j /  = .33.
These results suggest that Information Reduction was established with the first 
set o f stimuli, orientation-change, and was carried over to the second set, missing- 
shape, reasonably well, although many of the irregular shapes were spotted in the test 
block, so processing reverted to taking longer for the stimuli with more shapes. The 
changes in regression slopes are presented graphically in figure 9.11.
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For matching stimuli in missing-shape-first, there was a significant decrease in 
slopes for the first set of stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,63) = 8.90, MSE = 123.494, p < 
.001, r)p2 = .298 and a non-significant decrease for the second set o f stimuli, block 5 
— 8, F(3,63) = 1.19, MSE = 10.962, p = .317, y\2 = .054. At the change in stimuli 
there was a significant increase in slopes, block 4 — 5, F(l,21) = 46.49, MSE = 
614,193, p < .001, r]p2 = .689 and there was a non-significant increase in slopes from 
the final training block to the test block, block 8 — test, F(l,21) < 1. The effect size 
was large for the first set o f stimuli, and medium for the second set, indicating that 
there was some effect occurring here despite it not being statistically significant.
For differing stimuli in missing-shape-first, there was a significant decrease in 
slopes for the first set o f stimuli, block 1 —4, F(3,63) = 13.75, MSE = 94,032, p < 
.001, r]p2 = .396 and a significant decrease for the second set o f stimuli, block 5 — 8, 
F(3,63) = 7.92, MSE = 49,421, p < .001, rjp2 = .274. At the change in stimuli there 
was a significant increase in slopes, block 4 — 5, F(l,21) = 5.27, MSE = 54,772, p = 
.032, r\p2 = .201 and there was a significant increase from the final training block to 
the test block, block 8 — test, F(l,21) = 11.94, MSE = 111,132, p = .002, r\p2 = .362.
These results suggest that Information Reduction was established in the first 
set o f stimuli, missing-shape. Information Reduction did not seem to be transferred 
well to the second set o f stimuli, unlike the orientation-change-first set, as more of 
the incorrect stimuli were spotted in the test block. The changes in slopes are 
presented graphically in figure 9.11.
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Figure 9.11: Shapes task, the change in coefficient of regression slopes plotted 
by block (error bars represent the standard error of the means)
Key: solid line — matching stimuli, broken line — differing stimuli
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It can be seen that there was more convergence between the slopes for 
matching and differing stimuli when the stimuli were missing shapes than when they 
were orientation-change shapes, for both orders of stimuli. Whilst it seems that 
Information Reduction occurred and was transferred when orientation-change came 
first and that it occurred for missing-shapes-first, it did not transfer from missing- 
shapes to orientation-change.
The correlation o f the regression coefficient averaged over the final two 
training blocks and the error rates to irregular stimuli was significant for both 
orientation-change-first, r(19) = -.495, p = .023 and missing-shape-first, r(20) = - 
.595, p = .003. Figure 9.12 shows scatterplots o f the two measures, also indicating 
whether the participant spotted the Information Reduction shortcut and whether 
they used it or not.
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Figure 9.12: Scatterplots showing the regression slopes averaged over the final 
two training blocks against the percentage of errors to the irregular stimuli, 
indicating whether they found a shortcut or not.
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It can be seen that all participants who saw orientation-change-first and who 
indicated use o f Information Reduction on the questionnaire tended to have low 
slopes and a higher number o f errors to irregular stimuli. Two participants (9.5%) 
could be classified as reducers, although one did not appear to be aware o f so doing, 
and several others seem to have been partially using the strategy. In missing-shapes- 
first there would seem to be some partial reduction, but slopes were still high for 
most participants and most o f the irregular stimuli were spotted. Also one-third o f 
the participants seemed unaware of the regularity, although one seemed to be using 
Information Reduction as much as some of those who expressed awareness. This
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suggests that the change in stimuli meant that noticing o f a possible strategy and use 
o f it was incomplete.
9.3.4 D iscussion
In all tasks, it would seem that Information Reduction occurred for the first 
set of stimuli, since the regression slopes declined significantly, but slopes increased 
for both correct and incorrect stimuli at the change in stimuli. This suggests that 
participants reverted to checking the whole of each stimulus and that transfer did not 
occur. However, it is notable that only in the missing-shapes-first task did slopes for 
correct stimuli increase after transfer to more than the slopes at the start. In both 
multiple-triplet tasks the slopes after the change were less than the equivalent slopes 
for the same stimuli used at the start in the alternate version of the task. Thus it 
would seem that some learning did transfer in the multiple-triplet tasks, although 
whether this was anything more than unconscious automatic processes is open to 
question.
Lack of transfer is also suggested by the fact that slopes for the second set of 
stimuli did not significandy decrease for most tasks, and by the number o f people 
who showed no awareness of there being any strategy on their self-reports.
However, in the orientation-change-first shapes experiment it did seem as if there 
was some transfer — slopes reduced significandy for the second set o f stimuli and 
two people could be classified as reducers, one being aware of the strategy and one 
apparendy not aware. Since there were no full reducers in the shapes control 
experiment (Experiment 1), which gave 480 trials, compared to the 320 trials for 
each stimulus set here, it seems probable that in this task some participants noticed 
the strategy and transferred it rather than simply discovering and applying it during 
the second set of stimuli. The data also suggest that some participants transferred
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Information Reduction in the end-letters-first task, as there were some identifiable 
reducers there too. However, again awareness was not high. Some o f those with a 
high error-rate to irregular stimuli still had high slopes, showing that any transfer 
occurring was not complete.
As with the near-transfer experiment, it is not possible to determine from the 
questionnaires whether participants were aware, or making use, o f the regularity 
during the first set o f stimuli. The additional analysis carried out on the change in 
slopes for the single triplets in end-letters suggests that some were making use of 
only the final letter, either for all strings or for some o f them, but it is not possible to 
determine whether this was conscious knowledge or not. A future experiment could 
examine this in more detail and explore whether conscious awareness is required for 
transfer to occur. It could be speculated that even if aware during the first set of 
stimuli, the participant may not have been aware that they transferred Information 
Reduction to the second set, or perhaps may not have been able to verbalise the new 
regularity, and thus showed lack o f awareness on the self-report.
The percentage of identified reducers in the orientation-change-first task is 
similar to the reduction seen for the shapes task in the explicit instruction 
experiment (Experiment 4, Chapter 7). There were also more participants who 
indicated knowledge of the strategy on their questionnaires and fewer unaware 
participants than in the other tasks reported here. However, since there appeared to 
be participants in both orientation-change-first and end-letters-first who were unable 
to verbalise the strategy on their questionnaires but appeared to be using 
Information Reduction, it does seem as if conscious awareness is not definitely 
required for transfer to occur. It is possible that more trials with the first set o f 
stimuli would enable Information Reduction to be more firmly established and this
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might increase the amount of transfer seen. However, the experiment is already long 
and so this would be quite burdensome for participants. An alternative would be to 
split trials over more than one day, although this can create its own difficulties with 
participants failing to return.
It is possible, as was seen with the explicit instruction experiment, that some 
participants were trying to use strategies other than Information Reduction, which 
had limited success with one set o f stimuli, but could not be transferred to the 
second set. One possible alternative with the multiple-triplet 422-letters-first was the 
formation o f mnemonics for the initial triplet, such as BAG from B(4)G. The final 
triplet in end-letters did not lend itself to creating mnemonics, and thus would not be 
a transferable strategy. It was also clear from the RTs that the different stimuli sets 
were o f differing complexity. The results from Doane et al. (1996; 1999) suggest that 
transfer occurs more easily from the harder task to the easier one — in this case from 
the end-letters or orientation-change tasks — and when these came first, some 
Information Reduction was seen in the test block, whereas it was not seen in the 
opposite direction. Speelman and Kirsner (2001) also found that the disruption to 
skill improvement in a second task was exacerbated if the task complexity had 
increased. Developing tasks which were equally complex might indicate whether a 
change in complexity is a factor in whether transfer is seen or not.
With the end-letters multiple-triplet task, it would appear that most of the 
reduction in slopes occurred because participants processed only the final triplet, 
rather than noticing that the final letter was indicative by itself. This would account 
for the large number of irregular stimuli noticed in the test block and the higher 
slopes throughout, especially those for the incorrect stimuli. However, if reduction 
was only to the final triplet, it might be expected that more transfer would be seen,
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as it could be considered easier to notice the relevancy had moved from the initial 
triplet to a final one, or vice versa, to noticing the change from initial triplet to final 
letter.
A complete lack of transfer could be taken as evidence for Instance theory, 
since the instances are different between the two sets of stimuli. However, the fact 
that there may have been some transfer in this experiment, coupled with near 
transfer seen in the earlier experiment here, in Haider and Frensch (1996) and Haider 
et al. (2005), suggests that the lack of far transfer has another explanation.
Production rules theory would suggest that these results indicate a lack o f many 
overlapping productions between the processes required for each set o f stimuli, 
limiting the amount o f transfer that could occur. Since the productions can be 
unique to each individual (Taatgen, 2013), some participants will have more that are 
common to both tasks than others, explaining why some participants seem to have 
been able to transfer but not others. Lack o f conscious knowledge o f the strategy can 
be accommodated by the Production rules theory, since this is an explanation o f 
automatic procedural processes, which are generally taken to be unconscious.
Another reason why transfer did not seem to occur could be related to ‘set 
effects’. These occur when people are unable to change their representation o f a 
problem and thus are unable to discover a solution. Speelman and Kirsner (1997) 
found that strategies developed in training that were not needed in transfer, caused a 
decrement in performance. This would be the case where the initial strategy e.g. only 
process the initial triplet as in 422-letters-first, is not required in the end-letters 
stimuli and, if used, would result in a large increase in errors. Using a variety o f 
stimuli in training would prevent highly specific strategies developing and should 
encourage more general and therefore more easily transferred strategies. A future
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experiment could examine whether training with two intermingled different sets of 
stimuli would enable transfer of the idea of a strategy to a third set. Another possible 
experiment would be to include a hint such as that given in Experiment 4, explicit 
instruction. This could be at the start or between the two sets of stimuli. If  the 
experiment were split over two days then it would even be possible to explore 
whether a hint had different effects depending on whether Information Reduction 
had been discovered in the first set o f stimuli or not.
Overall, it would seem that most participants did not transfer the strategy, 
even if they had discovered it in the first set o f stimuli, but some did seem to transfer 
it. It does appear that transfer can occur without conscious awareness, but this needs 
to be explored further. The transfer seen can be explained by the Production rules 
theory, but this experiment does not provide any evidence either for or against the 
Information Reduction hypothesis.
The final chapter will provide an overview of the results from all the 
experiments and consider the theoretical implications arising from them.
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Chapter 10 DISCUSSION
10.1 O v e r v ie w
The basis for this thesis was to further investigate the strategy o f Information 
Reduction proposed by Haider and Frensch (1996; 1999a; 1999b) as some aspects of 
the previously published results needed exploration. Firstly, the fact that the 
hypothesis was developed solely from the Alphabet Verification task and so the 
strategy may not be a general learning mechanism, but artefactual to this task. 
Secondly, the fact that only about half the participants appear to use the strategy and 
it is not clear why this might be. It could be connected to whether there is conscious 
awareness of a regularity or not or it could be connected to aspects o f the task, 
training conditions or individual differences between participants. Information 
Reduction may not be an adaptive process that can be applied in a range o f settings. 
It is thought to operate as a result of implicidy learning during extended practice that 
some o f the incoming information in a stimulus can safely be ignored, and enables 
performance improvements over and above those that occur from practice alone. 
Since it has been noted that perceptual ignoring of information appears to occur 
under many conditions, such as reading labels on food packaging (Gaschler et al., 
2010) and shopping online (Gaschler et al., 2015), as well as in occupations such as 
air traffic control (Lee & Anderson, 2001; Niessen et al., 1999) and radiology 
(Kundel et al., 2007), it is necessary to elucidate factors that affect adoption o f this 
strategy. In some situations processing less information is more cognitively efficient, 
thus freeing resources for other tasks, and people may be more productive if they 
adopted Information Reduction. However, in other situations it may be that use o f
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Information Reduction could result in unfortunate or even disastrous errors being 
made.
Haider and Frensch (1996) have referred to Information Reduction as a 
‘quantitative’ change, since less o f the stimulus is processed, with irrelevant elements 
ignored at the perceptual level. This is contrasted with the ‘qualitative’ change of 
existing skill acquisition theories, which assume that the whole stimulus is still 
processed in some way. These theories state that the shift to faster processing occurs 
subconsciously and gradually, as a result o f encounters with individual stimuli 
(Logan, 1988) or individual processes (Anderson, 1987), with the relevant response, 
or procedures to obtain that response, retrieved from memory. All accounts are said 
to result in the aggregated power law noted by Newell and Rosenbloom (1981).
The experimental evidence used to elucidate the mechanism of Information 
Reduction was obtained solely from the Alphabet Verification task. In this task, 
which has been described in more detail in Chapter 3, participants are required to 
verify whether the correct number of letters have been omitted from a sequential 
alphabetic string. One of the main premises of the Information Reduction 
hypothesis is that there is a greater speeding for longer alphabetic strings, although 
Instance theory (Logan, 1988) can also accommodate this finding. The Information 
Reduction hypothesis suggests that the redundant letters are not processed at all 
whereas Instance theory states that there is a shift from multi-step algorithmic 
processing to one-step retrieval o f a response. However, Instance theory cannot 
explain the incorrect categorisations of ‘irregular’ strings in the test block, since these 
are effectively new instances and therefore should not be available in memory, if 
each full stimulus is taken as an instance. N ot only this, but it has been found that 
Information Reduction can be applied to previously unseen stimuli o f the same type
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(Gaschler & Frensch, 2009; Haider & Frensch, 1996), suggesting a top-down 
influence. Instance theory cannot account for newly encountered material being 
processed in the same way as previously encountered stimuli, although Anderson’s 
Production rules theory can, because it posits that the same procedures are used 
regardless o f the content o f the stimuli.
Haider and Frensch have demonstrated that many participants who are able to 
report the regularity show a discontinuity in their RT curve (Haider & Frensch, 2002; 
Haider et al., 2005). They believe that it is knowledge o f the regularity which 
precedes the discontinuity and that this is shown by increased RT variances in the 
block preceding the discontinuity. Hence they suggest that Information Reduction is 
abruptly applied (Haider & Frensch, 2002; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009) so that once 
the strategy has been noticed, it serves to change behaviour from that point onwards 
for all stimuli of the same type, even if not previously encountered. Anderson’s 
theory (1987) would also predict this, as it states that all stimuli would be processed 
in the same way as the production rules develop. However, Instance theory does not 
necessarily assume that a change in processing is abrupt and applied to all stimuli at 
the same time, since the processing depends on the number of times each individual 
stimulus has been encountered.
There is evidence from Haider and Frensch’s, and other, experiments that 
Information Reduction is not used by all participants. Both Logan’s and Anderson’s 
theories would predict that everyone would use Information Reduction, since these 
are data-driven, bottom-up theories stating that automaticity is an inevitable result o f 
practice. Haider and Frensch explain the lack o f reduction by some participants by 
suggesting that all can become aware o f the potential short-cut but actually adopting 
Information Reduction is a conscious decision. Theories about automatic processes
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would need modification to allow for the influence of top-down processing seen in 
the ability to process newly encountered stimuli and the apparent conscious nature 
of implementation of the strategy.
The fact that only around half the participants become ‘reducers’ during the 
course o f a normal length experiment was identified as an area that warranted further 
probing. As well as the use o f just a single task, Haider and Frensch also provide 
little consideration of how variable training conditions might affect the adoption of 
Information Reduction, so these were other areas to be considered. Finally, it was 
felt that additional work was required on how much consciousness of the regularity 
in the stimuli was needed for it to be adopted.
The underlying research questions developed were:
•  is Information Reduction merely an artefact of the Alphabet Verification 
task?
• is it possible to identify those using the Information Reduction strategy from 
the experimental data (error rates and response times) and from self-reports?
•  do manipulations of task and /or training conditions affect the number of 
people adopting an Information Reduction strategy?
• what, if anything, can be learned about the conscious nature of the strategy 
from manipulations o f training conditions and testing participants’ conscious 
knowledge post-testing?
• are there any individual differences which point to whether someone will be 
a ‘reducer’ or a ‘non-reducer’?
As a quick resume of the findings, which will be elaborated further in this chapter,
the answers to these questions would appear to be:
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•  no
•  sometimes
•  yes
• being conscious o f the strategy may aid its usage but does not seem to be 
either necessary or sufficient
• nothing so far.
The results suggest that there is a large variability in the adoption o f 
Information Reduction both within and between tasks and training conditions. Some 
participants discover and use it, some discover it but choose not to use, some are 
apparently not aware but still show signs o f usage and some are neither aware nor 
use it. Some findings, such as those for the multiple-triplet task in Experiment 3 
(chapter 6), are quite different to previously reported data (Haider et al., 2005). 
Individuals do not seem to abruptly adopt and consistently apply Information 
Reduction, thus this study only provides limited support for Haider and Frensch’s 
account. The results may have implications for the processes theorised to be 
involved in skill acquisition, particularly those around automatic processes, and 
implicit learning, including whether and how this could become conscious 
knowledge. There are also potential practical applications for training in skilled tasks, 
such as air traffic control and radiography.
10.2 R e c a p  o f  t h e  e x p e r im e n t s  c a r r ie d  o u t
10.2.1 Experim ent testing new  tasks
In this experiment three tasks, analogous to the Alphabet Verification task, 
were used. The target search task had previously been used (Edmunds, 2005), the
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multiple-triplet task was based on a brief description in a conference presentation 
(Lincourt, Rybash, & Hoyer, 1998) and the shapes task was novel. Information 
Reduction was demonstrated in all three tasks. The ‘string-length effect’ attenuated 
over training and more errors were made to ‘irregular’ than to ‘regular’ stimuli in the 
test block, along with, in some instances, a return of the string-length effect in the 
test block.
The results suggest that Information Reduction can be seen at an aggregate 
level in a variety o f cognitive laboratory tasks. However, for the shapes and target 
search tasks all the participants noticed the change in regularity in the test block, 
whereas only a few did so for the multiple-triplet task. This suggests that in the 
former tasks Information Reduction had not been fully adopted. Many participants 
in these two tasks appeared unaware of the regularity, so it could be that Information 
Reduction is only used consistendy once some conscious awareness has developed.
A number of participants indicated on their self-reports that they were aware o f the 
regularity and had taken advantage of it, but this was not apparent from their data, 
which raised the intriguing possibility of ‘partial reduction’. This will be discussed in 
more detail in section 10.5. It was also clear from the questionnaires that some 
people were aware o f the regularity but did not change their processing.
Overall, the results from all three tasks indicated that people may adopt 
Information Reduction under some circumstances but not others. This experiment 
served as a baseline measure for the subsequent manipulations. Due to the limited 
supply o f potential participants, it was necessary to cut down the number of tasks for 
the other experiments. Variations on the target search task had already been carried 
out (Edmunds, 2005). It was noted that the string-length effect, as measured in the 
Block 1 regression slopes, was biggest in the multiple-triplet task and shapes task.
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Additionally, these two tasks both showed a greater range o f error rate in the test 
block, therefore it was decided to proceed with these two tasks. All subsequent 
experiments used both of these tasks.
10.2.2 Feedback manipulation experiment
This experiment was identical to the control experiment, apart from 
withdrawal of feedback half-way through training, that is, after 240 of the 480 trials. 
Participants were informed o f this and in the multiple-triplet task it had a dramatic 
effect on usage o f Information Reduction. The regression slopes still declined 
overall, but only two participants (9%, compared to 64% in the control experiment) 
could be identified as reducers. O n the other hand, the results for the shapes task 
were similar to the control experiment — no participant reduced exclusively but 
several indicated on their questionnaires awareness o f the regularity and that they 
had made use o f it. In both tasks there seemed to be enough Information Reduction 
occurring to register at the aggregate level, but at an individual level it might be 
better described as limited or partial. Again there were some participants who 
seemed unaware of the regularity, but may have been reducing.
10.2.3 Speed pressure experiment
The manipulation that was introduced for this experiment was to emphasise 
speed over accuracy to the participants, via the instructions given, and it was 
anticipated that this would increase the adoption of Information Reduction. 
However, for the multiple-triplet task, there were again fewer reducers than in the 
control experiment, although more than for the feedback manipulation experiment. 
Also there was not a clear division between reducers and non-reducers, unlike the 
first two experiments. This points towards partial usage o f the strategy. In the shapes
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task, whilst again not having any participants who fully adopted the strategy, there 
did seem to be more consistent usage than previously. The string-length effect did 
not reappear in the test block and more participants produced an increased number 
of errors to inconsistendy placed differing shapes, though once again there was still 
no complete reduction.
10.2.4 Experim ent with explicit instruction to use shortcut
The modification from the control experiment introduced here was another 
variation o f the instructions given. Participants were informed that it was possible to 
find a shortcut to increase processing speed, and encouraged to indicate if they did 
so, which then took them to the final two blocks where they were asked to apply the 
shortcut they had noticed. For both tasks there were a number who discovered the 
strategy (21% in multiple-triplet and 35% in shapes) and in this experiment it was 
seen that complete reduction was possible in the shapes task. However, the 
surprising finding was that a third of participants in both tasks thought they had 
found a shortcut when in fact they had not. The remainder of the participants 
showed no awareness of any regularity. Despite not indicating knowledge, several in 
the multiple-triplet task had data intimating that they were fully reducing, which 
again suggests that conscious knowledge is not required for it to occur.
10.2.5 Transfer experiments
The final two experiments conducted examined how well Information 
Reduction would transfer to similar tasks after a period o f training. The first allowed 
for near transfer, where the rule to be applied was the same but the stimuli were 
slightly different. The second needed far transfer to occur — here the rule changed 
although the stimuli were superficially more similar. Some level o f Information
Reduction was seen in both experiments, although this was more certain in the near 
transfer for all sets of stimuli. It was deduced that some participants were able to 
successfully transfer the rule in the near transfer experiment and on the whole these 
were aware o f the strategy, suggesting that conscious knowledge may be required for 
successful transfer to occur. In the far transfer experiment, for most orders o f the 
stimuli, there appeared to be no transfer occurring, although there was potentially 
some in the orientation-change-first shapes task. Here it did seem as if conscious 
awareness was not needed, but given the very small number of participants who may 
have transferred, this conclusion should be treated with caution.
10.3 A p p l y in g  t h e  r e s u l t s  t o  t h e  r e s e a r c h  q u e s t io n s
One o f the issues with the Information Reduction hypothesis is that it has 
essentially been derived from results from one task — the Alphabet Verification task. 
This could mean that the attributes posited for it are due to the nature o f this task or 
particular characteristics o f the stimuli. One way to test this would be to demonstrate 
Information Reduction in other tasks and under various training conditions. The 
bulk of this thesis is based on two tasks developed for this purpose, the multiple- 
triplet task and the shapes task. In order to aid comparisons between studies, these 
tasks were designed to have the same parameters as the Alphabet Verification task:
•  one element that was relevant to fulfilling the task and at least one other 
element that was irrelevant
•  a variable number o f irrelevant elements so that the equivalent o f the string 
length effect could be detected
• a method of introducing relevance into the formerly redundant element(s) to 
test for increased errors/return o f the ‘string length effect’
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The tasks also addressed one of the criticisms of the Alphabet Verification task in 
that the stimuli within them had the same perceptual saliency and complexity 
throughout. This meant that there was no readily available pre-defined cue as to the 
relevant and irrelevant portions of the stimuli. Additionally, in the shapes task the 
automatic left-right reading process was avoided.
10.3.1 Information Reduction in other tasks
All the experiments provided evidence that Information Reduction did occur 
in both the multiple-triplet and shapes tasks, and variations o f them. The measures 
used to determine the presence o f Information Reduction were a significantly larger 
number o f errors made to irregular stimuli than regular in the test block and an 
attenuation of the string-length effect during training. Experiment 4, explicit 
instruction, contributed support for the appropriateness o f these measures. 
Participants were instructed to use the shortcut they had found in the final two 
blocks (one training and the unannounced test block). It was noted that those who 
had indicated knowledge of the regularity had low slopes and a high number of 
incorrect classifications of irregular stimuli. Overall, then, it was demonstrated that 
Information Reduction can be seen in a range of laboratory tasks under various 
conditions. Along with recently reported results for a parity judgement task 
(Gaschler et al., 2015) and those for the target search task (Edmunds, 2005), it can be 
concluded that it is not an artefact of the Alphabet Verification task. This provides 
support for the idea o f it being a general learning process, rather than a task-specific 
phenomenon. It seems to be applied when stimuli contain redundant information 
with a high degree o f regularity.
Whilst the measures used identified a process labelled as Information 
Reduction in these laboratory tasks, it cannot be stated with certainty that this is the
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same process which has been noted in ‘real-world’ tasks such as radiography and air 
traffic control. Since all the experimental tasks were designed to have the same 
parameters, to enable comparison between them, it is possible that the Information 
Reduction seen in these tasks is at least in part an artefact o f the task structure.
10.3.2 Determ ining the number o f reducers
The second research question was only partially answered — it was possible, by 
using the two measures and a correlation between them, to derive a figure for the 
number o f ‘reducers’ in some tasks and under some training conditions but not 
others. Table 10.1 shows the percentages o f reducers found in each experiment.
Table 10.1: percentages o f reducers in the various experiments
Ex
pe
rim
en
t
Number of reducers
Multiple-triplet task Shapes task
Control 64% N ot determinable
Feedback
manipulation
9% N ot determinable
Speed pressure 23% N ot determinable
Explicit instruction 21% 7%
Near transfer 39%/35% 4% /13%
Far transfer 0% /13% 0% /13%
In the multiple-triplet task most o f those identified as reducers from their data
could also be identified as such from their self-reports, although in a few cases the
participant showed no awareness of the regularity or o f having changed their
processing. These figures compare to approximately 41 % found by Haider and
Frensch (1999a) in the relevant-first condition and 55% in the relevant-last condition
of the Alphabet Verification task (22 and 23 participants respectively, with 700
training trials). Whilst the number of participants is small in all these experiments,
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these variations in numbers point towards reduction being applied differentially from 
task to task. It is possible that the various tasks may require different amounts of 
practice for Information Reduction to occur, so direct comparison of the numbers 
using it must be done cautiously. The multiple-triplet task required participants to 
carry out several calculations for the longer strings and under basic training 
conditions it would appear to be more efficient to use Information Reduction for 
this task than for the Alphabet Verification task, where all strings incorporate a single 
calculation.
In the shapes task it was generally not possible to determine the number of 
‘reducers’ under most training conditions, despite the aggregate data suggesting 
Information Reduction had occurred and some participants indicating usage in their 
self-reports. It may be that it would require more practice for Information Reduction 
to become fully established with this type o f task. In all experiments it appeared that 
a number of people were partially using the strategy, but how many and to what 
extent could not be quantified. Section 10.5 will consider the types o f processing 
which might come under the heading o f partial reduction.
Further analysis o f each individual’s data, on a trial-by-trial basis, could 
potentially reveal more about the processing occurring. This would be similar to the 
analysis carried out by Haider and Frensch (2002), which examined the mean 
latencies for the longest strings as a function o f practice block. They concluded from 
this that a discontinuity could be seen for all participants and reflected a change in 
strategy. A trial-by-trial analysis would be even more fine-grained and could show, 
for instance, whether a discontinuity occurs at the same time for all ‘string lengths’, 
which would be predicted from Haider and Frensch’s hypothesis, and whether 
participants are consistent in maintaining the increased speeding. The analysis could
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consider not just the latencies but also whether or not each trial resulted in a correct 
or incorrect response and may then indicate whether a speed-accuracy trade-off 
strategy was in operation, even if only for part o f the experiment.
10.3.3 Variations in number o f reducers
As well as addressing the second research question, the figures in Table 10.1, 
for both types of task, also answer the third question. Manipulations o f task and 
training conditions do affect the numbers who adopt an Information Reduction 
strategy. However, changes did not have an equivalent effect across tasks and in 
some cases seemed to be in the opposite direction to each other. The results from 
several o f the experiments indicated that Information Reduction tended to be 
abandoned in the multiple-triplet task when training conditions were altered from 
those used in the control experiment. This occurred under conditions when usage 
might be considered to be more optimal, such as the requirement to be as fast as 
possible, or when the participants should be evaluating the stimuli to discover a 
shortcut, as well as when the participants were unsettled, as in Experiment 2 when 
feedback was withdrawn. The level of Information Reduction remained stable or 
even increased in the shapes task. As it was seen under a range o f training 
conditions, this gives support to the hypothesis that Information Reduction is a 
general learning process, but it may be less robust a phenomenon than has been 
suggested.
Having additionally explored some individual differences, it seems that the task 
and training variables are more important for determining adoption o f the strategy. 
The variation in use between tasks and training conditions suggests that there is not a 
constant proportion of people who are reducers. It would also appear that no-one is 
an ‘always-reducer’, using the strategy exclusively whenever they spot a regularity.
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Almost all participants in the shapes task noticed some o f the ‘irregular’ stimuli in the 
test block, with only five participants across all experiments having a 100% error rate 
to these. Some self-reports suggested awareness of the regularity but a decision not 
to exploit it. The number o f ‘reducers’ varying from zero upwards and the existence 
o f ‘deliberate non-reducers’ supports the idea that using Information Reduction is a 
conscious decision. However, adoption of Information Reduction is not necessarily 
an all-or-nothing conscious move by participants as has previously been suggested 
(Haider & Frensch, 2002; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009). Several aspects of the results 
indicate that it is more complex than hypothesised by Haider and Frensch: some 
reducers were unable to verbalise the strategy and often partial reduction appears to 
occur, including times when the participant has reported that they were a ‘deliberate 
non-reducer’.
10.3.4 Conscious awareness
One of the research questions asks whether anything can be learned about the 
conscious nature o f Information Reduction. It has been hypothesised that 
implementation occurs in a conscious second stage of the process, following implicit 
learning of the regularity. The overall results, showing that Information Reduction 
occurs to different degrees in the tasks and as training conditions vary, could be 
taken as evidence that it is consciously applied, perhaps when the participant 
considers that it will reduce processing times. The idea that it is consciously adopted 
is supported by the confirmation from these experiments that although some 
participants were aware o f the regularity, they chose not to exploit it and indicated 
such on their self-reports. However, in all the experiments it was apparent that 
although most o f the identifiable reducers were able to verbalise knowledge about it, 
there were some who were unable to and did not even seem to realise there was any
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regularity. The questions started in a general way and then became quite explicit, for 
example “Did you notice that the errors always followed the first digit in brackets, 
except for the last set o f strings?” Some o f those who answered ‘no’ to this question 
had low slopes and a high error rate to the irregular stimuli, which suggests that they 
had been reducing. It is possible that some may not have understood this question, 
but it seems unlikely that all the non-aware users misinterpreted it. It also appeared 
from the explicit instruction experiment (Chapter 7) that verbalisable knowledge is 
not needed in order to use Information Reduction. This suggests that it is possible 
for Information Reduction to occur subconsciously.
The Unexpected-Event hypothesis argues that it is use o f the shortcut which 
leads to conscious awareness, when a faster than expected RT initiates hypothesis 
testing to find the cause. However, part o f the premise o f the Unexpected-Event 
hypothesis is that the unconscious strategy use is intermittent, and is only fully 
implemented after awareness has dawned. Therefore it could not explain the very 
high error rate to irregular stimuli seen for some o f the non-aware users, which 
suggests that reduction was more than intermittent. The representational-strength 
continuum (Cleeremans and Jimenez, 2002) could be compatible with the results, if 
the strength required for the implicit knowledge to become explicit varies between 
people and also builds up differentially depending on the task and training 
conditions.
Whilst it would seem that it is not necessary to be aware o f the regularity to 
use Information Reduction, results from the transfer experiments reported in 
Chapter 9 point towards explicit knowledge being needed for transfer to occur. This 
suggests that conscious knowledge facilitates transfer when there is a change to the 
stimuli or to the rule governing the regularity.
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10.3.5 Individual differences
In order to investigate the final research question, a number o f personality and 
cognitive factors were examined via questionnaires following Experiments 4 (explicit 
instruction) and 5 (transfer). These factors were: distractibility; impulsivity; trust in 
memory; cognitive miserliness and the ‘big five’ personality factors o f agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience. The results 
suggested that none o f the individual difference measures used, with the possible 
exception o f extraversion in the shapes task, would appear to distinguish reducers 
from non-reducers. They also did not discriminate those who became aware of the 
potential shortcut from those who did not show awareness within the duration of 
the experiment. Some of these factors may be relevant in identifying those who 
notice the regularity at an early stage of practice compared to those who need much 
more training before it is adopted. Another area where individual differences may be 
apparent is between the non-aware reducers and the non-aware non-reducers. 
Alternatively, it may be that factors not tested could account for some of the 
differences in performance. Some areas that could be investigated are attentional 
processes and executive functioning. It has been noted that cognitive style, for 
instance whether someone is a visualiser as opposed to a verbaliser, can affect which 
strategy is selected from the set possessed by that individual (Roberts & Newton, 
2001). Working memory capacity and reasoning ability can also impinge on strategy 
selection (Schunn & Reder, 2001), so these are other avenues that could be explored. 
However, it could be that more transitory factors like stress affect awareness and use 
of Information Reduction.
In summary, the results provide some support for the Information Reduction 
hypothesis, as well as some evidence against it. Information Reduction does seem to
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be a general learning process, but may be neither fully nor consistently applied. 
However, it must be acknowledged that there may be other processes involved in 
use o f the strategy, including automaticity.
10.4 W h y  m ig h t  t h e  n u m b e r s  o f  r e d u c e r s  v a r y ?
There are a number o f possible reasons, which could exist in combination, 
why the numbers using Information Reduction differed across the tasks. Firstly, the 
shapes task was processed more quickly than the multiple-triplet task indicating that 
it was an easier task. Doane et al. (1999) found that the strategy used varied with the 
difficulty o f the task. They concluded that something like Information Reduction 
had occurred in the difficult version, and these results tally with that. Secondly, the 
participants were more likely to notice the change in regularity in the test blocks for 
the shapes task than for the multiple-triplet task, and this could be related to how 
much of the rest of the stimulus was in the focal area or was perceived. Alternatively 
it may be related to the ease o f the task, or it may be that Information Reduction 
requires more practice in the shapes task before becoming fully established. Thirdly, 
it may be that ‘full’ reduction is more likely to be seen when there is some sort of 
calculation needed, as in the multiple-triplet task and Alphabet Vefification task, 
rather than when the task is purely visual, as in the shapes task. Fourthly, instance 
learning may be involved. With both the multiple-triplet task and the Alphabet 
Verification task the initial triplet occurs a number o f times within each block. If  the 
strings are ‘chunked’, with the initial triplet being one chunk, then this could become 
an instance, capable of creating many traces (Logan, 1988) or strengthening the 
representation (Rickard, 1997). This would increase the chance o f direct memory 
retrieval of the response needed. The structure o f the shapes task meant that 
instances were not repeated within blocks, decreasing the number o f traces and the
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chance o f direct response retrieval. Where the required response is directly retrieved 
then processing o f any other parts of the stimulus may be less likely to occur, 
encouraging the development o f Information Reduction.
Rather than the subconscious use of memory, as would happen in an 
automatic process, there could have been a conscious use, at least in the multiple- 
triplet task. Some participants did indicate use of memory strategies on their self- 
reports — for instance using mnemonics like BAG [B(4)G]. Kluger and DeNisi 
(1996) found that feedback on memory tasks was more effective than for tasks with 
rules to be followed. The large decrease in number o f reducers in the feedback 
manipulation experiment suggests the multiple-triplet task may be treated by 
participants as primarily a memory task. Changing the training conditions, and 
especially removal o f feedback, could have affected the willingness to rely on 
memory, making the participants more conservative and checking the strings 
thoroughly. Touron and Hertzog (2004a, 2004b) demonstrated that a adopting a 
memory retrieval strategy was affected by confidence in memory ability. Although 
the results from the individual difference questionnaire suggested that trust in 
memory did not distinguish reducers from non-reducers, it may be that aware 
reducers who do not trust their memory become aware non-reducers without 
feedback. Levels of awareness o f the regularity were similar to the control 
experiment (73% aware in Experiment 1, 64% in Experiment 3) and therefore it 
would be expected that similar numbers of reducers would be seen. Choosing not to 
use Information Reduction, if that is what occurred, supports Haider and Frensch’s 
proposal of a voluntarily-controlled strategy but not the idea that it is consistently 
applied once noticed.
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Another reason why the numbers o f reducers may vary in the multiple-triplet 
task is the cognitive (working memory) load associated with calculating several 
triplets in the longer strings, alongside holding other instructions, such as to be as 
fast as possible. This could engender a search for a shortcut strategy, which in itself 
takes up additional working memory resource, as does the evaluation o f any potential 
strategy (Newton & Roberts, 2000). Experiment 4 demonstrated that 31% of 
participants in the multiple-triplet task thought they had found a shortcut, although 
they did not choose Information Reduction from the list o f options. This suggests 
that when attempting to find a strategy, the hypothesis-testing can prevent discovery 
of Information Reduction in some participants. Roberts and Newton (2001) suggest 
that using or testing ineffective strategies can inhibit the discovery o f alternatives. 
There are several places in the sequence o f processes where this inhibition could 
occur. It could be at the level o f implicit learning o f the regularity or at 
implementation o f the strategy.
Finally, there is a possibility that there are inherent limitations or problems 
with the overall methodology employed, or with remote testing o f participants, and 
that this is why the number o f reducers varied from experiment to experiment. By 
structuring the tasks in the same way and employing the same type of analysis as 
previously used then any methodological weakness is perpetuated. Participants may 
not have understood the instructions given, although only a few were eliminated 
from the analyses for recording too many errors and in general all experiments 
should have been equally affected by such an issue. There may have been 
experimenter or demand effects, but again it would be expected that all experiments 
would have been equally affected by these.
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The Information Reduction hypothesis advanced by Haider and Frensch 
would seem to suggest that in the right conditions everyone could become a reducer. 
One of their experiments suggested that this might be the case, if the amount of 
practice is increased (Haider & Frensch, 2002). However, this series of experiments 
has shown that it is remarkably difficult to increase the number o f reducers. Given 
that every manipulation to the multiple-triplet task resulted in fewer reducers 
compared to the control experiment, it is possible that the number seen in 
Experiment 1 was the maximum possible for this task. Future research could 
investigate whether increased practice does increase the number o f reducers. Perhaps 
boredom with the task may be the motive needed for full adoption o f Information 
Reduction.
10.5 P a r t ia l  r e d u c t io n
At an aggregate level in the multiple-triplet task the regression slopes for 
correct and incorrect stimuli converged over the course o f training, which is 
indicative o f Information Reduction occurring. There was less convergence in the 
shapes task. Processing for incorrect stimuli can cease as soon as the error is 
encountered, so the rest o f the stimulus can be ignored, leading to low slopes. If the 
redundant parts of correct stimuli come to be ignored then the slopes should decline 
to be equivalent to those for the incorrect stimuli. However, the fact that there was 
always some difference in the slopes suggests that there was still some processing of 
the irrelevancies at the end of the training. This could be explained by the fact that 
some participants were known to not be reducing, but also could reflect ‘partial 
reduction’ by other participants. Another factor that suggests that some participants 
were only partially reducing is that often there was not a clear division between the 
reducers and the non-reducers in the scatterplots o f the final regression slopes
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against error rate to the irregular stimuli. The aggregate data suggest that Information 
Reduction had occurred, even where the number of reducers could not be identified. 
A t various points in this thesis it has been suggested that adopting Information 
Reduction is not an all-or-nothing process, as has been proposed (Haider & Frensch, 
2002; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009), but that many participants only seem to use it 
some o f the time. How ‘partial reduction’ might be manifested in processing is not 
known, and this could happen differently in different people, or differently in the 
same person, even within the same experiment. Variations to training conditions may 
affect people in diverse ways.
One possibility for partial reduction is that the strategy was applied to most or 
some stimuli, but a variable number o f randomly chosen ones were fully processed.
A number of self-reports from all tasks and experiments indicated that the regularity 
was checked first, followed some of the time by checking the rest o f the stimulus. 
This might be termed residual checking and the level at which this occurs could vary 
between participants, with some being more vigilant than others. Residual checking 
was apparent in the incorrect training stimuli. Processing o f these should always 
cease once the error has been found, giving a zero string-length effect. It was noted 
that this did not always occur and whilst the string-length effect was small, it was still 
present. Attentional slippage, where occasionally unattended, irrelevant items 
become attended has been described (Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004). This 
transfer of attention may be inadvertent, but can occur when the irrelevant 
information is available at the same time as the relevant. Under these conditions 
attention may be shifted to the irrelevant item after the target has been identified. 
From a survival point o f view, it would be important to discover whether 
information which had been irrelevant had become relevant and relatively infrequent
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checks would enable this. Therefore some level o f residual checking would make 
sense for everyday tasks.
If  one of the irregular stimuli in the test block happens to be fully processed, 
then the change in regularity may be noticed, leading to full checking of subsequent 
stimuli in that block. This was posited by Haider and Frensch (1999a) and they 
claimed to have seen this in 80% of their participants’ data. In the experiments 
reported here, noticing the change in regularity may account for some having a low 
error rate to irregular stimuli but it did not seem to be the case for all. For many 
participants there was no pattern to the irregular stimuli that they correctly or 
incorrectly classified, although this might simply mean that the change in regularity 
did not consciously register and cause a reversion to full processing o f all stimuli.
Another suggestion for partial reduction is that random parts o f some stimuli 
were processed (Haider & Frensch, 1999b). However, it is hard to imagine how this 
could result in a steady decline in the string-length effect. One could speculate that 
this kind o f strategy might be adopted under some conditions, such as speed 
pressure, and it is possible that the results seen for the multiple-triplet task in that 
experiment could be accounted for by this type of processing.
A further possibility is that participants randomly switched strategies during 
the experiment, so that use o f Information Reduction was not consistent. One such 
strategy that could have been employed is a speed-accuracy trade-off, and again this 
might have been more likely to occur when placed under speed pressure. This would 
be contrary to Haider and Frensch’s idea that Information Reduction is consciously 
adopted at one point in time and affects behaviour reasonably consistently from then 
on.
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Finally, partial reduction may occur because control over the process has 
wavered. Information Reduction is proposed to be a consciously controlled process. 
These processes are generally considered to be effortful (Moors & De Houwer,
2006) and thus it would not be surprising if occasionally participants lost control and 
found themselves processing the entire stimulus. Some participants may be better at 
maintaining control and thus show less partial reduction. However, a loss of 
conscious control could not account for unaware users who showed partial 
reduction, as many in the shapes task seem to do.
Trial-by-trial analysis may be one way to investigate the processing occurring 
and could shed some light on what participants were doing and which, if any, o f the 
suggestions outlined is correct.
The current Information Reduction model, which proposes that either the 
strategy is abruptly and fully adopted for all stimuli at the same time (all) (Haider & 
Frensch, 2002; Gaschler & Frensch, 2009) or not adopted at all (nothing) would 
need to be extended to explain ‘partial reduction’. Partial reduction may be an 
adaptive response to ensure that irrelevant information had not become relevant.
10.6 In t e g r a t in g  In f o r m a t io n  R e d u c t io n  in t o  t h e
THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE
10.6.1 E xisting theories
The starting point for the idea o f Information Reduction was the observation 
that the learning and expert-novice literature contained results which suggested that 
with practice processing becomes limited to task-relevant information (Haider & 
Frensch, 1996). Experts may use fewer, more relevant, cues than novices (Shanteau, 
1992) or may not fixate on the irrelevant items in a display (Lee & Anderson, 2001;
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Shapiro & Raymond, 1989). There is long-standing experimental evidence from the 
attention literature o f visual stimuli being unattended at the perceptual level. For 
instance, Rock and Gutman (1981) found that when two overlapping figures of 
different colours were used, but the task required attention to just one, that 
participants were unable to recognise or report the unattended figure. This is 
considered to have occurred because of a conscious, top-down influence on what 
was attended, affecting perception.
Existing theories of automaticity, which are generally used to explain 
performance gains in practice learning, are unable to account for perceptual changes 
after practice. The literature review (chapter 2) considered these theories in more 
detail. Foremost are the Production rules theory (Anderson, 1987) and Instance 
theory (Logan, 1988). In the former it is the steps required that become encoded, 
into procedural memory. The number o f steps can be reduced by ‘composition’, 
although the whole stimulus is still processed. In the latter theory it is proposed that 
each time a stimulus is encountered it creates a trace in memory, including the 
required response. After a number of identical instances have been encoded it 
becomes faster to retrieve the response related to that stimulus directly in one step 
than to perform the steps o f the processing algorithm. However, the whole stimulus 
has to be perceived for the appropriate memory trace to be accessed. A variation on 
this theory is the Component Power Laws theory (Rickard, 1997), which proposes 
just one representational ‘instance’ which gets stronger as practice proceeds. All 
these theories are based on non- or sub-conscious processes.
10.6.2 An alternative m echanism?
Based on the results from a number of experiments using the Alphabet 
Verification task, one of which confirmed that parts o f the stimulus are ignored
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(Haider & Frensch, 1999a) an alternative mechanism, Information Reduction, was 
proposed. This was posited to be a two-stage process (Haider & Frensch, 1996; 
Haider & Frensch, 1999a; Haider & Frensch, 1999b; Haider et al., 2005). In the first 
stage a regularity o f task-relevant and redundant information in the stimuli is 
implicitly learned. The second stage involves this implicit knowledge becoming 
available to conscious awareness resulting in a decision to ignore the irrelevant 
information and only process the relevant. It is proposed that this second stage is 
implemented abruptly resulting in a discontinuity in an individual’s RT curve over 
time. However, aggregation of results across a number o f individuals, who will have 
adopted the strategy at different points during training, gives the normal power law 
curve (Haider & Frensch, 2002; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). As well as being 
proposed as a possible additional or alternative mechanism to automaticity, the 
Information Reduction hypothesis also touches on theoretical areas around implicit 
learning and how this could become conscious. These were considered in the 
literature review (chapter 2). One hypothesis which endeavours to explain conscious 
awareness o f implicitly learned material, which was partially developed using the 
results from Information Reduction studies, is the Unexpected-Event hypothesis 
(Frensch et al., 2003). This suggests that the implicit learning affects behaviour and 
noticing this behaviour triggers explicit hypothesis-testing to determine the cause. 
Once the causal knowledge is conscious, it is applied consistently to affect 
subsequent behaviour. Another theory is the representational-strength continuum 
(Cleeremans and Jimenez, 2002), which suggests that as learning progresses the 
strength of the representations increases, so that knowledge moves from being held 
implicitly through explicitly to being automatically applied.
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The results from this study confirm the existence of Information Reduction 
and that it can be learned without instruction, or in other words that it is learned 
implicitly. Theories o f automaticity such as Instance theory (Logan, 1988) or 
Production rules (Anderson, 1987) assume the learning would be conscious and 
controlled, only becoming subconscious once automaticity has developed (Schneider 
& Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore it seems that these theories 
of automaticity may not explain the type o f processing occurring in Information 
Reduction. Information Reduction can appear in a number o f tasks and under 
various training conditions and this could be taken as evidence for it being a general 
learning process. However, whilst it may be generally available, the results reported 
here indicate that it may not be generally used. Other research has found that whilst 
strategies may be available to all, a number o f factors will affect who discovers or 
uses any particular one. These include individual differences in the way task 
representations are formed and processed, which could be termed cognitive style, the 
repertoire o f available strategies an individual possesses, as well as their ability to 
select an appropriate strategy in response to feedback (Newton & Roberts, 2000; 
Roberts & Newton, 2001; Schunn & Reder, 2001).
In the experiments reported in this thesis there were a number of 
circumstances, for instance, being required to be as fast as possible, where usage in 
the multiple-triplet task decreased compared to baseline, rather than increasing. This 
was contrary to expectations and could indicate that Information Reduction is less 
robust than Haider and Frensch have suggested. The results obtained here tend to 
rule out theories of automaticity as sole explanations for the processing occurring. If 
either instance learning (Logan, 1988) or creation of production rules (Anderson, 
1987) leads to Information Reduction, then there should have been the same level of
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reduction in Experiments 2 and 3 as seen in Experiment 1, since the stimuli were 
identical, required the same processing and were seen for the same number of trials. 
Doane et al. (1999) explain their Information Reduction-like results in terms of a 
synthesised data-driven model o f automaticity incorporating both rule compilation 
and instance learning (Anderson, Fincham, & Douglass, 1997). Lee and Anderson 
(2001) suggest that improvements in the speed o f execution of different elements of 
a task are due to different mechanisms, some of which are due to attentional shifts, 
i.e. reducing fixation time, which occur below the level of awareness. This could be 
another explanation for the non-aware users.
10.6.3 Is automaticity involved?
The results obtained in this study also point towards conscious awareness 
being neither necessary nor sufficient for Information Reduction to be adopted, with 
four types o f participant being identified: aware users, non-aware users, aware non­
users and non-aware non-users. A mechanism such as that put forward in the 
Unexpected-Event hypothesis can explain why some participants become aware of 
the strategy, but aspects o f it are at odds with the findings here that Information 
Reduction may not be applied consistently (‘partial reduction’, discussed in section 
10.5). Additionally, it would not explain why some choose not to use it — if 
awareness results from noticing that responses are faster than expected, or occurring 
before the stimulus has been fully processed, then why would someone cease using it 
once it has passed into consciousness? Another difficulty with postulating that 
Information Reduction is a fully consciously applied strategy comes from 
considering the properties of controlled processes. Controlled processing is 
considered to be effortful, slow, serial and intentional, whereas automaticity is 
considered to be unconscious, effortless, fast, obligatory and may occur in parallel
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with other processes (Moors and De Houwer, 2006). Information Reduction seems 
to be both fast and effortless and thus may involve some sort o f automaticity.
Perhaps it may be consciously applied initially, but after some usage, this develops 
into an automatic process. This potentially could explain why some reducers seemed 
unaware post-hoc: they were aware for a period o f time during the experiment, but 
this awareness did not need to be maintained and was lost to some individuals.
If  Information Reduction does progress into automaticity then this could be 
explained by the representational-strength continuum proposed by Cleeremans and 
Jimenez (2002), possibly in combination with the Component Power Laws theory 
(Rickard, 1997). This would allow for the implicit learning with the formation of 
representations which become stronger with practice, so that they progress into 
explicit knowledge, and finally into an automatic process. The Component Power 
Laws theory also allows for ‘partial reduction’, since Rickard’s experiments showed 
that memory retrieval was not implemented for all problems at the same time. For 
some problems there was an abrupt change and for some it was more gradual, 
varying even within the same person.
Overall, more reduction was seen when stimuli were repeated, or contained a 
repeating element such as the initial triplet in the multiple-triplet task. Therefore it 
would seem that memory for instances can play a part, although in the context of the 
experiment this could be working memory rather than episodic memory, giving only 
a temporary advantage. Spacing out practice over two or more sessions could test 
this further. Reduction did seem to transfer from one stimuli set to another, although 
it is not certain if the idea o f reduction can transfer when the rule changes. More 
practice with the first stimuli set, so that Information Reduction can be more firmly 
established before transfer is attempted, might shed further light on whether transfer
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can occur when the rule about the regularity changes. Transfer can be explained by 
the Production rules theory, since productions are not stimulus-specific. Thus it 
seems that there is a place for some automaticity in the execution o f Information 
Reduction. Proponents o f the Information Reduction model reject the notion that 
theories o f automaticity are compatible with the top-down conscious processing they 
have observed in the Alphabet Verification task (Gaschler & Frensch, 2007). Instead 
they favour the idea that sometimes strategy change occurs as a result o f a 
continuous, implicit, data-driven and not verbally expressible mechanism and 
sometimes as a result o f abrupt, explicit, top-down and verbally expressible 
processing. However, there has been no discussion o f why there should be two 
separate mechanisms or how or why one over the other might be chosen for a 
particular task. A theory which combines elements o f the Information Reduction 
hypothesis with some form o f automatic processing may provide a resolution o f the 
various results presented here.
10.6.4 What about attention?
Another theoretical area which could be considered with respect to 
Information Reduction is that o f attention. Attention can be described as the process 
by which the myriad amount o f information impinging on a person’s senses every 
moment is reduced to a manageable level and brought into awareness, enabling 
successful interaction with the environment. Attention can be both consciously and 
non-consciously driven. There are parallels between the perceptual changes which 
appear to occur in Information Reduction and those noted in Broadbent’s filter 
theory for selective attention. It tends to be assumed that this model bases selection 
purely on physical properties, however the model was adjusted to allow for memory, 
prior experience and expectations to act on the filter (Broadbent, 1958), thus
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accounting for the ‘cocktail party effect’ amongst other experimental results. 
Broadbent refers to “adjusting the internal coding [of the selective filter] to the probabilities of 
external events” (1958, p298). Whilst Broadbent was presumably referring to the 
separation o f one incoming sensation from others, the idea could be extended to 
allow for separating one part o f a stimulus from the rest.
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Figure 10.1 In formation-flow diagram for selection o f stimulus 
to be processed (Broadbent, 1958)
Additionally, it is known that attention can be affected by top-down processes 
or ‘biased’. Bias refers to the preferential selection of stimuli in the environment that 
have some salience for the individual, so that only behaviourally relevant stimuli are 
processed. Attentional bias is a normal cognitive process driven by the prevailing 
active goals. It has been shown that at a neuronal level, attention is directed to 
objects relevant to current behaviour, with suppression of the representations of 
objects to be ignored (Duncan, Humphreys, & Ward, 1997). Attentional bias has 
been mainly studied in areas such as emotional disorders and addiction (Field & Cox, 
2008; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), where it is quite pronounced. Tasks such 
as the modified Stroop (Sharma, Albery, & Cook, 2001), the visual-probe task 
(MacLeod et al., 1986) and the flicker-induced change blindness paradigm (Jones, 
Bruce, Livingstone, & Reed, 2006) have been used to measure the bias. These tasks, 
or adaptations o f them, could be used following training in Information Reduction 
experiments to determine if bias is involved. The flicker change detection task has
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been used to determine where attention is allocated in processing o f food labelling 
(Gaschler et al., 2010), on the basis that over time people have learned where to 
attend to find the information that is personally relevant to them. Since participants 
in Information Reduction experiments are requested to be as fast as possible, and 
may also find the task boring, a goal to finish quickly should develop and this could 
cause a bias in where attention is allocated in processing the stimulus.
Lavie and Tsai’s ideas on perceptual load (1994) may also have a bearing on 
some o f the results seen here. This suggests that even with a clear physical 
distinction between relevant and irrelevant information the overall perceptual load 
determines how much material is selected for processing. This could perhaps explain 
partial reduction. We might speculate that the shapes task has low perceptual load, 
thus allowing for more, if inadvertent, processing o f the rest o f the stimulus and 
preventing full reduction from taking place. It would also seem that the visual system 
groups stimuli together, so that this grouping can affect what is attended and what is 
not (Driver, 2001). This would perhaps account for results suggesting that stimuli 
with a clear perceptual group, such as the initial triplet in the Alphabet Verification 
and multiple-triplet tasks, induce more Information Reduction.
Logan has endeavoured to combine Instance theory with the ‘executive 
control theory of visual attention’ since he believes that both rely on choice 
processes and categorisations (Logan, Taylor, & Etherton, 1999; Logan, 2002). 
Instance theory states that learning, and hence automaticity, is a side effect of 
attention (Logan et al., 1996). Attention is considered to be essential for encoding o f 
instances, “obligatory encoding”, (Logan & Etherton, 1994) and also a stimulus must 
be attended in order for information associated with the instance to be retrieved, 
“obligator}7 retrieval” (Logan, 1988). Attention selects what is perceived and from
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this propositions are formed about the stimulus, which determine current 
performance. These propositions are also encoded into instances for later retrieval 
(Logan & Etherton, 1994). The combined theory assumes that attention selects the 
‘winner’ o f the race from the activated instance representations, so that attention is 
responsible for which object is selected whilst automaticity says how a response to 
that object was created (Logan et al., 1999). Initially Logan believed that only 
information relevant to the task was represented explicitly in the instance. However, 
experiments showed that some attributes, which may guide attention, could also 
form part o f the instance, even if not explicitly required for responding. In other 
words some attributes were implicitly learned, but only retrieved if needed (Logan et 
al., 1999). This may create a way to combine Information Reduction with Instance 
theory.
10.6.5 Working towards developing a theory
Learning seems to progress through the same stages, whether the skill being 
developed is perceptual-motor or cognitive (Rosenbaum et al., 2001). These stages 
are considered to be: declarative, when the basics of the task are being learned; 
associative, when the procedures o f the task become more fluent and are compiled 
into procedures; and finally autonomous, when the procedures become automatic 
and less susceptible to disruption from external events (Anderson, 1982). Anderson 
et al. (1997) consider that performance in a skilled task results from a mixture of 
processes, with a complex set o f strategies developing based on both procedural 
memory (production rules) and declarative memory (instance retrieval). Initially 
processing is slow, as declarative analogies are drawn from the first examples 
encountered in order to produce responses, but from these it becomes possible to 
create procedural production rules. As practice proceeds, examples may be
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repeatedly encountered and this gives an opportunity for instances to be stored for 
direct retrieval. Thus any particular response can be generated by either the 
automatic use o f a production or the automatic retrieval o f an instance (if available).
The challenge is to determine how Information Reduction might fit into a 
theory o f skill acquisition. It might be another stage that can occur before, alongside 
or after the formation of other automatic processes. Alternatively, it may be a 
completely separate mechanism. The implicit learning of the regularity which seems 
to occur does not fit with Anderson et al.’s description o f early learning being 
declarative, especially when considering that this never seems to become conscious 
knowledge for some people. On the other hand, some aspects do seem to suggest 
that automaticity is involved. However, these experiments demonstrated that 
Information Reduction is a fragile mechanism, easily affected by changes to training 
conditions. This intimates that it is not an inevitable result o f practice and thus seems 
to be separate from the automatic processes theorised by Anderson and Logan.
Any theory about Information Reduction needs to consider the implicit nature 
of the learning and the fact that whilst knowledge about the regularity becomes 
conscious for some people, it does not for others. How the regularity gets 
represented may be a key issue here. It may be that an abstracted £rule’ is formed (e.g. 
“the error always occurs in the initial triplet”) or it may be that the representation is 
more tied to specific instances (e.g. “B(4)G is always correct”, aided by this being a 
memorable ‘word’). It has been suggested that in implicit grammar or other rule- 
based learning tasks either fragments of the grammar are learned (Perruchet, 1994) 
or during testing items similar to those seen in training are selected (Cock, Berry, & 
Gaffan, 1994). However, Vokey and Brooks (1994) argue that non-literal abstracted 
rules about fragments are learned. Huddy and Burton (2002) suggest that the
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representation is not static, so that adaptation to various testing demands can occur. 
The ideas o f fragments being memorised and £non-static’ representations could be 
accommodated within Instance Theory, if an instance is not the whole stimulus, 
since some attributes can be implicitly learned and form part of the instance, only 
being retrieved if needed (Logan et al., 1999). One possibility is that sufficient 
fragments are learned as instances and retrieved quickly, to enable faster processing 
and cause a reduction in the string-length effect. This then triggers conscious 
hypothesis-testing, as suggested by the Unexpected-Event hypothesis, and some 
participants discover the rule, enabling them to apply it to all stimuli. This could then 
become proceduralised into productions.
10.6.6 Individual differences again
For any given task people have a variety of strategies available to them, some 
previously learned and some which are discovered as the task is practised (Roberts & 
Newton, 2001). Strategies may be adopted to achieve goals such as increasing 
accuracy, faster processing or decreasing task load. There is evidence which suggests 
that strategies are evaluated as to their validity and effectiveness by performance 
monitoring (Newton & Roberts, 2000; Schunn & Reder, 2001). However, individual 
differences may prevent correct evaluation and lead to less efficient strategies being 
used or may mean slower or non-existent adaptation to feedback on errors that 
indicate a change in strategy is needed (Schunn & Reder, 2001). Individual 
differences in awareness are also linked to variations between people in their ability 
for necessary adaptation in their strategy use (Schunn, Lovett, & Reder, 2001). 
Experiment 4, which gave explicit instruction about the presence o f a shortcut, 
demonstrated that many participants found it difficult to evaluate their processing 
and discover performance enhancing strategies. Several experiments have shown that
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participants are not necessarily aware o f using Information Reduction, which would 
affect their ability to consciously stop using it or change strategy if needed.
It is both theoretically and practically important to identify what individual 
differences affect the discovery, awareness and use o f strategies, and hence 
performance on tasks. Some professions, such as Air Traffic Controllers, need to be 
flexible in the use o f strategies in a frequent and rapidly changing task environment. 
Schunn and Reder (2001) suggest that use o f inductive reasoning and task expertise 
predict those who are able to adapt, whilst ability to reason inductively, to learn facts 
and the limits o f working memory indicate how much adaptation can occur. They 
found that the rate at which adaptation occurred was determined by task expertise 
and processing speed. They also suggest that more work is needed to determine 
which factors might be the best predictors across a range of tasks and situations. 
Testing these individual differences with Information Reduction tasks could shed 
light on whether they are predictive o f it being adopted or not or o f the rate at which 
it is discovered. If  they were found to be a factor then one or more o f the tasks 
could become part o f an aptitude test for some professions.
10.6.7 Summary o f the theoretical im plications
The process o f Information Reduction impinges on a number o f cognitive 
areas — attention, implicit learning, instance learning, procedural learning and 
consciousness, as well as metacognitive processes of strategy development, strategy 
selection and performance monitoring. Information Reduction does not seem to be 
solely data-driven and bottom-up, although this may account for the first, implicit, 
stage o f the process. Instance memory, particularly if instances can be formed from 
‘chunks’ o f part o f the stimulus, may be relevant in some or all tasks. Productions in 
procedural memory also seem to play a part and can explain the transfer seen.
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Implicit learning allows for regularities in the environment to be abstracted in some 
way and to affect behaviour. Thus there may be two subconscious elements involved 
in Information Reduction — automatic processes and implicit learning. Cleeremans 
and Jimenez (2002) suggest that these two lie at the ends o f a strength-of- 
representation continuum, with conscious processing in the middle. A theory about 
Information Reduction which involved this kind of continuum would be able to 
account for the implicidy learned information moving into conscious awareness. 
However this does not always occur and any theory must also address this. Top- 
down influences are also apparent in Information Reduction, not least where 
participants are aware non-users. One way forward may be to consider whether the 
conscious use o f the strategy can develop into automaticity, which would suggest 
moving further along the continuum proposed by Cleeremans and Jimenez. Further 
work is needed before a theory which could account for all the results noted can be 
developed. However the development of theories about the phenomenon will create 
testable hypotheses, which can then be used in the cycle o f enquiry to refine the 
theory.
Regardless o f whether Information Reduction, as seen in these laboratory 
tasks, has any parallels in ‘real-world’ tasks such as radiography or air traffic control, 
it has the potential to be a mechanism for investigating across many areas of 
cognition, particularly the higher-level construct of consciousness. What is perceived 
depends on where attention is focussed and this may depend on conscious or 
unconscious processes; automaticity and implicit learning are considered to occur 
subconsciously but strategy use may depend on conscious or unconscious decisions; 
transfer between tasks is a debated topic and may also involve conscious awareness. 
Consequently the tasks developed here could be used to further examine many of 
these processes.
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10.7 F u t u r e  d ir e c t io n s
There are many areas, both theoretical and experimental, in which knowledge 
and understanding o f the phenomenon known as Information Reduction can be 
advanced. The Information Reduction hypothesis was developed from results using 
the Alphabet Verification task. It is only recently that alternative tasks, including the 
multiple-triplet and shapes tasks, have been reported in the literature (Gaschler et al., 
2015; Rowell, Green, Kaye, & Naish, 2015). Both the Alphabet Verification task, the 
target search task and these new tasks, as well as any yet to be developed, could be 
tested in further experiments to investigate the strategy and its use further. They 
could also be used to advance understanding o f a number o f higher level cognitive 
processes. Experiments could be variations o f those already performed or use 
alternate paradigms, as well as making use of more detailed analysis such as trial-by- 
trial performance.
Some areas, such as the role o f feedback in the adoption o f Information 
Reduction and the effect o f changing task instructions, would lend themselves to a 
variety of manipulations. These may give more insight into partial reduction and 
possible use o f alternate strategies. It may also prove possible to increase the number 
o f reducers over baseline in the multiple-triplet task, which is something not 
achieved with the experiments conducted so far. Potential ways to test if the number 
o f reducers could be increased would be to increase the number o f training blocks or 
to vary perceptual or cognitive load. Increasing the number o f reducers may also 
increase the level of awareness and give insight into the conscious nature o f the 
strategy.
Additional experiments testing transfer from one task to another could shed 
more light on whether awareness is required in order for transfer to occur. It would
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be useful to equalise the complexity of the tasks and to test for conscious knowledge 
at points throughout, perhaps using protocol analysis. There is some evidence that if 
participants are required to verbalise their task goals, transfer to new untrained tasks 
may be improved (Karbach & Kray, 2009). It would also be interesting to examine if 
the strategy could be transferred between completely different tasks, such as between 
the shapes and target search tasks. This could add evidence as to the general nature 
o f the strategy.
Gaschler and Frensch (2007; 2009) showed that Information Reduction 
develops at the same rate for both frequently and infrequently presented strings. This 
could be extended to investigate whether Information Reduction would develop if 
two tasks were intermingled and whether adoption occurs at the same rate for both. 
Again this could provide evidence about the conscious nature of the strategy and 
how generalisable it is, although task-switching costs will also need to be taken into 
account. There may also be individual differences in executive control which mean 
that some are better at task-switching than others (Logan, 2002).
Previous research has indicated that inconsistent training with around 10% or 
more of irregular stimuli can prevent Information Reduction developing (Gaschler & 
Frensch, 2009; Haider et al., 2005). Many experiments, including those reported here, 
have used consistent training and followed this with an single unannounced test 
block containing some irregular stimuli. Future experiments could examine how long 
Information Reduction persists if several blocks with irregular stimuli are presented 
after training, the percentage o f irregular stimuli needed to cause cessation of 
reduction and whether providing feedback is essential for the change to be noticed. 
This could link to metacognitive skills of performance evaluation and strategy 
selection.
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Other paradigms which could be employed in Information Reduction studies 
would be to change or mix modalities, or to require the participants to perform two 
simultaneous tasks. It is known that automaticity reduces dual-task interference 
(Logan & Etherton, 1994), so adding in an additional task after Information 
Reduction has become established may help elucidate if it does involve some 
automatic processes. As well as more studies using eye-tracking, methodologies like 
E E G  could be utilised. Haider and colleagues (Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 
2005) suggest that there is a step-change in RTs when Information Reduction is 
implemented, as a result of conscious awareness o f the regularity. One might 
therefore expect to see changes in ERPs — either their magnitude or location or both 
— at the point o f adoption. This could resolve the issue o f whether there is an abrupt 
change in processing as has been proposed or whether it is less consistent, as the 
results reported here would seem to suggest.
One other important area to be investigated is why some participants are 
deliberate non-users. Whilst it can be speculated that this is related to experimenter 
or demand effects, there is little evidence to support these ideas. Qualitative methods 
such as post-testing interviews may be more suitable for giving insight into the 
reasons that someone decides not to use Information Reduction.
10.8 C o n c l u s io n
The results presented here point towards a variety of usage and awareness of 
Information Reduction. One of the aims o f this study was to investigate whether 
characteristics o f the task, characteristics o f the training conditions, characteristics o f 
the participants or a combination of all three were involved in whether or not an 
individual adopted the Information Reduction strategy. It can be concluded that the 
first two aspects, characteristics o f the task and the training conditions, are definitely
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implicated. Future work could relate this to practical situations where Information 
Reduction is known or thought to occur, to ensure that it is enhanced when needed 
or suppressed when usage could be dangerous. At the moment there is little evidence 
for the characteristics of the participants having an effect, but this cannot yet be 
ruled out entirely.
The results also suggest that some people use Information Reduction (at least 
occasionally, but frequently enough to show up in the aggregate results) without 
apparently being aware of doing so. It was clear that some people’s non-usage was 
due to lack of awareness of an available strategy whereas with others it was a 
conscious decision not to exploit the noticed regularity. More exploration o f why 
people should choose not to use it is needed. There is also evidence that ‘partial 
reduction’ may be occurring, although this could encompass a range o f processing 
differences. One that was clear from some participants’ self-reports was residual 
checking and this does seem to be conscious, rather than a consequence of 
participants occasionally losing control over the reduction process, but this latter 
possibility cannot be ruled out in all cases. Partial reduction and deliberate non-usage 
mean that Information Reduction is not the all-or-nothing process hypothesised by 
Haider and Frensch.
The results are neither well explained by theories of automaticity (e.g. Instance 
theory) nor by the Information Reduction model alone. They may be better 
accommodated by a model which brings together both top-down processes and the 
automatic processes contained within Instance Theory (Logan, 1988) and Production 
rules (Anderson, 1987), or perhaps by a representational-strength model (Cleeremans 
and Jimenez, 2002). In order to develop the model it will be necessary to elucidate 
what process (es) are occurring in ‘partial reduction’, how much conscious knowledge
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individuals have and why or how it is selected from the range o f strategies available.
It would also be interesting to examine whether ‘partial reduction’ develops into ‘full 
reduction’ with increased practice, especially with the easier tasks. The role of 
attention within the process also needs further investigation. Further examination of 
these factors might also advance general knowledge and understanding o f higher 
level cognitive processes. The fact that not all participants use Information 
Reduction leads to the conclusion that it is not an inevitable consequence o f task 
structure, supporting Haider and Frensch’s theory that it is consciously applied. 
However it may be more sensitive to task and training conditions than previously 
reported and not as simple or as robust as they have suggested.
Neither the hypotheses proposed by Haider and Frensch about the mechanism 
o f Information Reduction, nor the main existing theories of automaticity, are 
sufficient to explain the strategy, and a theory o f practice learning which incorporates 
both data-driven automaticity and top-down controlled processes may provide a 
better overall explanation. Consequendy the Information Reduction hypothesis 
proposed needs to be amended in order to accommodate this study’s results.
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A p p e n d i x  1 -  P o s t -t e s t i n g  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  
M u l t ip l e -t r ip l e t  ta sk
1. Have you done this type of task before?
If  yes, what do you remember about it?
2. Did you notice anything about the letter strings you were asked to verify?
3. Did you notice anything about the errors in the strings?
4. Did you start to do the task differently as you went on?
If so, how?
[new page]
5. Did you notice that the initial letter-digit-letter repeated a number o f times, 
with different numbers o f other letters?
6. Did you notice that the errors always followed the first digit in brackets, 
except for the last set of strings?
If so, did this affect the way you carried out the task and how did it do so?
At what point did you notice this regularity?
7. Did you notice that the error was sometimes in the other letters in the final 
set of strings?
8. Did you try to remember the letter-digit-letter combinations or use any other 
memory strategy?
9. Do you have anything else you would like to add about the task?
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Shapes
1. Have you done this type of task before?
If  yes, what do you remember about it?
2. Did you notice anything about the shapes you were asked to compare?
3. Did you notice anything about the shape that was different?
4. Did you start to do the task differently as you went on?
If so, how?
[new page]
5. Did you notice that the different shape was always located middle right, 
except for the last set o f shapes?
If so, did this affect the way you carried out the task and how did it do so?
At what point did you notice this regularity?
6. Did you notice that the different shape was sometimes located elsewhere in 
the final set o f shapes?
7. D o you have anything else you would like to add about the task?
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T a r g e t  Se a r c h  ta sk
1. Have you done this type of task before?
If yes, what do you remember about it?
2. Did you notice anything about the letter strings you were asked to check?
3. Did you notice anything about the letter you were searching for?
4. Did you start to do the task differently as you went on?
If so, how?
[new page]
5. Did you notice that the first three letters repeated a number o f times, with 
different numbers o f other letters?
6. Did you notice that the letter you were searching for was always second from 
left, except for the last set of strings?
If so, did this affect the way you carried out the task and how did it do so?
At what point did you notice this regularity?
7. Did you notice that the letter was sometimes in a different position in the 
final set o f strings?
8. D o you have anything else you would like to add about the task?
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A p p e n d i x  2  -  D i c k m a n  I m p u l s i v i t y  Sc a l e  
F u n c t io n a l  Im p u l s iv it y
I don't like to make decisions quickly, even simple decisions, such as choosing what 
to wear, or what to have for dinner.
I am good at taking advantage o f unexpected opportunities, where you have to do 
something immediately or lose your chance.
Most of the time, I can put my thoughts into words very rapidly.
I am uncomfortable when I have to make up my mind rapidly.
I like to take part in really fast-paced conversations, where you don't have much time 
to think before you speak.
I don't like to do things quickly, even when I am doing something that is not very 
difficult.
I would enjoy working at a job that required me to make a lot o f split-second 
decisions.
I like sports and games in which you have to choose your next move very quickly.
I have often missed out on opportunities because I couldn't make up my mind fast 
enough.
People have admired me because I can think quickly.
I try to avoid activities where you have to act without much time to think first.
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D y s f u n c t io n a l  Im p u l siv it y
I will often say whatever comes into my head without thinking first.
I enjoy working out problems slowly and carefully.
I frequendy make appointments without thinking about whether I will be able to 
keep them.
I frequendy buy things without thinking about whether or not I can really afford 
them.
I often make up my mind without taking the time to consider the situation from all 
angles.
Often, I don't spend enough time thinking over a situation before I act.
I often get into trouble because I don't think before I act.
Many times the plans I make don't work out because I haven't gone over them 
carefully enough in advance.
I rarely get involved in projects without first considering the potential problems. 
Before making any important decision, I carefully weigh the pros and cons.
I am good at careful reasoning.
I often say and do things without considering the consequences.
Dickman, 1990
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A p p e n d i x  3 -  C o g n i t i v e  F a il u r e s  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e
The following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes from time 
to time, but some o f which happen more often than others. Please indicate how 
often these things have happened to you in the last six months.
Do you read something and find you haven't been thinking about it and must read it 
again?
D o you find you forget why you went from one part o f the house to another?
D o you fail to notice signposts on the road?
D o you find you confuse right and left when giving directions?
Do you bump into people?
Do you find you forget whether you've turned off a light or a fire or locked the 
door?
Do you fail to listen to people's names when you meet them?
D o you say something and realise afterwards that it might be taken as insulting?
D o you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are doing something else?
Do you lose your temper and regret it?
Do you leave important letters unanswered for days?
Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road you know well but rarely use? 
Do you fail to see what you want in a supermarket, although it's there?
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D o you find yourself suddenly wondering whether you've used a word correcdy? 
D o you have trouble making up your mind?
D o you find you forget appointments?
D o you forget where you put something like a newspaper or a book?
D o you find you accidentally throw away the thing you want to keep and keep what 
you meant to throw away?
D o you daydream when you ought to be listening to something?
D o you find that you forget people's names?
Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted into doing something else 
(unintentionally) ?
Do you find you can't quite remember something although it's 'on the tip of your 
tongue'?
Do you forget what you came to the shops to buy?
D o you drop things?
D o you find you can't think o f anything to say?
Answers to each question are given as one out of:
Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Quite often, Very often 
Broadbent et al., 1982
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A p p e n d i x  4 -  Sq u i r e s  Su b j e c t iv e  M e m o r y  
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e
I. My ability to search through my mind and recall names or memories I know are 
there is
2 .1 think my relatives and acquaintances now judge my memory to be
3. My ability to recall things when I really try is
4. My ability to hold in my memory things I have learned is
5. If  I were asked about it a month from now, my ability to remember facts about 
this form I am filling out would be
6. My ability to make a past memory that is 'on the tip of my tongue' available is
7. My ability to recall things that happened a long time ago is
8. My ability to remember the names and faces o f people I meet is
9. My ability to remember what I was doing after I have taken my mind off it for a 
few minutes is
10. My ability to remember things that have happened more than a year ago is
I I . My ability now to remember what I read and what I watch on television is
12. My ability to recall things that happened during my childhood is
13. My ability to know when the things I am paying attention to are going to stick in 
my memory is
14. My ability to make sense out o f what people explain to me is
15. My ability to reach back in my memory and recall what happened a few minutes 
ago is
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16. My ability to pay attention to what goes on around me is
17. My general alertness to things happening around me is
18. My ability to follow what people are saying is
Each item is rated on a nine-point scale from Disastrous (-4) through zero to Perfect 
(+4)
Squire et al., 1979; van Bergen et al., 2010
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A p p e n d i x  5 -  C o g n i t i v e  M i s e r
Below are 10 problems that vary in difficulty. Try to answer as many as you 
can.
1) A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost?
______ pence
2) If  it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?
_______ minutes
3) In a lake, there is a patch o f lilypads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If  it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the lake?
______ days
4) Mary’s mother had four children. The youngest three are named: Spring, Summer, 
and Autumn. What is the oldest child’s name?
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5) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of 
water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water 
together?
_______ days
6) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How 
many students are in the class?
_______ students
7) Just after being picked, a 90 lb watermelon was 90% water. But after being left in 
the sun for a week, only 80% of its weight is water. How much does it weigh 
then?
________pounds
8) If you flipped a fair coin 3 times, what is the probability that it would land 
“Heads” at least once?
_______ percent
9) A bear loses 20% of its weight during hibernation. If it weighs 100 kg after 
hibernation, how many kg did it weigh before?
_______ pounds
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10) If  you have a pocketful o f current U.K. coins, what is the most they could be 
worth if you cannot make exact change for a pound? (That is, if no combination 
adds to exactly £1.00).
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A p p e n d i x  6 -  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P e r s o n a l i t y  It e m  
P o o l
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviours. Please use 
the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. 
Describe yourself as you honesdy see yourself, in relation to other people you know 
of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe 
yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. 
Please read each statement carefully, and then fill in the bubble that corresponds to 
the number on the scale.
N e u r o t ic is m
Positively keyed Negatively keyed
Often feel blue. Rarely get irritated.
Dislike myself. Seldom feel blue.
Am often down in the dumps. Feel comfortable with myself.
Have frequent mood swings. Am not easily bothered by things.
Panic easily. Am very pleased with myself.
E x t r a v e r s io n
Positively keyed
Feel comfortable around people.
Make friends easily.
Am skilled in handling social 
situations.
Am the life of the party.
Know how to captivate people.
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Negatively keyed
Have little to say.
Keep in the background.
Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. 
D on't like to draw attention to myself.
D on't talk a lot.
O p e n n e s s  t o  E x p e r ie n c e
Positively keyed
Believe in the importance of art.
Have a vivid imagination.
Tend to vote for liberal political candidates.
Carry the conversation to a higher level.
Enjoy hearing new ideas.
Negatively keyed
Am not interested in abstract ideas.
D o not like art.
Avoid philosophical discussions.
D o not enjoy going to art museums.
Tend to vote for conservative political 
candidates.
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A g r e e a b l e n e s s
Positively keyed
Have a good word for everyone.
Believe that others have good intentions. 
Respect others.
Accept people as they are.
Make people feel at ease.
Negatively keyed
Have a sharp tongue.
Cut others to pieces.
Suspect hidden motives in others.
Get back at others.
Insult people.
Co n s c ie n t io u s n e s s
Positively keyed
Am always prepared.
Pay attention to details.
Get chores done right away.
Carry out my plans.
Make plans and stick to them.
Negatively keyed 
Waste my time.
Find it difficult to get down to work. 
Do just enough work to get by.
D on't see things through.
Shirk my duties.
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R e s p o n s e  O p t io n s
Very Inaccurate 
Moderately Inaccurate 
Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate 
Moderately Accurate 
Very Accurate
For + keyed items, the response "Very Inaccurate" is assigned a value o f 1, 
"Moderately Inaccurate" a value o f 2, "Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate" a 3, 
"Moderately Accurate" a 4, and "Very Accurate" a value of 5.
For - keyed items, the response "Very Inaccurate" is assigned a value o f 5, "Moderately 
Inaccurate" a value o f 4, "Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate" a 3, "Moderately 
Accurate" a 2, and "Very Accurate" a value o f 1.
Once numbers are assigned for all o f the items in the scale, just sum all the values to 
obtain a total scale score.
http://ipip.ori.org/
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A p p e n d i x  7 -  C o m p a r i s o n  o f  l a b o r a t o r y  a n d
O N L IN E  T E ST IN G  
T-tests to compare data collected under laboratory conditions with that
collected remotely
Experiment 1: shapes task
Data was collected from 8 participants under laboratory conditions and from 14 
participants remotely.
Overall mean RTs for the first training block (lab group mean 1.8s, SD 0.41; remote 
group mean 1.7s, SD 0.17) were not significantly different from each other, t(20) = 
0.29, p = 0.776 (two-tailed). Similarly mean RTs for the final training block (lab 
group mean 1.19s, SD 0.17; remote group mean 1.06s, SD 0.25) were not 
significantly different from each other, t(20) = -1.31, p = 0.204.
The regression coefficient for the slopes for the first training block (lab group mean 
151.7, SD 90; remote group mean 168.1, SD 102) were not significantly different 
from each other, t(20) = 0.38, p = 0.71. Similarly the regression coefficient for the 
slopes for the final training block (lab group mean 96, SD 56.1; remote group mean 
59.8, SD 59.4) were not significantly different from each other, t(20) = -1.4, p = 
0.176.
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A p p e n d i x  8 -  T e s t i n g  f o r  a g e  e f f e c t s
In order to test for any age effects in Experiments 1-3, it was decided to classify 
participants from their data rather than their self-reports. Those with < 20% errors 
to irregular stimuli and mean final two training block regression slopes o f > 200 were 
designated as non-reducers, whilst those with > 80% errors to irregular stimuli and 
mean slopes o f < 200 were reducers. All those in-between were ‘indeterminate’. 
There were no reducers in the shapes task by these criteria.
Due to the small number o f participants, younger participants were taken as those < 
35 and older participants were those 45 and above. Table A8.1 gives the contingency 
tables for the multiple-triplet task and the shapes task. Chi-square tests were carried 
out. For the multiple-triplet task the number o f indeterminate users gave expected 
cell counts o f < 5, so the analysis omitted this category. The results for the multiple- 
triplet task were: X2 (1, 29) = .32, p = .573, V = .105, showing no association 
between age group and reducer type. For the shapes task: x2 (1, 40) = 1.52, p = .218, 
V = .195, showing no association between age group and reducer type.
Table A8.1: contingency tables for age group and reducer type, Experiments 1-3 
a) multiple-triplet task
Reducer Indeterminate Non-reducer
Younger 8 3 7
Older
b)
6 4 8
b) shapes task
Indeterminate Non-reducer
Younger 10 7
Older 9 14
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For Experiment 4, participants were classified by whether they indicated finding a 
shortcut, and if so whether this was Information Reduction. This gave categories of 
Reducer, Other Strategy and N ot Aware (did not indicate any shortcut). Data from 
both the multiple-triplet and shapes tasks were combined, but even so 4 cells had 
expected counts of less than 5, due to a small number of participants younger than 
35 in this experiment. Consequently no analysis was carried out, as the result would 
not have been reliable. Table A8.2 is the contingency table for this experiment.
Table A8.2
Reducer Other Strategy N ot Aware
Younger 2 1 6
Older 7 6 9
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A p p e n d i x  9 - P a r t i c i p a n t  c o r r e l a t i o n s
Error rate and RT per block correlated for each participant in Experiment 3.
1. M u l t ip l e -t r ip l e t  ta sk
Participant correlation p value Strategy used
1 -0.784 0.021* Speed-accuracy trade-off
2 -0.558 0.15 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
3 -0.307 0.46
4 -0.613 0.106
5 -0.027 0.949
6 0.447 0.266 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
7 0.157 0.711
8 -0.301 0.468
9 -0.281 0.5 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
10 -0.209 0.619
11 0.461 0.25 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
12 -0.544 0.163 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
13 -0.182 0.666
14 -0.428 0.29
15 0.262 0.53
16 0.712 0.047*
17 0.911 0.002*
Information Reduction (and on 
questionnaire)
18 -0.122 0.773
19 -0.354 0.39
20 0.061 0.886
21 -0.246 0.557
22 0.356 0.387 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
* indicates a significant correlation
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2. Shapes task
Participant r p value Strategy used
1 -.417 .411
2 .224 .670 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
3 .537 .272
4 .929 .007* Information Reduction (and on questionnaire)
5 .768 .075
6 .439 .384 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
7 -.3 .564 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
8 .836 .038* Information Reduction (and on questionnaire)
9 .008 .987
10 .774 .071 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
11 .580 .227
12 .439 .384
13 .218 .678
14 .829 .041* Information Reduction (and on questionnaire)
15 .795 .059
16 -.148 .780
17 .719 .107
18 .336 .515
19 .740 .093 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
20 -.234 .656 Information Reduction (from questionnaire)
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